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Abstract 
Recent research has discussed the possible role of idiosyncratic risk in explaining 
equity returns. Simultaneously, but somehow independently, numerous other studies 
have documented the failure of the static and conditional capital asset pricing models 
to explain momentum profits and the value premium The first and second parts of 
this study assess whether the widely documented momentum profits and post-1963 
value premium can be attributed to time-varying idiosyncratic risk as described by a 
GJR-GARCH(l, I)-M model. 
In accordance with existing studies, we find that the static CAPM has no explanatory 
power for momentum profits and the value premium, and that firm size has only a 
limited role to play. The results show that momentum profits are a compensation for 
time-varying idiosyncratic risk. In addition, negative return shocks increase the 
volatility of losers, more than they increase that of winners, and the volatility of the 
losers responds to news more slowly, but eventually to a greater extent, than that of 
the winners. 
The post-1963 value premium can be fully captured by the conditional variance 
specification incorporating time-varying idiosyncratic risk as well. The value 
premium is a compensation for exposure to time-varying risk. This conclusion is 
robust to different characteristics of value and growth stocks and to the countries 
under review (US and UK). 
The third part of this study analyses the impact of trading costs on the profitability of 
momentum strategies in the UK. It finds that losers are more expensive to trade than 
winners due to the high selling cost of loser stocks that can be characterized as small 
size and low trading volume stocks. It proposes a new low-cost momentum strategy 
by selecting winner and loser stocks with the lowest total transaction costs. While the 
study severely questions the profitability of standard momentum strategies, it shows 
that there is still room for momentum-based return enhancement, should asset 
managers decide to adopt low-cost momentum strategies. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which states that security prices full,,, - reflect W 
all available information (Fama, 1970), has been the central proposition of finance 
for over thirty years. The hypothesis implies that security prices are correctly set bý- 
rational agents and incorporate their true value. Therefore, no investment strategy 
can earn excess risk-adjusted returns in an efficient market. The problem is how to 
measure the risk for a particular investment strategy. It requires a model to capture 
the fair relationship between risk and return. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) is 
built on the early work of Markowitz (1952) on diversification and modem portfolio 
theory. It is used to determine a theoretically appropriate rate of return as 
compensation to investors for taking on additional risk. The central principle of the 
CAPM is that only systematic risk, as measured by beta, should be incorporated into 
asset prices for a completely diversified investor. In addition, expected asset returns 
are positively related to market beta. 
The EMH and the CAPM are internally consistent and connected in the sense that the 
latter provides an approach for testing the former. A large number of early studies 
show the success of either or both the EMH and the CAPM. However, after the late 
1970s, researchers report a series of "anomalies" that are difficult to explain by the 
EMH and the CAPM, such as the size effect, the overreaction effect, the momentum 
effect and the value premium. Of these, the momentum effect and the value premium 
are regarded as the most important 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) first document the momentum effect that stocks with 
the best (winner stocks) or the worst (loser stocks) past performance over the 3 to 12 
months tend to continue to perform well or poorly respectively over the following 3 1 
to 12 month holding periods. They also find that winner stocks appear to be no more 
risky than loser stocks. 
Evidence for the value premium has been reported by a number of US studies. such 
as Basu (1977), Fama and French (1992,1993,1995 and 1996) and Lakonishok. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994). They find that stocks with high ratios of book-to-market 
equity (B/M), cash flow to price (C/P) or eamings to price (E/P) (value stocks) eam 
higher average returns than stocks with low ratios of B/M, C/P and E/P (growth 
stocks). 
Momentum and value strategies involve buying winner and value stocks and short 
selling loser and growth stocks. These strategies have received considerable attention 
because financial economists fail to reach an agreement on the reasons behind the 
profitability of these strategies. Two explanations have been put forward. One 
explanation concems the financial implication of the psychological investment 
decision process for irrational traders. Behavioural economists attribute momentum 
profits and the value premium to systematic mistakes that investors make in the way 
they process information. For example, investors may overvalue stocks with a long 
record of good news and undervalue stocks with a long record of bad news due to the 
representativeness heuristic bias; and they may underreact to the latest eamings news. 
due to the conservatism bias (see, for example, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998, 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyarn, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999; Haugen, 1995. 
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Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994 and La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). 
The second explanation is based on the EMH. Rational economists relate the profits 
of momentum and value strategies to their increased risk and/or trading costs. Fama 
and French (1993,1995 and 1996) and Chen and Zhang (1998) argue that the 
superior returns on value stocks are compensation for common variation in the 
returns on distressed stocks. Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) point out that finn 
size and the price level are associated with trading costs, which have been 
underestimated by previous momentum studies. They conclude that after taking 
account of trading costs, momentum profit opportunities disappear. 
1.1. Motivation 
The academic work on momentum and value strategies has a strong impact on 
professional investment management. Momentum, value and growth are now the 
major investment styles for fund managers. These investment styles are the important 
drivers of risk and return and allow fund managers to organize and simplify their 
portfolio allocation decisions, as well as evaluate their performance against specified 
style benchmarks. Issues on how to identify momentum, value and growth styles and 
to design the style-specific benchmark indices for performance evaluation have 
pushed ongoing analysis in the academic literature. 
Despite the large amount of attention that momentum and value strategies have 
attracted from both finance researchers and fund mangers, momentum profits and the 
value premium still remain puzzles. The purpose of this study is to examine the 
profitability of momentum and value strategies. It is particularly interested in the 
3 
potential explanatory power of time-varying idiosyncratic risk and trading costs for 
four reasons. First, systematic risk cannot explain momentum profits and the value 
premium, since these profits are hard to rationalize using the CAPM. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) use the CAPM to ad ust momentum strategies for risk. They find that i 
both winners and losers have about the same betas. Therefore, the cross-sectional 
differences in expected returns under the CAPM cannot explain momentum profits. 
Fama and French (1996) show that their three-factor model fails to capture the 
returns of momentum strategies. Two recent studies by Fama and French (2006) and 
Ang and Chen (2007) report that the CAPM is able to explain the US value premium 
of 1926-1963, but cannot explain it for the post- 1963 period. 
Second, the debates surrounding the use of time-varying market beta as modeled by 
the conditional CAPM to explain the profits of momentum and value strategies are 
still ongoing. Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Lettau and Ludvigson (200 1), Wang 
(2003), Ang and Chen (2007) and Adrian and Franzoni (2005) argue that one of the 
major problems of the traditional CAPM is that it is originally derived from a static 
framework. They find that the conditional CAPM, with time-varying betas, performs 
well in explaining cross-sectional expected returns. By contrast, Lewellen and Nagel 
(2006), Fama and French (2006) and Petkova and Zhang (2005) report that even 
allowing betas to vary over time, the conditional CAPM still fails to capture 
momentum profits and the post- 1963 value premium. 
Third, an increasing literature concerns the relationship between idiosyncratic risk 
and stock returns. The traditional CAPM implies that all idiosyncratic risk 
(unsystematic risk) can be diversified away when investors hold a market portfolio. 
However, Levy (1978), Merton (1987) and Malkiel and Xu (2001) introduce the 
4 
extensions of the CAPM and find that idiosyncratic risk can also be priced if 
investors do not hold the market portfolio. The winner, loser, value and growth 
portfolios are sorted by past performance and book-to-market equity of stocks. These 
portfolios may not be perfectly diversified in terms of market portfolio although they 
consist of large numbers of stocks. For example, Chen and Zhang (1998) report that 
value portfolios tend to pick up firms which experience high likelihoods of financial 
distress with high earnings uncertainty. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
show that growth portfolios concentrate on firms which experience strong growth 
with high earnings. Therefore, firm-level idiosyncratic risk, driven by the specific 
characteristics of these stocks, may be a potentially important factor in explaining the 
profits of momentum and value strategies. 
Fourth, trading costs play an important role in assessing investment perfon-nance. But 
existing studies cannot agree on the estimated trading costs for momentum strategies. 
Most of the previous studies, such as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Rouwenhorst 
(1998) and Liu, Strong and Xu (1999), suggest that transaction costs are sufficiently 
small to allow large profit opportunities for momentum investors. However, 
Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) argue that the majority of momentum profits are 
produced by loser stocks, which can be characterized by small size, illiquidity and 
low price with high trading cost stocks. After taking account of trading costs, the 
greater momentum profit opportunities do not exist. 
1.2. Contributions 
The contributions of this study to the literature can be further specified as follows. 
First, this study examines whether momentum profits and the post- 1963 value 
5 
premium can be explained by time-varying idiosyncratic risk. It is distinguished from 
existing studies in the way that it assumes that the variance of stock returns follo,,, N-s a 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) process (see Engle. 
1982 and Bollerslev, 1986). It is the first to employ a GARCH frameNvork to 
formulate a set of conditional models to examine momentum profits and the value 
premium. These models can capture the impact of new information on the 
conditional variance through the most recent squared error. Additionally, they allow 
expected stock returns, the variances and the covariance of stock returns to vary over 
time. They estimate the CAPM and GARCH-in-mean (GARCH-M) model 
simultaneously and enable us to solve the problem of conditional heteroskedasticity 
in previous studies that arises when using the static and conditional versions of the 
CAPM. 
Second, this study adds the conditional standard deviation or variance of asset returns 
to the mean equation. This is able to capture the time-varying relationship between 
total risk and return. It also uses the GJR (stands for Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle, 
1993) variant to the standard GARCH model in order to allow good news (measured 
by positive return shocks) and bad news (measured by negative return shocks) to 
have an asymmetric impact on the volatility of the winner, loser, value and growth 
portfolios. 
Third, this study estimates the magnitude of trading costs for 9 momentum strategies 
with different ranking and holding periods in the UK. It also further examines the 
asymmetric trading costs of the winners and losers and breaks down each round-trip 
6 
trade into buyer-initiated or seller- initiated trades' for the winners and losers. This 
approach enables us to explore the reasons behind the relatively high trading costs of 
the losers. 
Fourth, this study proposes a new type of momentum strategy. It is defined as a 
low-cost momentum strategy. This strategy ranks all winner and loser stocks based 
on their total trading costs at the end of ranking periods, then, buys L% (L = 10,20, 
50,80 and 90) of winner stocks and sells L% of loser stocks with the lowest total 
trading costs, and holds the long-short portfolio over the next K months (K = 3,6 and 
12 months). These strategies show the existence of significant and positive net 
momentum profit opportunities if asset managers adopt low-cost momentum 
strategies. 
The remainder of this study is outlined as follows. Chapter 2 attempts to review a 
large amount of related literature on momentum and value strategies. It begins by 
providing a brief summary of the theoretical and the empirical foundations of both 
the EMH and the CAPM, and then highlights some of the challenges that have been 
reported concerning these foundations. It surveys the evidence on the momentum 
effect and the value premium in the US and international markets. In addition, it 
explores the different types of the momentum effect and provides an overview of the 
various explanations for the returns on momentum and value strategies. Next, it 
updates recent literature on the conditional CAPM and time-varying idiosyncratic 
risk in explaining the cross-section of expected returns and the returns on momentum 
'A number of US studies report that stock prices respond differentlY between buyer- and 
seller- initiated trades (see Kraus and Stoll, 1972; Holthausen, Leftwich and 'Mayers, 1987; Chan and 
Lakonoshok, 1993 and Keim and Madhavan, 1996). 
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and value strategies. Finally, it briefly reviews the components, estimation methods 
and determinants of trading costs. 
Chapter 3 examines the relationship between time-varýling idiosyncratic risk and 
momentum profits. It first runs time-series tests of the static CAPM and Fama and 
French three factor model (FFM) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. In 
accordance with previous research (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; 
Fama and French, 1996 and Karolyi and Kho, 2004), the results indicate that 
traditional versions of the CAPM and the FFM fail to explain momentum profits. It 
then tests the hypothesis that momentum profits are a compensation for time-varying 
idiosyncratic risk, as modeled by the conditional models with a GJR-GARCH_M2 
specification. After ignoring the transaction costs and illiquidity issues, the results 
are in support of the hypothesis. Finally, it explores momentum profits through the 
GJR-GARCH(l, 1) and the GARCH(l, l)-M specifications, and the results reveal 
neither of them could capture the abnormal performance of momentum strategies. 
Chapter 4 follows a similar methodology as applied in Chapter 3 and analyzes the 
US post- 1963 value premium. The results show that the market beta has strong 
explanatory power for the value and growth portfolio returns, but it cannot explain 
the post-1963 value premium. However, the value premium can be fully captured by 
a GARCH-M specification and the premium is a compensation for time-varying 
idiosyncratic risk. This chapter also examines the value premium based on different 
definitions of value and growth stocks, such as B/M, C/P and E/P ratios, and UK 
stocks. The results from robustness tests totally support the US findings. In order to 
GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M stands for Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle (1993), Generalized Autoregresslý'e 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity of order 1,1 with a Mean term that models the conditional risk premium. 
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investigate whether the size effect could explain the value premium, this chapter adds 
a size factor to the model. The results show that the size effect can explain part of the 
value premium when it is defined using B/M, but it does not account for the value 
premium defined by C/P and E/P. 
Chapter 5 investigates the impact of trading costs on momentum strategies. It begins 
by examining the characteristics of the winners and losers. In line with the findings 
of Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) for the US, it shows that the loser portfolio in 
the UK also consists mainly of stocks with low capitalization, low price and low 
trading volume, compared to the winner portfolio. As a result, the average round-trip 
quoted spreads for the losers are much higher than those for the winners. This 
chapter further analyzes the reasons behind the relatively high trading costs of losers. 
The results reveal that the losers with low capitalization and low trading volume are 
particularly expensive to sell. Finally, it proposes low-cost momentum strategies and 
finds that a shortlist comprising the 10% and 20% of winner and loser stocks with the 
lowest effective spreads based on actual turnover can generate positive and 
significant net average annual returns of 19.10% and 15.53%, respectively. After 
taking account of market risk and Fama and French three risk factors, low-cost 
momentum strategies with L= 10% and L= 20% still can generate positive and 
significant net abnormal returns at the 5% level based on both full and actual 
tumover. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the whole study and suggests directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1. Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) has been one of the dominant themes in the 
academic literature for over thirty years. Fama (1970) defines an efficient capital 
market as one in which security prices fully reflect all available information. This 
hypothesis relies on three assumptions. First, investors are rational and hence value 
securities rationally. Second, even if some investors are irrational, their trades are 
random and the effects of their actions cancel each other out without affecting the 
price o securities. Third, if the ma ority of investors are irrational in similar ways, i 
rational arbitrageurs will counter this and eliminate the influence on prices (Shleifer, 
2000). 
According to the type of information which is reflected in prices, Fama (1970) also 
defines three different levels of efficiency. Weak-form efficiency states that share 
prices fully reflect all information contained in past price movements. It indicates 
that future returns cannot be predicted using past data. Semi-strongform efficiency 
suggests that share prices fully reflect all the relevant publicly available information. 
It implies that investors cannot earn superior risk-adjusted returns using this 
information. Strong-form efficiency states that all relevant information, including 
public and private, is reflected in the share price. Therefore, even insider information 
is unable to yield abnormal profits. 
Under the EMH, rational investors value each security using the discounted sum of 
expected future cash flows, where the discount rate is consistent with a common 
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acceptable preference specification. When new information is announced about a 
firm, investors quickly and rationally respond to this information. As a result, share 
prices incorporate the news almost immediately and correctly. Therefore, it is 
impossible to earn superior risk-adjusted returns through investment strategies. The 
ways for investors to beat the market are to take a higher risk or to be lucky. The 
problem is that measuring the risk of a particular investment strategy is difficult and 
controversial, and requires a model of the fair relationship between risk and return. 
The next section reviews the risk and one of the most widely used models for 
assessing the risk of investment strategies. 
2.2. Risk and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
2.2.1. Risk 
Risk plays an important role in making investment decisions. In finance, it is often 
defined as the variability or volatility of returns, measured by the standard deviation 
or variance. Most investors are risk-averse, preferring less risk to more risk for a 
given return Therefore, the identification, measurement and the possibility of 
reduction of risk should be a central feature in the decision-making process. 
Markowitz (1952) first develops a portfolio theory that allows investors using 
diversification to reduce risk by spreading investments across a range of assets, 
which are not perfectly correlated. As a result, investors are able to optimize their 
portfolios with the highest return for a particular level of risk. After the work of 
Markowitz (1952), the measurement of risk does not only rely on standard deviation, 
since one type of risk factor will be eliminated when a large portfolio is formed. The 
other type of non-diversified risk is often measured by the CAPM. 
2.2.2. The CAPM 
Based on diversification and modem portfolio theory, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965) first introduce the CAPM to determine an appropriate required rate of return 
for taking on additional risk. It breaks down total risk into two components: 
systematic risk and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is also known as 
non-diversiflable, non-specific or market risk. It refers to the common risk to all 
securities, including macroeconomic movements such as economic growth, inflation 
and exchange rate changes. Systematic risk cannot be avoided by diversification. 
Unsystematic risk is also known as diversifiable, specific or idiosyncratic risk. It 
aftects a very specific group of securities or an individual security. Unsystematic risk 
can be reduced by holding a large number of different securities. 
According to the CAPM, systematic risk, as measured by beta (determined by the 
covariance between the expected return on an asset with the return on market 
portfolio), is the only factor required to explain the expected return on an asset for a 
completely diversified investor and the relationship between expected asset return 
and market beta is linear. The CAPM relies on a number of assumptions about the 
behaviour of investors and the operation of capital markets. These assumptions have 
been progressively criticized as being unrealistic in the real world. Here are some of 
them: 
1. The CAPM assumes that asset returns are normally distributed random variables 
and that the variances of the error terms are constant through time. However, a 
number of studies, such as French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987), Schwert and 
Seguin (1990) and Mandelbrot (1963), have documented that the variances of the 
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error terms change over time and exhibit volatility clustering. where high (low) 
volatility tends to be followed by high (low) volatility. 
2. The CAPM assumes that market beta is an adequate measure for expected asset 
returns and that market beta is constant over time. It is, however, frequently 
observed that betas tend to change from one period to another and play a weak 
role in explaining the cross-section of average returns (see, for example, Blume. 
1971; Levy, 1971; Fama and French, 1992 and1993). Apart from the market risk, 
a firm's size, the ratios of B/M, C/P and E/P, dividend yield, leverage and the 
past performance of stocks have also been identified and have explanatory power 
in expected asset returns (see, for example, Banz, 1981; Reinganum, 1981,1983; 
Basu, 1977,1983; Bhandari, 1988; Keim, 1990; Litzenberger and Ramaswarny, 
1979; De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Fama and French, 1992,1993; Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993 and 2001),. 
3. The CAPM assumes that all investors have access to the same information and 
agree about the risk and expected return of all assets for any given time period. 
However, in the real world, investors may hold private information and update 
their expectations each period according to new information. This leads to 
conditional expectations, which are stochastic rather than constant. 
4. The CAPM assumes that there are no taxes or transaction costs. In the real world, 
transaction cost is one of the important elements in markets for trading and it has 
a non-negligible impact on stock returns. 
The central CAPM theory of the positive relationship between expected asset returns 
and market risk is consistent Nvith the EMH. This allows researchers to test the 
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validation of both the EMH and the CAPM. A large number of earlier empirical 
studies, such as Fama (1965), Jensen (1978) and Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), 
find that neither of them can be rejected, based on the data that is available at the 
time. However, after the late 1970s, a series of findings known as "anomalies" has 
been reported to challenge the EMH and the CAPM. For example, Banz (198 1) and 
Reinganum (1981) document that the CAPM understates the cross-sectional average 
returns of NYSE and AMEX-listed firms with low market values, and it overstates 
those of firms with high market values. Basu (1977) shows that excess retums are 
positively related to the firm's E/P ratio, when using the CAPM to measure expected 
stock returns. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) report that past loser stocks significantly 
outperform past winner stocks over the following 3- to 5-year test period. The 
differences in returns of the losers over the winners are not explained by the greater 
risk of the losers under the CAPM. Their results imply weak-form market 
inefficiency since stocks returns are predictable from past returns. 
However, Farna (1991) states that empirical anomalies are always joint evidence on 
the EMH and the CAPM. These tests may suffer from the joint hypothesis problem 
since researchers cannot conclude whether such anomalies result from the 
mis-specified CAPM or market inefficiency. He believes that evidence of the size 
and book-to-market equity effects is due to the weak role of the market beta in 
explaining the cross-section of average returns; therefore, they are anomalies of the 
CAPM instead of market efficiency. 
A large number of anomalies can be grouped by size, seasonality or book-to-market 
equity and so on. In any comparison of their relative significance, momentum and 
value strategies are regarded as the most important anomalies. The next two sections 
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review evidence, types and explanations for the profitability of momentum and value 
strategies. 
2.3. Momentum Strategies 
Momentum is one of the major unresolved puzzles in the finance academic literature. 
The momentum effect is defined as evidence that stocks with high past returns tend 
to continue outperforming stocks with low past returns over of the following 3 to 12 
months. Momentum strategies exploit this effect by buying stocks with the highest 
past returns and short selling stocks with the lowest past returns. 
2.3.1. Momentum Evidence 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) were the first to report momentum evidence. Using 
data from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) returns file over the 
1965 to 1989 period, they form ten portfolios that result from equally weighting all 
stocks based on their returns over the past 3 to 12 months. The portfolio with the 
lowest return over the rank period is called the 'loser' and with the highest return is 
called the 'winner'. Then, they examine the profitability of relative strength trading 
strategies of buying the winners and selling the losers. They find these strategies 
yield significant positive returns over the next 3 to 12 months. The best momentum 
strategy that selects stocks based on their returns over the past 12 months and holds 
the portfolio for 3 month (hereafter the 12-3 strategy) generates a significant profit of 
1.3 1% per month. In order to avoid some of the bid-ask spread, price pressure and 
lead-lag effect addressed by Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990), they also 
examine the performance of these strategies by skipping a week between the 
portfolio formation period and the holding period. They find that the 12-3 strategy 
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yields a profit of 1.49% per month. They attribute momentum profits to delayed 
reaction to firm-specific information rather than a compensation for systematic risk. 
Several later studies find that momentum strategies are also profitable in markets 
around the world. Rouwenhorst (1998), Chui, Titman and Wei (200 1) and Griffin, Ji 
and Martin (2003) report that momentum profits are large in many European and 
Asian stock markets. They attribute the profitability of momentum strategies to 
macroeconomic risk instead of conventional risk factors, such as size and the market. 
Chan, Harneed and Tong (2000) test 23 national indices and find that significant 
momentum profits mainly arise from price continuations in individual stock indices 
rather than non-synchronous trading. 
Using UK data, Liu, Strong and Xu (1999) report that momentum strategies are 
profitable even after taking account of risk factors. Their results suggest that 
momentum profits are due to market underreaction to firm-specific information. Hon 
and Tonks (2003) test a large sample from the London Stock Exchange and find that 
momentum profits are positive and significant over short and medium horizons up to 
24 months. They show that momentum profits are high for the 1977 to 1996 period, 
but little evidence is found for momentum profits over the period of 1955 to 1976, 
suggesting that the momentum effect in the UK depends on the sample period. Ellis 
and Thomas (2003) show that momentum strategies earn significant and positive 
returns with an average profit of 1.4% per month for FTSE 350 stocks. 
2.3.2. Other Types of Momentum 
The momentum effect documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is also referred 
to as price momentum or individual momentum in the finance literature. After their 
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finding, a large number of studies have discovered other momentum effects 
associated with industry, earnings and style. This section reviews the evidence of 
each type of momentum effect. 
Industry momentum 
Industry momentum refers to the fact that investing in previously winning industry 
portfolios and selling previously losing industry portfolios can generate significant 
returns. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find that the industry momentum effect is 
strong and persistent even after controlling for size, book-to-market equity and 
microstructure influences; the profitability of individual momentum strategies can be 
fully captured by industry momentum and the profits are mainly driven by the long 
position. 
Grundy and Martin (2001) however argue that the results reported by Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999) are because their strategies do not skip a month between the 
formation period and the holding period. They provide evidence that individual stock 
momentum can be explained by the stock-specific component of returns and is 
different from industry momentum. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) attribute 
industry-based momentum to macroeconomic variations rather than industry- specific 
returns. They show that industry momentum and individual stock momentum are 
distinct and independent effects, with each strategy being profitable on its own. 
Earnings momentum 
Earnings momentum is based on past earnings and has been examined by Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996). They report that earnings momentum and price 
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momentum strategies yield large differences in future returns. Earnings momentum 
strategies tend to be smaller and persist for a shorter period of time than price 
momentum strategies. Using a two-way analysis, they find that both past returns and 
earning surprises contribute to some improved predictive power for future returns. 
This indicates that earnings momentum and price momentum reflect different pieces 
of information and cannot subsume each other. They also show that the profitability 
of momentum strategies is not a compensation for risk; instead, it is driven by an 
underreaction of stock prices to the information in past returns and earnings. 
Style momentum 
Investment styles are clusters of stocks with similar characteristics, such as large 
capitalization or small capitalization. Style momentum strategies involve buying a 
style portfolio with the best past returns and selling a style portfolio with the worst 
past returns. Chen and De Bondt (2004) form style portfolios based on annual 
dividend yields, market value of equity and the book-to-market ratio for large US 
m strategies generate companies in the S&P 500 index. They find that style momentu +rL 
significant profits over the following 3 to 12 months. The most successful strategy 
that selects stocks based on their past 12 month returns and holds for the following 6 
month yields a profit of 0.5% per month. They also show that style momentum 
differs from price momentum and industry momentum. 
2.3.3. Explanations for Momentum Profits 
Explanations for momentum profits have been subject to considerable debate, as the 
profits remain inexplicable from the Fama and French three-factor model (Fama and 
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French, 1996). In this section, the different views are put forward to explain the 
profitability of momentum strategies. 
Behavioural models 
Several studies develop behavioural models to take account of the investment 
behaviour of investors and the momentum effect. De Long, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldmann (1990) propose a model of positive feedback trading where investors buy 
stocks with prices rising and sell stocks with prices falling. The most common form 
of positive feedback trading is extrapolative expectations where investors assume 
that future stock prices will follow past prices. This judgment bias may result in 
momentum profits. 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) build a model motivated by two important 
psychological biases: conservatism and the representativeness heuristic. 
Conservatism bias leads investors to change their beliefs insufficiently when news 
arrives and underweight the new information. As a result, investors tend to 
underreact to firm-specific news, producing a momentum effect. The 
representativeness heuristic bias leads investors to misestimate future growth of 
companies since they use past history as the representativeness of an underlying 
earnings growth potential. As a result, investors tend to overvalue stocks with a 
record of good news and undervalue stocks with a record of bad news. 
A model to reconcile long-term reversal and short-run momentum is constructed by 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Their model is based on two 
psychological biases: overconfidence and biased self-attribution. Overconfidence 
leads investors to overestimate their ability to assess information and underestimate 
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their forecast error. As a result, investors overweight private signals, resulting in 
overreaction and underweight the public signal causing underreaction. If an investor 
trades on private information, self-attribution bias leads his confidence to increase 
when public information confirms his belief Therefore, increasing overconfidence 
further accelerates the initial overreaction to the past private signal and continuing 
correction causes prices changes to be positively correlated to public signal. This 
suggests that momentum arises because public news pushes a continuing 
underrreaction to the public signal and causes market mis-pricing. However. 
momentum is eventually reversed as further public information slowly drags the 
price back towards its true value. 
Another behavioural model, developed by Hong and Stein (1999), is based on two 
different trading groups: news watchers and momentum traders. They assume that 
private information diffuses gradually across the news watchers who trade on private 
signals about future fundamentals rather than past prices. As a result, prices adjust 
slowly to new information and generate momentum profits. By trading based on past 
price movements, momentum traders explore momentum profits by pushing up 
short-run prices of past winners. Eventually, prices will overshoot their fundamentals 
in the long-run, when more and more momentum traders enter the market to earn 
profits. 
Behavioural models suggest that any large momentum effect should be followed by a 
large price reversal. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) provide evidence that industry 
momentum is the strongest at the I 
-month horizon; then, tends to disperse after 12 
months and eventually reverses over long-term holding periods. Similar evidence has 
also been reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Bhojraj and Swaminathan 
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(2006). Their findings appear to support the key prediction of the behavioural models. 
However, Fama. (1998) criticizes that the behavioural models suffer from a -bad 
model problem", as they perform well on the anomalies that they are designed to 
explain, but fail to predict long-term return reversal. He attributes short-tenn return 
continuation and long-term return reversal to chance. 
Compensations for risk 
Rational expectations proponents show that the profitability of momentum strategies 
is a compensation for risk. The following section reviews different types of risk that 
have been addressed by momentum studies, which include cross-sectional variation 
in mean returns, business cycle risk, time-varying risk, liquidity risk, skewness risk 
and stochastic growth rates. 
Cross-sectional variation in mean returns 
A number of studies have examined the argument that momentum profits can be 
explained by cross-sectional differences in mean returns. Following the methodology 
of Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Conrad and Kaul (1998) evaluate 
two possible sources of profit from long-term contrarian and short-term momentum 
strategies: time-series predictability in asset returns and cross-sectional variation in 
mean returns of securities. They find that rather than the time-series patterns in stock 
returns, the cross-sectional dispersion in mean returns plays an important role in 
determining the profitability of momentum strategies because stocks with high (low) 
realized returns tend to be stocks with high (low) expected returns. 
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Under the Conrad and Kaul's hypothesis, momentum profits should be persistent in 
the future period. By contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) provide evidence that 
the positive momentum profits are not permanent; instead. they only exist over the 
following 12 months (except for the first month) and become negative from 13 to 60 
months following portfolio formation. The losers are more sensitive to the size and 
book-to-market equity factors than the winners, suggesting that momentum profits 
cannot be captured by the cross-sectional differences in expected returns under the 
FFM. However, they can be partially explained by the behavioural models. Similar 
findings have been reported by Grundy and Martin (2001). They confirm that the 
profitability of momentum strategies is neither fully explained by the cross-sectional 
variations in expected returns nor as a compensation for dynamic exposure to the 
FFM. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) also provide evidence that industry 
momentum profits have the same magnitude as individual stock momentum profits, 
indicating that the cross-sectional dispersion in unconditional mean returns does not 
drive momentum profits. 
Time-varying risk 
Chordia and Shivakurnar (2002), Wu (2002), Wang (2003) and Karolyi and Kho 
(2004) find that the models which add conditioning information into the traditional 
CAPM or FFM perform well in explaining momentum profits. Therefore, 
time-varying risk and time-varying expected return may contribute to momentum 
profits. By contrast, Grundy and Martin (2001), Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003) and 
Lewellen and Nagel (2006) argue that time-varying risks are not large enough to 
account for the momentum returns. 
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Business cycle risk 
Business cycle risk is another potential explanation for momentum profits. Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2002) report that a set of macroeconomic variables which are 
related to the business cycle can explain momentum profits. Using a one-step-ahead 
forecasting model to predict the returns associated with macroeconomic variables, 
they find that momentum profits are positive only during expansions and are 
negative during recessions. However, Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003) attribute 
momentum profits to country specific risk. They show that both macroeconomic 
factors documented by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and a conditional forecasting 
model of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) fail to capture momentum profits across 40 
countries. 
Liquidity risk 
Liquidity risk has also been documented as a potential factor to explain momentum 
returns. Sadka (2006) tests a large cross-section of NYSE-listed firms and finds that 
the average total cost per share is higher for large trades; both the winners and losers 
are initially less liquid. His results suggest that based on the frequency of trading, 
superior returns from momentum strategies are related to high trading costs, a low 
level of liquidity and limits to arbitrage. By examining the liquidity-based factors, he 
finds that half of the returns on the relative- strength portfolios can be explained by a 
liquidity-risk Premium. Furthermore, the unexplained momentum profits are due to 
low liquidity. 
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Skewness risk 
Fuertes, Miffre and Tan (2008) use a sample free of survivorship bias, which consists 
of all stocks listed on the Amex, NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges during the period 
1973 to 2004. They extend the CAPM and the FFM by adding skewness and kurtosis 
factors and find that skewness risk can explain approximately 0.65% of the annual 
nI. I. 
abnormal returns of momentum strategies and the performance of momenturn 
strategies falls after controlling for skewness risk. 
Stochastic growth rates 
Johnson (2002) argues that stochastic growth rates may account for momentum 
profits. His model suggests that a large stock return depends on a persistent growth 
rate shock, since positive growth rate shocks are more likely among companies with 
good performance, while negative growth rate shocks are more likely among 
companies with poor performance, when other things are equal. Therefore, 
momentum profits might be attributed to growth rate risk. 
Other contributions to momentum profits 
Momentum profits are also found to be the result of other contributions in a number 
of studies, such as gradual diffusion of information, transaction costs, trading volume 
and data mining. The following section reviews the potential determinants of 
momentum profits. 
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Slow diffusion of information 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) use size and coverage as proxies for information 
diffusion speed and find that higher momentum profits are limited to smaller sized 
stocks with low analyst coverage. After controlling for size or low analyst coverage, 
stocks exhibit higher momentum. Their results are consistent with the model of Hong 
and Stein (1999). However, Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) argue that the results 
reported by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) are due to the fact that their information 
diffusion speed proxies exclude trading costs. After controlling for trading costs, 
analyst coverage provides a little explanatory power for the momentum returns. 
Sadka (2006) also argues that although small stocks, with low analyst coverage, earn 
high momentum returns, these returns cannot be exploited because small stocks have 
a low level of liquidity and higher liquidity costs. 
Transaction costs 
Transaction costs are regarded as one of the most important factors in explaining 
momentum profits. Carhart (1997) argues that the apparent profitability of 
momentum strategies in mutual funds is due to the omission of transaction costs. 
Grundy and Martin (2001) confinn that the level of round-trip transaction costs will 
offset the returns of momentum strategies. Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) find 
that the momentum returns are mainly produced by stocks with the characteristics of 
small size, high beta and low liquidity, which have large trading costs. After taking 
account of trading costs, the greater momentum returns cannot be exploited by 
arbitrageurs. 
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An alternative finding is reported by Hanna and Ready (2005). They report that both 
equally-weighted and value-weighted momentum strategies earn significantly excess 
returns after trading costs. Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) discover that momentum 
strategies remain profitable when transaction costs equal effective and quoted 
spreads. However, after considering price impact costs, the profitability of 
equally-weighted momentum strategies is eliminated whereas value-weighted 
momentum strategies earn substantial abnormal returns until the market value of the 
investment is slightly less than $1 billion. Ellis and Thomas (2003) estimate a cost of 
5.8% for a momentum strategy over a 12 month holding period for FTSE 350 stocks. 
They find thet momentum profits are still significant in their sample after transaction 
costs. 
Trading volume 
Trading volume is also reported as having a strong ability to predict future price 
momentum. Lee and Swarninathan (2000) find that past low volume stocks earn 
higher future returns than high volume stocks. Additionally, trading volume provides 
an important link to reconcile underreaction and overreaction since two 
winner-minus-loser strategies exhibit long-term price reversals and price 
continuations based on past volume. They show that stocks with low (high) past 
volume behave more like value (growth) stocks, which are under- (over) valued by 
the market. Therefore, the evidence of low (high) volume firms earning high (low) 
future returns is due to market misestimate of firms' future earnings. In contrast to 
their results, using UK data, Ellis and Thomas (2003) report that high-volume 
momentum portfolios generate higher returns than low-volume momentum portfolios. 
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Chan, Harneed and Tong (2000) also find that portfolios with high lagged trading 
volumes earn higher momentum profits than those of low lagged trading volumes. 
Data mining 
Data mining involves sorting through large amounts of data and picking out the 
relevant information through chance correlations or patterns. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) re-examine the trading strategies in the time period subsequent to their 
original study (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). They find that past winners continue to 
outperform past losers by the same amount as in the earlier period. Momentum 
strategies earn a profit of 1.17% per month over the 1965 to 1989 sample period and 
yield a profit of 1.39% over the period 1990 to 1998. Apart from the US stock 
market, a number of studies have discovered that the momentum effect exists in 
other markets, such as international equity markets (Rouwenhorst, 1998), foreign 
currency markets (Okunev and White, 2003) and commodity futures markets (Miffre 
and Rallis, 2007). All their findings confirm that momentum evidence is not merely 
due to data mining. 
2.4. Value Strategies 
Having reviewed the literature on momentum, I now turn my attention to the other 
anomaly that is the focus of this Phl): the value premium. Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) define value stocks as those with high ratios of B/M, C/P, E/P and 
high growth in sale (GS); while growth stocks are those with low ratios of B/M, C/P, 
E/P and low GS. Value strategies are referred to as those investing in value stocks 
and selling growth stocks. 
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The Value Premium Evidence 
The value premium is known as the difference in return between a portfolio of ý-alue 
stocks and a portfolio of growth stocks. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
examine the performance of portfolios based on the ratios of B/M. E/P, C/P and GS. 
From a one-way classification, they report that high B/M (value) stocks outperform 
low B/M (growth) stocks by an average of 10.5 % per year. The difference of 
size-adjusted average return between value stocks and growth stocks is about 7.8% 
per year. From a two-way classification, they find that the value portfolios 
significantly outperform the growth portfolios and the higher returns of the value 
portfolios are not due to fundamental risk. They attribute the evidence of higher 
standard deviations of the value portfolios to the size effect, since the value 
portfolios largely consist of small stocks. They conjecture that the value premium 
arises from expectation errors made by investors who irrationally extrapolate future 
growth based on past growth. As a result, they are too optimistic and overvalue 
growth stocks, and too pessimistic and undervalue value stocks. Fama and French 
(1992,1993,1995 and 1996) and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) also report similar 
results. 
The performance of the value and growth portfolios is examined in world markets. 
Fama and French (1998) study the value and growth portfolios for the US and twelve 
major EAFE (Europe, Australia, and the Far East) countries and find that there is 
strong evidence of value stocks outperforming growth stocks in markets around the 
world. Using the ratio of E/P, 12 out of 13 value-growth premiums are positive. 
There are similar value premiums when portfolios are sorted on the ratios of B/N4, 
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C/P and dividend to price (D/P), suggesting that the higher average returns on value 
stocks are a global phenomenon. 
Dimson, Nagel and Quigley (2003) examine the value premium across all stocks 
listed on the London Stock Exchange during the period of 1955 to 2001. They find 
that the value premium exists within small capitalization, as well as large 
capitalization universe. However, they argue that implementation of value strategies 
to capture the value premium is potentially costly, particularly within the small 
capitalization segment. Gregory, Harris and Michou (2001 and 2003) investigate 
value strategies in the UK market. From both one-variable and two-variable analyses, 
they find that value stocks significantly outperform growth stocks. Both the FFM and 
the multi-factor asset pricing model fail to entirely explain the superior returns of 
value strategies from two-way classification. 
2.4.2. Explanations for the Value Premium 
The existence of the value premium goes largely undisputed, interpreting the 
premium and identifying its causes has been more controversial. The main debate 
focuses on a behavioural-based explanation, a risk-based explanation or bias related 
to the original study of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). 
Behavioural-based explanation 
Behavioural economists explain that the value premium is driven by the judgmental 
bias of investors. Haugen (1995) interprets that investors are too pessimistic 
concerning value stocks and too optimistic concerning growth stocks; therefore, they 
undervalue value stocks and overvalue growth stocks. La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer 
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and Vishny (1997) suggest that expectation errors about future earnings prospects are 
an important deterrninant of the superior performance of value stocks. They find that 
earnings announcement returns are substantially higher for value stocks than for 
growth stocks after formation. Additionally, announcement returns for groxvth stocks 
are significantly lower than growth returns on an average day, which is against the 
risk premium explanation. However, Levis and Liodakis (2001) test this 
extrapolation hypothesis using UK data. They find that the market does not 
extrapolate from either past earnings growth or past price performance. They show 
an asymmetric impact of good news and bad news on the returns of value and growth 
stocks. Good news has a stronger positive impact on returns of value stocks than 
other stocks; while bad news has a minor impact on the returns of value stocks but 
has a significantly more negative impact on the performance of growth stocks. 
Risk-based explanation 
Fama and French (1992,1995 and 1996) and Chen and Zhang (1998) argue that the 
superior returns on the value portfolios are a compensation for high risk driven by 
their characteristics of financial distress and low earnings. They find that the value 
portfolios have strong positive loadings on SMB 3 and HML 4. By contrast, growth 
stocks have strong negative loadings on HML. They conclude that the value 
premium can be explained by their three-factor model. However, the problem with 
their prediction is that they use the HML factor to explain the expected returns of the 
SMB stands for small minus big, which is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small 
stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks. 
4 HML stands for high minus low, which is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high 
book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. 
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value and growth portfolios, in other words, the explanatory and explained vanables 
measuring the same thing. 
Data snooping 
The view that data snooping relates to the superior returns of value stocks has been 
documented by Conrad, Cooper and Kaul (2003). Conducting both one-way and 
two-way sorts on 15 characteristics, they find that nearly 50% of in-sample profits 
reported in one-way-sort studies can be explained by data snooping and about 80% to 
100% of the profits to strategies of 10 x 10 two-way-sort portfolios are attributed to 
data snooping. Their results suggest that the greater potential for data snooping bias 
in two-way sorts arises because the two-way-sort procedure uses the prior familiarity 
data of finn characteristics; these fin-n characteristics are highly correlated. As a 
result, the two-way-sort procedure generates spurious superior returns for value 
stocks. 
Selection bias 
Using Compustat data, the average performance of high B/M portfolios may be 
enlarged by survivorship bias. Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) point out that high 
B/M firms experience relatively high financial distress and they may not be included 
in Compustat database. By contrast, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995) argue 
that the selection bias in the Compustat data is overstated by Kothari, Shanken and 
Sloan (1995). They find that only 3.1 % of CRSP company-years can be widely 
interpreted as financially distressed companies, which are omitted from the 
Compustat database. Also, the returns on the NYSE-AMEX domestic primary 
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companies are only slightly different from the returns on the corresponding firms 
with the Compustat data. 
2.5. Time-Varying Risk and the Conditional CAPM 
Although many financial researchers have tried to determine the reasons behind the 
profits of momentum and value strategies, the debate on explanations is still ongoing. 
In recent years, a growing literature has attempted to use time-varying risk and the 
conditional CAPM to capture a cross-section of average returns and the returns of 
anomalies. This section reviews time-varying risk, idiosyncratic risk and the 
conditional CAPM. 
2.5.1. Time-Varying Risk and Idiosyncratic Risk 
One of the key features of financial time series is that volatility (as measured by 
variances) changes over time. It shows that large volatility changes tend to be 
followed by large volatility changes and small volatility changes tend to be followed 
by small volatility changes (see, for example, Mandelbrot, 1963; French, Schwert 
and Stambaugh, 1987 and Schwert and Seguin, 1990). Engle (1982) first introduces 
the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (ARCH) process to explicitly model 
time-varying risk (as measured by the conditional variance) as a linear function of 
past squared innovations. Bollerslev (1986) extends Engle's work to the 
Generalized-ARCH (GARCH) process. The GARCH model provides a more flexible 
framework to capture various dynamic structures of volatility. It measures the 
conditional variance as dependent not only on past shocks but also on its previous 
lags. Another important extension of the ARCH model is the ARCH-in-mean 
(ARCH-M) model developed by Engle. Lillien and Robbins (1987), where the 
conditional standard deviation of asset returns is added into the mean equation. 
Therefore, changing time-varying risk directly affects the expected return on a 
portfolio. 
The traditional CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) implies that only 
systematic risk should be incorporated into asset prices and that idiosyncratic risk 
can be diversified away when investors hold a market portfolio in equilibrium. 
However, Levy (1978), Merton (1987) and Malkiel and Xu (2001) extend the CAPM 
and find that idiosyncratic risk can also be priced to compensate rational investors if 
they do not hold the market portfolio. Campbell, Lettau, Malkie and Xu (2001), 
Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003), Ghysels, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2005), Fu (2005), 
Diavatopoulos, Doran and Peterson (2006), and Jiang and Lee (2006) further 
investigate time-varying idiosyncratic risk in explaining stock returns. They find that 
there is a positive relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and stock market 
returns. However, Bali, Cakici, Yan and Zhang (2005) and Bali and Cakici (2007) 
argue that the relationship is in part driven by a illiquidity premium. In contrast to 
anbuove studies, Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006) report the puzzling results 
whereby stocks with high past idiosyncratic volatility earn low returns and the low 
returns of stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility cannot be explained by size, 
book-to-market, momentum and liquidity effects. 
2.5.2. The Conditional CAPM 
The traditional CAPM is derived from a static framework. It assumes a static 
variance-covariance matrix for asset returns and predicts that market beta is constant 
over time. The conditional CAPM attempts to capture the impact of conditional 
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information on the volatility of asset returns and the expected asset returns. It 
imposes the restriction that conditional expected returns on assets are linearly related 
to the conditional expected return on a market-wide portfolio in excess of the 
risk-free return. The coefficient in the linear relation is the asset's beta or the ratio of 
the conditional covariance of the asset's return with the market to the conditional 
variance of the market. Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988), Bodurtha and 
Mark (1991) and Ng (1988) carry out tests of the conditional CAPM by allowing 
time variation in the expected asset returns, asset variance, and covariance. They 
assume that covariance matrix of asset returns and market risk premium to follow a 
multivariate GARCH proceSS5 
. 
Their results suggest that time-varying systematic 
risk might be a better measure for the expected return on the stock market. Harvey 
(1989 and 1995) and Ferson and Harvey (1991 and 1993) develop the conditional 
CAPM by allowing for both time-varying market betas and time-varying expected 
returns. They find that estimated betas exhibit statistically significant time variation. 
Therefore, the conditional CAPM with time-varying beta performs substantially 
better than the static CAPM. 
Recently, a number of studies have used the conditional CAPM to examine the 
cross-sectional variations in expected asset returns and the returns of anomalies. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Lettau and Ludvigson (200 1), and Adrian and 
Franzoni (2005) report that this model with time-varying beta works well in 
explaining the cross-sectional variation in expected returns on size and B/M 
portfolios. Wang (2003), Ang and Chen (2007) and Zhang (2005) show that it can 
also capture the profitability of momentum and value strategies. However, Lewellen 
5 Bodurtha and Mark ( 198 8) model market risk prem i um as an autoregression. 
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and Nagel (2006) cast doubt on the empirical success of the conditional CAPM- 
They argue that betas vary substantially but these variations are not large enough to 
explain the value premium and the momentum effect. Fama and French (2006) and 
Petkova and Zhang (2005) confirm that even allowing betas to vary annually. this 
model still fails to explain the post- 1963 value premium. 
2.6. Trading Costs 
Although many studies have reported that momentum and value strategies can 
generate significant gross profits, to implement these strategies, investors are also 
likely to face significant trading costs. The third objective of this study is to 
investigate the impact of trading costs on momentum strategies. With this in mind, 
this section reviews the components, estimation methods and determinants of trading 
costs. 
2.6.1. Components of Trading Costs 
Trading costs of implementing an investment strategy is an integral part of the 
investment process, having a direct impact on investment performance. According to 
Keirn and Madhavan (1998), total trading costs can be categorised into two major 
components: explicit costs and implicit costs. 
Explicit trading costs 
Explicit trading costs include the commission charged by brokers, taxes, short selling 
costs and other regulatory charges, depending on the particular country and exchange. 
Keim and Madhavan (1997) found that commission costs are relatively low, at about 
0.2% of trade value. In addition, commission paid by investors has declined over 
time. Stoll (1995) reports that commission in 1982 is 0.58% of market value for 
institutional investors, which is more than double the commission in 1992. The 
decline in commission may be due to an increased institutional presence in the 
market, a more competitive environment for trading services, and technological 
innovations. A short selling cost is charged by the brokerage firm for borrowing the 
security. When investors believe that the future price of a security will fall, they can 
borrow this security from a brokerage firm and sell it if they do not own it. 
Implicit trading costs 
Implicit trading costs are the main area of interests for researchers as they are 
difficult to measure. Implicit trading costs contain bid-ask spreads, price impact costs 
and opportunity costs. 
Bid-ask spread 
Early studies show that the bid-ask spread is the major part of implicit trading costs. 
It includes a quoted bid-ask spread and an effective bid-ask spread. The quoted 
bid-ask spread is the difference between the quoted ask price and the quoted bid 
price. Stoll (1989) first concluded that the quoted spread can be decomposed into 
three components: order processing costs; inventory costs; and adverse information 
costs. Lee and Ready (1991) argue that the measurement of the quoted bid-ask 
spreads may overstate the actual spread since trades are often executed inside the 
quoted spread. 
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The effective bid-ask spread provides a more accurate measure of actual trading 
costs than the quoted spread. Roll (1984) first shows that the effective spread can be 
inferred from first-order serial covariance of price changes \, N-hen the market is 
efficient. He finds that these serial covariance estimators of the effective spread tend 
to be smaller than the quoted bid-ask spread. Another way to measure the effective 
bid-ask spread is the difference between the transaction price and bid-ask midpoint. 
This can account for potential price improvement when market orders are crossed, or 
the specialist "stops" an order before trade. 
Price impact cost 
Bid-ask spread estimates fail to capture the fact that large trades may move price 
away from the true "equilibrium" price. The price impact measures the deviation of 
the transaction price from the true "equilibrium" price. Berkowitz, Logue and Noser 
(1988) estimate the price impact cost of executing a trade as the difference between a 
trade price and the volume-weighted average price. They find that price impact costs 
on the NYSE tend to be small in relation to commissions. Knez and Ready (1996) 
use all market orders in the Trades, Orders, Reports, and Quotes database measuring 
price impact costs for listed firms on the NYSE. They find that the price impact cost 
is strongly related to the difference between quoted depth and order size. 
Opportunity costs 
Keim and Madhavan (1998) state that opportunity costs are associated with missed 
trading opportunities. The costs represent the difference between the perfonnance of 
the desired investment and the actual investment after adjustment for execution costs 
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and commissions. The opportunity costs are also referred to as the "hidden" costs of 
trading. They are not directly recorded and are therefore difficult to estimate. 
2.6.2. Total Trading Costs 
The previous section introduces the individual components of trading costs. The 
measurement of total trading costs by simply adding up the isolated cost components 
can lead to misleading results since implicit and explicit costs are sometimes 
correlated and jointly determined at a certain order level. The following section 
reviews the estimation methods of total trading costs. 
Spread plus commission 
The most direct estimate of total trading cost is spread plus commission. This is the 
sum of the proportional bid-ask spread and a representative conunission. The 
proportional bid-ask spread is calculated using current specialist quotes. The 
commission is a proportion of the transaction value based on price per share and the 
number of shares traded. Stoll and Whaley (1983) investigate the small firm effect on 
the NYSE. They estimate the trading costs by directly calculating quoted market 
bid-ask spread data plus prevailing commission schedules. They report that trading 
costs can partially account for the small size effect. Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) use 
a similar method to estimate trading costs for the January effect. They find that there 
is no positive abnormal return in January after taking account of transaction costs. 
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Price impact plus commission 
Total transaction costs are also estimated by commissions plus price impact costs. 
Berkowitz, Logue and Noser (1988) find that price impact costs on the NYSE tend to 
be small in relation to commissions although total transaction costs can be very large 
due to large commissions. They report that total transaction costs are for their sample, 
on average, 0.23% of the principal value. Commissions are, on average, 0.18% of the 
principal value, suggesting that commissions dominate total transaction costs. Chan 
and Lakonishok (1997) also use the same approach to estimate the total transaction 
costs between issues listed on the NYSE and the NASDAQ for institutional investors. 
They find that institutional trading costs for relatively smaller firms are lower on the 
NASDAQ, while costs for the larger firms are lower on the NYSE. 
Limited dependent variable (LDV) model 
The limited dependent variable (LDV) model is proposed by Lesmond, Ogden and 
Trzcinka (1999). This model uses daily security retums to measure the effect of 
transaction costs through the incidence of zero returns. It assumes that if the value of 
accumulated information exceeds the costs of trading, the marginal investor will 
either reduce trading or not trade, causing a zero return. Therefore, the estimates 
from this model are marginal trader's effective transaction costs. They find that 
transaction costs, estimated by their model, are highly correlated (85%) with those 
estimated from the most commonly used method of spreads plus commissions. 
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2.6.3. Determinants of Trading Costs 
Previous theoretical and empirical research suggests that trading costs are affected by 
a number of factors. Of these, the market capitalization of firms, the size of the 
transaction and the investment style, have been identified as the most important 
determinants of trading costs. 
Market capitalization 
Market capitalization has been reported as negatively associated with trading costs. 
Since market capitalization relates to market liquidity, stocks with large 
capitalization are more liquid than those with small capitalization. Therefore, they 
have lower implicit and explicit costs than small stocks. Chan and Lakonishok (1997) 
examine all trades on the NYSE and NASDAQ using 33 institutions from 1989 to 
1991. They find that an average round-trip execution cost is 0.9% for large stocks 
and 3.3 1% for small stocks on the NYSE; while an average round-trip execution cost 
is 1.23% for large stocks and 2.22% for small stocks on the NASDAQ. Stoll and 
Whaley (1983), Chan and Lakonishok (1995), Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) 
and Keim and Madhavan (1997) also report that there is a negative relationship 
between the market capitalization of stocks and trading cost. 
Trade size 
Trade size has been found to be positively related to trading cost. Large trades are 
generally more difficult to execute without high impact costs. Chan and Lakonishok 
(1997) report that "easy" packages, which include packages ranked below the 
median when sorted by relative package size, incur an average round-trip cost of 
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0.25%. The corresponding round-trip cost is 2.35% for "difficult- packages that is 
the largest 5% of packages when ranked by relative size. Loeb (1983), Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993 and 1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1996 and 1998) also provide 
evidence to show a similar relationship between trading cost and trade size. 
Style investment 
The market impact of a transaction can vary with different investment styles. Chan 
and Lakonishok (1993 and 1995) identify that the dominant influence on the market 
impact of a trade is investment style. They find that institutional investors, trading in 
growth stocks, incur a round-trip cost of 0.7%, while those trading in value stocks 
experience a benefit of 0.4%. Keim and Madhavan (1997) also analyze the 
relationship between investment style and trading costs. They find that there is a 
considerable variation in costs between markets and across investment styles. In 
particular, value traders have substantially lower trading costs than those whose 
trading strategies demand more immediacy. 
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Chapter 3. Momentum Profits and Time-Varying 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
3.1. Introduction 
Momentum strategies that buy recent winners and sell recent losers are profitable 
over short horizons of 3 to 12 months (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Price 
continuation has prevailed over time (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001), across countries 
(Griffin, Ji and Martin, 2003; Liu, Strong and Xu, 1999 and Ellis and Thomas, 2003), 
across industries (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999), across equity styles (Chen and De 
Bondt, 2004) and across asset classes (Okunev and White, 2003). While the 
profitability of relative- strength portfolios is not disputed, there is still a lot of 
controversy as to why these abnormal returns occur. Two explanations have been put 
forward. 
The first is based on psychology and market inefficiency. Behavioural proponents 
relate price under- and over-reaction to cognitive errors that investors make when 
incorporating information into prices. For example, investors may be too quick to 
draw the conclusion that a given stock follows a particular "ideal type" (the 
representativeness heuristic), and they may be too slow to update their beliefs when 
confronted with new, especially contradictory, evidence (the conservatism bias). 
These behavioural. attributes lead first to momentum as stock prices react with delay 
to firm-specific information and, once deviations from equilibrium are acknowledged, 
to subsequent mean reversion (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Daniel. 
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Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998 and Hong and Stein. 1999). 
6 This suiniests that 
the irrationality from which agents suffer may push prices awaY from fundamentals 
and allow profitable mis-pricings to survive. 
The second explanation relies on the notion of market efficiency and argues that the 
returns of the relative-strength portfolios are a fair compensation for the risk and/or 
trading costs of implementing the strategies. On balance, however. the evidence 
suggests that the profitability of the rel ative- strength portfolios is not solely a 
compensation for exposure to higher risks (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996; Fama and French, 1996; Griffin, Ji and Martin, 
2003; Karolyi and Kho, 2004 and Sadka, 2006) 7. Studies that allow for 
time-variation in systematic risks reach conflicting conclusions. While Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002), Wu (2002) and Wang (2003) explain the profitability of 
momentum strategies through time-variation in expected returns, Grundy and Martin 
(2001), Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003) and Lewellen and Nagel (2006) argue that the 
momentum returns are too large to be accounted for in terms of time-varying risks. It 
is important to note also that a rationale related to transaction costs has been put 
forward as an explanation for momentum profits. Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) 
6 Other behavioral deficiencies that investors may suffer from include biased self-attribution and 
overconfidence (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998) 
, 
and bounded rationality (Hong and 
Stein, 1999). 
7 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) estimate a market model, to which Chan Jegadeesh and Lakonishok 
(1996) and Fama and French (1996) add the return of portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market value. 
Griffin, A and Martin (2003) look at macroeconomic and financial factors that are in the spirit of the 
model of Chen, Roll and Ross (1986). Sadka (2006) looks at the role of liquidity risk. Karolyi and Kho 
(2004) use bootstrap experiments and a wide range of return 
-generating processes. 
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indeed argue that momentum profits have little to do with risk as they are simply an 
illusion induced by trading CoStS. 8 
The contribution of this chapter to the literature on momentum is twofold. The first 
contribution is with regards to the time-varying idiosyncratic risk of the winners and 
the losers and to the role it may have in explaining the abnormal returns of 
momentum strategies. While several studies look at variations in systematic risk 
(Grundy and Martin, 2001; Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002; Wu, 2002, Griffin, Ji and 
Martin, 2003; Wang, 2003 and Lewellen and Nagel, 2006), this chapter is the first to 
look at variations in the idiosyncratic risks of the winner and loser portfolios. We do 
this within a GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M framework9. 
The rationale for choosing a GARCH(l, I)-M model stems from the idea that in 
rational markets, volatility is often viewed as being commensurate with news or 
information flow, and indeed, the autocorrelation in information arrival ("news 
events happen in bunches") is one of the primary rationalizations of the volatility 
clustering that is almost universally observed in asset returns. The conditional 
standard deviation term in the mean equation captures the time-varying relationship 
between total risk and returns, and thus our contribution is to link momentum profits 
with the impact of news on returns. We use the GJR variant of the basic GARCH 
model in order to allow for a possible asymmetry in the relationship between the 
' Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) show that momentum strategies are highly trading intensive and 
pick up stocks that are expensive and risky (small, high beta, illiquid, off-NYSE extreme performers). 
Besides, the momentum profits are mainly driven by the losers (Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000) and thus 
short-sale costs also need to be taken into account. 
9 GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M stands for Glosten et al. (1993) Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity of order Ij Nvith a Mean term that models the conditional risk premium. A number 
of studies (Nelson, 1991; Glosten et al., 1993; Rabemananjara and Zakoian, 1993) show that good 
news (measured by positive return shocks) and bad news (measured by negative return shocks) hm e 
an asymmetric impact on the conditional variance of stock returns. 
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returns to the winner and loser portfolios and the volatility. By using a conditional I 
model, we are able to capture the possibility that the risks of the winners and the 
losers may change in a predictable, but different, way over time. This suggests that a 
model explicitly allowing for risk to be time-dependent might explain the abnormal 
returns of the momentum strategies. Our approach is an alternative to one where 
pre-specified conditional variables, such as macroeconomic or firm-specific 
influences, are used as the risk factors in a conditional pricing model. Most such 
models have largely failed to explain the profitability of relative strength portfolios, 
and thus an advantage of the method that we employ is that it does not require any a 
priori specification of the set of risk factors in order to allow for time-varying risk. 
The second contribution of this chapter to the momentum literature is to look at the 
impact of recent, old and bad news on the volatility of the winners and losers. As the 
losers are more likely to sit on bad news than the winners, managers are more likely 
to withhold information. On the other hand, as the winners are more likely to receive 
good news than the losers, managers are more eager to disclose information. 
Therefore, the winners and losers may respond to recent, old and bad news m 
different ways. 
We draw the following two conclusions from our analysis. First, we identify some 
clear patterns in the volatility of the winner and loser portfolios. The volatility of the 
winners is found to be more sensitive to recent news than that of the losers, whereas 
by contrast, the volatility of the losers is found to be more sensitive to distant news 
than that of the winners. Besides, the volatility of the losers (%ý'ith an average 
volatility half-life of 24 months and 133 days) shows a higher le\, el of persistence than 
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that of the winners (whose volatility half-life only equals 3 months and 5 days on 
average). 
The second conclusion of this chapter is with regards to the hypothesis that the 
momentum returns are a compensation for time-varying unsystematic risk as 
modeled by the GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M model. We show that the 
GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M terms, when are added to the traditional market and Fama and 
French models, explain the abnormal performance of the momentum strategies 
without the need to resort to the transactions cost and illiquidity issues. Interestingly. 
neither the GJR-GARCH(l, l) nor the GARCH(l, l)-M specifications alone could 
account for the abnormal return of the relative- strength portfolios. It is therefore both 
the asymmetric response of the losers to good and bad news and the conditional risk 
premium embedded in the GARCH(l, l)-M model that explain the profitability of 
momentum strategies. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the 
dataset, the methodology employed to construct the momentum portfolios and the 
models used to adjust for risk. Section 3.3 examines the performance of momentum 
strategies and analyzes how recent news, distant news and negative return shocks 
impact the volatility of the winners and losers. It also tests whether momentum 
profits are a compensation for time-varying idiosyncratic risk common to the winners 
and losers. Finally, section 3.4 concludes this chapter with a summary of our 
findings. 
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3.2. Data and Methodology 
Monthly UK stock prices adjusted for dividends are obtained from the London Share 
Price Database (LSPD) over the period 28 February 1975 to 31 December 200 1.10 To 
address problems of survivorship bias, we also include stocks that are delisted due to 
merger, acquisition or bankruptcy. The sample includes all companies with at least 3 
months of available returns. A total of 6,155 companies are considered. 
All stocks are ranked and sorted into 10 equal ly-weighted portfolios based on their 
past J-month cumulative returns (J = 3,6,12 months). The decile portfolio with the 
highest cumulative return is termed the "winner" portfolio, while the decile portfolio 
with the lowest cumulative return is called the "loser" portfolio. The return on the 
momentum portfolio is then measured as the return difference between the winner 
and loser portfolios over the next K months (K = 3,6,12 months). The resulting 
portfolio is referred to as the J-K momentum portfolio. The procedure is rolled 
forward at the end of each holding period to produce new winner, loser and 
momentum portfolios. The formation of the relative-strength portfolios is therefore 
non-overlapping, thus reducing the trading frequency and transaction costs incurred 
in portfolio construction and ensuring that statistical tests are valid without requiring 
modification of the standard errors. Our framework is also more realistic in terms of 
the behaviour of investors than one based on overlapping portfolios where they 
would presumably have to vary the amount of wealth devoted to the strategies over 
time. 
10 The returns to the Fama-French factor portfolios that we employ subsequently are only available to 
December 200 1, which necessitates this truncation of our sample period. 
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Traditionally, performance has been measured by regressed a portfolio's returns on a 
set of systematic risk factors emanating from the CAPM of Sharpe (1964) or the 
three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), which can be expressed respectively 
as 
=a +, B(Rml 
- 
Rf, ) + c, (1) 
R, 
=a+ ß(Rvl 
- 
Rfl)+ sSMB, + hHML, + ei (2) 
where Rt is either the return on the momentum portfolio or the return of the winner 
and loser portfolios in excess of the risk-free rate, Rp is the three-month Treasury bill 
rate, Rm, is the value-weighted market return on all stocks quoted on the London 
Stock Exchange, SMBI and HML, are the UK-based returns from the Fama and 
French (1993) size and book-to-market value portfolios as provided by Nagel" and 
, 
61 is a white noise error term. The performance of the portfolios is then evaluated by 
testing the statistical significance of the a coefficient in (1) and (2). 12 
r 
Embedded in equations (1) and (2) is the assumption that c, 
- 
N(O, a') and, thus, 
that there is no conditional volatility in the market. Since Engle (1982), numerous 
studies have been written on the family of GARCH models (Poon and Granger, 2003; 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Christoffersen and Diebold, 2005 and Bauwens, Laurent and 
11 These data are available at http: //facuIly-gsb. stanford. edu/nageUdata/UK FFFact. csN., 
12 The Carhart (1997) four-factor version of the Fama-French model is often used in performance 
attribution for mutual funds. The fourth factor, known as UMD ("up-m inus- down") is a measure of the 
return to momentum portfolios. The key distinction between this approach and what we propose here is 
that we are trying to explain the profitability of momentum portfolios using a previously unexamined 
measure of risk, whereas the UMD term uses momentum to explain the returns from other strategies. 
Thus, in our study, momentum is the explained variable whereas in the Carhart model, it is an 
explanatory variable. 
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Rombouts, 2006). The attractiveness of the GARCH family models stems from the 
fact that they model the conditional variance of asset returns by taking into account 
persistence in volatility (where volatility shocks today influence expected volatilitý, 
many months from now) and "leverage effects" (where negative return shocks 
impact volatility more than positive return shocks of the same magnitude). These two 
features are central to our hypotheses that the losers' volatilities show more 
persistence and asymmetry than those of the winners. 
We investigate whether momentum profits in the UK are a compensation for 
time-varying risk within GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M versions of the market and Fama and 
French models: 
R, a +, 8(R., 
- 
Rf, )+, 5u, + el 
cr 
2 CO +2 /C 22+ ou 
2 
1 1-1 + qIl-l -'/-1 1-1 
(3) 
R, 
=a+, 8(Rm, - Rfl)+ sSMB, + hHML, + (5c, + cl (4) 
(T 2= 0) + 
'VE2 + 771, 
-1 E2+ 
ou 2 
1 1-1 1-1 1-1 
where or 2 is the conditional variance of the winner, loser and momentum portfolios, I 
6 measures the time-varying risk premium, Y. 77 relate to the lagged squared error 
term and measure the impact of recent news on volatility, q also measures any 
asymmetric response of volatility to bad and good news (commonly attributed to as 
leverage effect), I, 
-, 
=I if cl-I <0 (bad news, also called negative return shock) 
and I, 
-, 
-0 otherwise, 0 relates to the lagged conditional volatility and measures 
the impact of old news on volatility. 
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Within the framework of systems (3) and (4), the following two hypotheses can be 
tested. First, the coefficients on conditional volatility indicate ho,,,, - news impacts the 
volatility of the winners and of the losers. In particular, we analyze the speed of the 
response of the winners and losers to news and test for the presence of any 
asymmetry in the response of the winners' and losers' volatilities to good and bad 
news. Second, the sign and significance of a in the mean equations of systems (3) 
and (4) indicate whether the momentum returns are a compensation for market risk, 
the risks associated with size and book-to-market value and time-varying, 
idiosyncratic risk. 
We also test whether momentum profits can be explained by a simplified version of 
the above models in the standard GARCH(l, l)-M framework. This specification 
models the time-varying risk premium as in (3) and (4) but does not allow for 
asymmetric response of volatility to good and bad news. Practically, this breaks 
down to estimating the following systems of equations 
ß(Rm, 
- 
Rfl)+, 5u, + cl 
ul 
=+ yc, 
-i + Ou, -i 
(5) 
Rt 
=a+ ß(RM, - Rft)+ sSMB, + hHML, + gul + et (6) 
ut 
= 0) + Yst-, + Out-1 
Our hypothesis is to test whether momentum profits are a compensation for 
time-varying idiosyncratic risk. If this hypothesis is true, then the (x coefficients of 
momentum portfolios should be statistically indistinguishable from zero, and 
therefore, a two-sided test is more appropriate for assessing parameter significance in 
GARCH model. 
50 
3.3. Empirical Results 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. 
The rows represent the ranking periods (J = 3,6 and 12 months) and the columns 
represent the holding periods (K = 3,6 and 12 months). It is clear from this table that 
the winners systematically outperform the losers at the 1% level. Across strategies, 
the momentum portfolios earn an average return of 0.0151 a month, with a range 
from 0.0093 for the 3-3 strategy to 0.0193 for the 6-6 strategy. 13 These results 
corroborate those of Liu, Strong and Xu (1999) and Ellis and Thomas (2003) for the 
UK. 
Table 3.1 also reports the monthly standard deviations and reward-to-risk ratios of 
each portfolio return. Consistent with rational expectations, the momentum portfolios 
with higher returns also have more risk. For instance, the 6-6 strategy earns the 
highest average return (0.0 193) and, with a standard deviation of 0.0511, it is also the 
second most volatile strategy. With a reward-to-risk ratio of 0.3856, the 12-6 strategy 
generates the highest average return in risk-adjusted tenns, while the 3-3 strategy 
offers the lowest risk-adjusted return (0.1925). 
The contribution of this chapter is with regards to the time-varying idiosyncratic risk 
of the winner and loser portfolios and the impact that it may have on momentum 
profits. With this in mind, we first analyze the performance of the winner, loser and 
momentum portfolios within the standard market and Fama and French models and 
then allow for time-varying idiosyncratic risk through different specifications of the 
13 Note that all figures in this chapter refer to monthly proportion returns rather than percentage returns, 
unless otherwise stated. 
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GARCH(l, l) model. While doing this, we will also analyze the impact of recent 
news, old news and bad news on the volatility of the winners and losers. 
3.3.1. Static Market and Fama and French Models 
Table 3.2 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the market and Fama 
and French models (1) and (2) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. " In 
line with previous research (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Fama and French, 1996 
and Karolyi and Kho, 2004), the results indicate that traditional versions of the 
market and Fama and French models fail to explain momentum profits. Regardless of 
the model, of the ranking period, and of the holding period, the a coefficients of the 
momentum strategies in equations (1) and (2) are positive and significant at the 1% 
level. The momentum returns estimated from the market model range from 0.0095 
(3-3 strategy) to 0.0194 (6-6 strategy), with an average return at 0.0151 a month. 
According to the Fama and French model, the winners outperform the losers by 
0.0177 on average, with a range of 0.0110 (3-3 strategy) to 0.0222 (12-6 strategy). 
While systematic risk explains most of the over-performance of the winners, it fails 
to account for the under-performance of the losers. Irrespective of the ranking period, 
of the holding period and of the risk model considered, the losers indeed have 
negative alphas that are significant at the I% level. As in Hong, Lim and Stein 
(2000), the momentum profits are therefore driven by the losers. 
The factor loadings on Rm,, SMB, and HML, in (1) and (2) suggest that the winner and 
loser portfolios tend to pick small capitalization stocks (s>O) and the losers have 
14 Engle (I 982)'s ARCH-LM test provides strong evidence of Heteroskedasticity in the OLS residuals 
of the market and Fama-French models. Hence, we use White's Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors. 
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higher market risk than the winners(, 6L>, 6w). The winners have growth characteristics 
(h<O) and the losers have value characteristics (h>O). The momentum strategies are 
predominantly market-neutral (, ff--O) and size-neutral (s--O) and have negative 
loadings on HML,. These results are consistent with those previously reported, 
including the studies by Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) and Liu, Strong and 
Xu (1999). 
Table 3.3 reports the ARCH LM test statistics and p-values. The results show that 
there is substantial evidence of ARCH effects since all the LM statistics of the 
market and the Fama and French models are significant at the 5% level for the 
winner, loser and momentum portfolios. These results indicate that the static market 
and the Fama and French models fail to capture the problems of heteroskedasticity 
(and autocorrelation) contained in the returns on the winner, loser and momentum 
portfolio. 
3.3.2. GARCH(1,1) Versions of Market and Fama and French Models 
Table 3.4 presents the results of normality test for the residuals of the conditional 
market (MM) and Fama and French models (FFM) (3) and (4) that include a 
GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M term. With only a few exceptions (the 3-3 loser of the MM, the 
6-3 loser of the FFM, the 6-6 loser of the FFM and 3-12 momentum of FFM), ) 
Jarque-Bera (JB) statistics are significant at the 5% level, suggesting the rejection of 
the hypothesis that the residuals are normal distributed. Following the argument of 
the central limit theorem, the sample sizes that we have in chapter 3 are quite large; 
therefore, non-normality will have less impact on inference than that would be the 
case for small samples. The studies of Brooks, Cemy and Miffre (2008) and Fuertes, 
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Miffre and Tan (2008) also report that the departure from normalivy, of return 
distributions has little to no impact on performance or on asset allocation/hedging 
decisions. 
Table 3.5 reports the estimates of the MM and FFM that include a 
GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M term. Table 3.6 reports the average coefficient estimates across 
9 strategies. As the non-normality of residuals reported in table 3.4, we estimate 
GARCH family model in the rest of this chapter using quasi-maximum likelihood 
covariance and standard errors introduced by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). The 
rational for employing this method is because Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard 
errors combine unbiased and consistent maximum likelihood parameter estimates 
together with non-normality robust standard errors, which solve the problem of the 
biased maximum likelihood parameter standard errors. We first analyze how news, 
whether it is recent, distant or negative, impacts the volatility of the winners and the 
losers. We subsequently test for whether the time-varying idiosyncratic risk common 
to the winners and losers explains the profitability of momentum strategies. 
The pattern of conditional volatility 
The coefficients ;v and q in systems (3) and (4) relate to the lagged squared error term 
and, therefore, to the impact of recent news on volatility. In Table 3.6, the average 
ý+q/2 of the conditional market model equals 0.2554 for the winners and 0.1262 for 
the losers. 15 The average ý+i712 of the conditional Fama and French model is 0.2867 
'5 While the parameters in the conditional variance equation of a symmetric GARCH model are usually 
required to be positive, when the GJR form of the model is used, it is possible for the parameter on the 
asymmetry term (17 in our notation) to be negative. More specifically, if E(It) = '/2, then provided that y 
+1712 >0, the negative parameter would not lead the conditional variance to be negative. We have 
checked this condition and it is satisfied for all models estimated in this study. 
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for the winners and 0.1551 for the losers. Clearly, recent news impacts on the 
volatility of the winners more than it impacts on that of the losers. With only one 
exception (the 3-3 winner in the Fama and French model), the conclusion holds 
throughout in Table 3.5, irrespective of the ranking period, of the holding period and 
of the model considered. 
The coefficient 0 in systems (3) and (4) reflects the effect of lagged conditional 
variance and captures the impact of "old news" on volatility. The results of the 
conditional market model in Table 3.6 indicate that the average 0 coefficient of the 
winners (0.5785) is lower than that of the losers (0.7911). The same conclusion 
applies to the conditional Fama and French model, for which the winners have an r 
average 0 coefficient of 0.5017 and the losers have an average 0 coefficient of 
0.8072. It is clear therefore that "old news" has more impact on the volatility of the 
losers than on the volatility of the winners. Looking at the estimates of 0 in Table 3.5, 
it appears that the conclusion holds for the vast majority of the portfolios, the 12-12 
winner in the market model being the only exception. 
The asymmetric coefficients (q) in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 suggest that bad news has 
different impacts on the volatility of the winners and of the losers. For the losers, the 
mean of the q coefficients in Table 3.6 is 0.3028 for the conditional market model 
and 0.2203 for the conditional Fama and French model. With only a few exceptions, 
these coefficients are significant at the 5% level in Table 3.5. Clearly, therefore, bad 
news increases the volatility of the losers. For the winner portfolios, however, the 
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Table 3.6. Average coefficient estimates of conditional market and Fama and 
French models with a GJR-GARCH (1, I)-M term across nine strategies 
The table reports average coefficient estimates across 9 strategies for systems (_3 )) and 
(4) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. a measures the portfolio abnormal 
performance, P measures the market risk, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size 
and book-to 
-market value factors as measured by F ama and French (1993), (50-, isthe 
time-varying risk exposure. The conditional variance of the portfolio returns follows a 
2=C GJR-GARCH(l, I) structure as c 0+/VE21 +77,1_1, C2 + oU2 where co, y, q and 0 1 t- t-I 1-1 9 
are estimated parameters and It-, takes a value of 1, when 6,1 is negative and a value of 
0. otherwise. MM refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French 
model. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance is 
denoted by superscripts at the 1% (a) 5% (b ) and 10% (') levels for a two-sided test. 
Winner 
MM FFM 
Loser 
MM FFM 
Momentum 
MM FFM 
a 0.0078 0.0161 0.0501 0.0132 -0.0016 0.0004 
(1.04) (3.15) (3.29) (1.82) (-0.21) (0.10) 
0.7101 0.9358 0.7140 0.9882 0.0214 
-0.0650 
(21.87) a (37.72) a (19.00) a (24.94) a (0.53) (-1.67) 
S 0.8512 1.0336 -0.2130 
(24.19) a (19.59) a (-3.46) a 
h 0.0180 0.5426 
-0.4957 
(0.44) (7.46) a (-5.98) a 
5 
-0.1696 -0.7808 -1.3611 -0.8931 0.4340 0.4368 
(-0.65) (-2.76) a (-3.60) a (-3.74) a (2.64) a (2.30) b 
(0 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(2.45) b (2.73) a (1.93) (1.65) (1.48) (1.51) 
y+il/2 0.2467 0.3336 0.1413 0.1450 0.2426 0.2243 
(2.00) b (2.66) a (-0.83) (2.08) b (1.83) (1.98) b 
71 -0.1852 0.0949 0.3028 0.2203 -0.3334 -0.2750 
(-1.38) (0.52) (3.28) a (2.53) b (-2.66) a (-2.01) b 
0 0.5785 0.5017 0.7911 0.8072 0.7357 0.7489 
(5.36) a (4.62) a (13.93) a (14.16) a (10.25) a (10.56) a 
y+i712+0 0.8339 0.7885 0.9172 0.9623 0.9813 0.9727 
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average q coefficient in Table 3.6 equals 
-0.1852 for the conditional market model 
and 0.0949 for the conditional Fama and French model, with 14 out of 18 
coefficients that are insignificant at the 5% level in Table 3.5. It follows that the 
announcement of bad news does not have any noticeable impact on the volatility of 
the winners. It may be the case that stocks whose recent performance has already 
been poor are hit much harder by further bad news than stocks recently performing 
well, which are able to absorb bad news more easily. 
The evidence of Table 3.5 thus far indicates that, with relatively few exceptions, the 
losers have higher 77 and 0, and lower y, than the winners. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 also 
report the persistence in volatility of the winners and losers, measured as ý+7712+0. 
The volatility of the losers appears to be more persistent than that of the winners. 
Indeed, the average 7+ql2+0 of the losers (winners) in Table 3.6 equals 0.9172 
(0.8339) for the conditional market model and 0.9623 (0.7885) for the conditional 
Fama and French model. For the conditional market model, this converts into 
volatility half-lives of 3 months and 18 days for the winners and 8 months for the 
losers. The volatility half-lives estimated from the conditional Fama and French 
model equal 2 months and 20 days for the winners and 18 months for the losers. 
Clearly and with only one exception out of 18 regressions, 16 the volatility persistence 
of the losers exceeds that of the winners. 
The impact of time-varying firm specific risk on momentum profits 
Table 3.5 also reports, through (5, the impact of conditional volatility on the returns of 
the winners, losers and momentum portfolios. An increase in conditional volatility 
16 The exception is the 12-12 winner for the conditional market model (Table 3.4). 
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decreases the return of both the winners and the losers, but increases the momentum 
returns. The (5 coefficients of the momentum portfolios from the conditional market 
model range from 0.2718 (12-6 strategy) to 0.7616 (6-3 strategy) (Table 3.5) Nvith an 
average at 0.4340 (Table 3.6). 6 (9) coefficients out of 9 are significant at the 5% 
(10%) level. Similar results are reported for the conditional Fama and French model, 
for which (5 equals 0.4368 on average (Table 3.6), with 6 (8) coefficients out of 9 that 
are significant and positive at the 5% (10%) level. This suggests that there is a 
positive relationship between time-varying risk and momentum return: AI 
increase in conditional volatility leads, on average, to a 0.43% increase in monthly 
momentum returns. 
The factor loadings on Rml, SMBI and HMLI for the conditional volatility model in 
Table 3.5 indicate that the winners and the losers have value characteristics (h>O) 
and are tilted towards small 
-capitalization stocks (s>O) and the losers have higher 
market risk than the winners (#L>, 8w). The latter two characteristics appear to 
corroborate the evidence from the unconditional Fama and French model (Table 3.3). 
As the loadings of the losers on Rm, SMB, and HML, are typically higher than those 
of the winners, the momentum portfolios have coefficients on the three Fama and 
French factors that are predominantly negative. 
The main contribution of this chapter is to test whether momentum profits are a 
compensation for time-varying idiosyncratic risk as described by the 
GJR-GARCH(l, I)-M model. If this is indeed the case, then the a coefficients of 
momentum strategies should be statistically indistinguishable from zero when these 
terms are incorporated into the risk attribution model. This conjecture is supported 
uniformly at the 5% level for both the conditional market and Fama and French 
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models. The GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M market model is able to explain the momentum 
returns, since the alpha estimates are reduced both in magnitude and in statistical 
significance. The alphas indeed range from 
-0.0103 (12-3 strategy in Table 3-5) to 
0.0093 (12-6 strategy in Table 3.5), with a mean at 
-0-0016 (Table 3.6). The 
GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M Fama. and French model does a good job of explaining 
momentum profits too, with an average alpha of 0.0004 (Table 3.6) and a range of 
-0.0085 (12-3 strategy in Table 3.5) to 0.0093 (6-6 strategy in Table 3.5). Clearly, the 
results of Tables 3.3 and 3.5 suggest that adding a GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M structure to 
the models traditionally used to measure performance is crucial in explaining the 
n'k 
abnormal return of momentum strategies. Interestingly, the considerable reduction in 
momentum returns after allowing for time-varying risk seems due to an increase in 
the abnormal performance of the loser portfolios. This suggests that the 
underperformance of the losers identified in Table 3.3 can be partly explained by 
their sluggish and asymmetric reaction to bad news. 
Analysis of results 
A negative relationship between stock return and conditional volatility has long been 
recognized by financial literature (see, for example, Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; 
French, Schwert and Stambaugh, 1987; Nelson, 1991; Glosten, Jagannathan and 
Runkle, 1993; Campbell, 1993,1996; Bekaert and Wu, 2000, and Ang, Hodrick, 
Xing and Zhang, 2006). Campbell and Hentschel (1992) explain this relationship as 
evidence of a volatility feedback effect, whereby large pieces of good news and bad 
news increase the future volatility of stock; the increased volatility raises the required 
rate of return and causes an immediate drop in stock price. Our results of negative (5 
coefficients for the winners and losers in Table 3.5 are consistent with the 
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explanation of the volatility feedback hypothesis that recent and distant news 
increase volatility of the winners and losers; the increased volatility implies a 
reduction in future investment opportunities. This leads to an increase on the required 
rate of return for winner and loser stocks and causes to an immediate drop in price-, 
however, the price drop will be followed by a price rise for the winners and the losers 
in the future. 
Proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis could argue that our results are an 
indication of momentum profits being merely a compensation for idiosyncratic risks 
common to the winners and losers but stronger for the former than the latter. This 
line of thought would therefore conclude that our findings are consistent with 
rational pricing in efficient markets. Thus, future research could seek to determine 
why idiosyncratic risk is important. 
However, our results are also consistent with a behavioural explanation along the 
lines of Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), where information on loser stocks takes longer 
to be fully reflected in prices. The strong impact of old news identified for the losers 
and the persistence in their volatility are in support of the statement of Hong, Lim 
and Stein (2000) that "bad news travels slowly". When a finn with no or low analyst 
coverage receives bad news, its managers are likely to withhold that news as 
disclosing it would put downward pressure on price. Since losers are more likely 
than winners to sit on bad news, they are also more likely to withhold information. 
For the losers, this converts into higher volatility persistence (or higher volatility 
half-lives) and higher sensitivity of volatility to distant news. The results in Table 3.5 
also give credence to the conjecture that, for winners, good news travels fast. 
Managers of no or low coverage firms have strong incentives to disclose good news 
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the minute it arrives as this stimulates the -share price. Since winners are, by 
definition, more likely than losers to receive good news, they are more eager to 
disclose information. This converts in our setting into a higher sensitiN-ity of winners' 
volatility to recent news and less volatility persistence (or lower volatility half-lives). 
We identify another interesting pattern in the volatility of the winner and losers. 
Relative to the volatility of the winners, the volatility of the losers clearly shows an 
asymmetric response to good and bad news: bad news substantially increases the 
volatility of the losers, while it does not impact on that of the winners. This is in line 
with the prediction of the behavioural argument put forward above. Since, relative to 
winners, losers have a higher probability of disclosing bad news, negative return 
shocks increase their volatility more than they increase that of the winners. The 
asymmetric response of losers to negative returns shocks could be explained as 
follows. Relative to winners, the probability that losers disclose bad news is far 
greater. Thus the announcement of a bad piece of news does not alter the volatility of 
winners (as bad news is expected to be transitory only) while it pushes up that of 
losers. When losers do disclose bad news, investors interpret this as a sign that their 
beliefs are correct, leading them to sell the losers. As a result, their volatility 
increases and becomes more persistent. 
A failure to explicitly model the asymmetric response of the losers and winners to 
bad news might therefore lead us to under-estimate the volatility of the losers, and 
consequently their performance, following a price drop or to over-estimate the 
volatility of the winners, and consequently their performance, following a price rise. 
This motivates the hypothesis that the momentum profits might, at least in part, be a 
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compensation for an asymmetric response of winners and losers to negative return 
shocks. 
Robustness of the results to the specification of the GARCH(1,1) model 
In this section, we test whether the momentum profits can be explained by a 
simplified version of the conditional models. Table 3.7 reports the parameter 
estimates of systems (5) and (6) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. 
Table 3.8 reports the average parameter estimates across 9 strategies. Table 3.7 
therefore assumes that the return and conditional volatility of the momentum 
portfolios are better described by a GARCH(l, l)-M model. 
The omission of the leverage effect in Table 3.7 does not alter the main conclusions 
of Table 3.5 with regards to the pattern of volatility for the winners and the losers. 
For example, Tables 3.6 and 3.8 document that the volatility of the winners (W) is 
more sensitive to recent news than the volatility of the losers (L); namely, 7W ýýO 7L' 
Similarly, the impact of old news on volatility in Tables 3.6 and 3.8 is stronger for 
the losers; namely, OL > Ow. Finally, volatility in both tables is found to be more 
persistent for the losers; namely, 7L + 17L /2 + OL ýýO vw + i7w /2 + Ow in Table 3.6 
and YL + OL > 7w + Ow in Table 3.8 17 
. 
As a result, the average volatility half-lives 
are much smaller for the winners than for the losers. Across GARCH specifications, 
ranking periods, and holding periods, the volatility half-life of the winners is 3 
months and 5 days on average, while that of the losers is 24 months and 13 days. 
17 Again, there are a few exceptions (y, > yý, ) for the 3-3 and 3-12 winners of the conditional Fama 
and French model in Table 3.6, but these are extremely rare. 
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The omission of the leverage effect however has a direct impact on the significance 
of the time-varying risk parameter 6 in Table 3.7. Of the 18 6 coefficients estimated 
for the momentum strategies in Table 3.5,12 are significant at the 5% level. When. 
as in Table 3.7. the impact of news on volatility is assumed to be symmetric. the 
number of significant 6 coefficients drops to 3. As a result, the market and Fama and 
French models with GARCH(l, l)-M terms are less able to explain the momentum 
profits. Though largely insignificant in Table 3.7, the average abnormal returns of the 
momentum strategies in Table 3.8 equal 0.0125 a month for the GARCH(l, l)-M 
market model and 0.0079 for the GARCH(l, l)-M Fama and French model. These 
average a coefficients are in excess of the 
-0.0016 and 0.0004 average abnonnal 
return for the GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M market model and the GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M 
Fama and French model, respectively. 
To summarize, the evidence in Tables 3.5 and 3.7 suggests that it is both the 
asymmetric response of the losers to good and bad news and the conditional risk 
premium that explain the profitability of the momentum strategies. Neither the 
leverage effect, nor the conditional risk premium in isolation can explain the 
abnonnal performance of the momentum strategies. It is the interaction between two 
that drives the momentum returns. 
To judge the relative merits of models (1) to (6), the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) is calculated for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. AIC trades off 
better model fit for greater numbers of parameters, and thus a preferred model is one 
with the lowest value of the criterion. The results are reported in Table 3.9 for 
different specifications of the market and Fama and French models. These 
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specifications include the static models (1) and (2), the GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M models 
(3) and (4), and the GARCH(l, l)-M models (5) and (6). 
For a given specification of the risk-return relationship, the data always favour the 
Fama and French model over the market model. This indicates that the size and 
book-to-market value risk factors add explanatory power to the models over and 
nu 
above that provided by the market return. More pertinent to our study, the data 
evidently prefer the GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M models to the static approaches. The 
GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M market and Fama and French models have the lowest values of 
AIC in the vast majority of the cases, and never rank last in terms of AIC values. 
These results for the GJR-GARCH (I, I)-M models compare favorably to the AIC of 
the GARCH(l, l)-M. Irrespective of the ranking and holding periods, the static 
versions of the market and Fama and French models stand out as having the highest 
values of the AIC. This suggests that of the three specifications of the market and 
Fama and French models, the static versions provide the worst account of the returns 
of the winner, loser and momentum portfolios, while the time-varying conditional 
volatility models allowing for asymmetries provide the best. 
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Table 3.8. Average coefficient estimates of conditional market and Fama and French models with a GARCH (1,1)-M term across ranking and holding periods 
The table reports average coefficient estimates for systems (5) and (6) across ranking and 
holding periods for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Winner (Loser) is an 
equally-weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed 
the best (worst) over a given ranking period. Momentum is a portfolio that buys the 
winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio. cr measures the portfolio's abnormal 
performance, fl measures the market risk, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size and 
book-to-market value factors as measured by Fama and French (1993), (5 is the 
time-varying risk exposure. The conditional variance of the portfolio returns follows a 
GARCH(l, 1) structure as C2 = CO + 7C 21 + OU21 
, 
where co, y and 0 are parameters. MM 
refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French model. 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance is denoted by 
superscripts at the I% ('), 5% (b ) and 10% (') levels for a two-sided test. 
Winner 
MM FFM 
Loser 
MM FFM 
Momentum 
MM FFM 
a 0.0152 0.0150 
-0.0122 0.0035 0.0125 0.0079 
(1.91) c (3.05) a (-1.72) C (0.62) (2.09) b (1.34) 
0.7312 0.9304 0.7195 0.9956 0.0075 
-0.0667 
(18.41) a (35.50) a (14.56) a (24.55) a (0.22) (-1.66) 
S 0.8435 1.0355 
-0.1907 
(23.73) a (19.09) a (-3.20) a 
h 0.0170 0.5807 
-0.5539 
(0.49) (7.48) a (-7.10) a 
(5 
-0.4126 -0.7026 0.0482 -0.5085 0.0177 0.2031 
(-1.65) (-2.61) a (0.29) (-2.81) a (0.16) (1.09) 
co 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(2.39) b (2.67) a (1.25) (1.43) (1.86) c (1.66) 
y 0.2711 0.2962 0.1885 0.1964 0.2605 0.2310 
(2.69) a (2.49) b (2.8 7) a (3.25) a (2.79) a (2.95) a 
0 0.5356 0.4932 0.7943 0.7825 0.7083 0.7342 
(4.72) a (4.36) a (11.07) a (12.64) a (8.59) a (9.2 5) a 
y +0 0.8068 0.7894 0.9827 0.9789 0.9689 0.9653 
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Robustness of the results to the market examined 
In order to determine whether the ability of the asymmetric conditional volatility 
model to explain the results of the momentum portfolios results from some specific 
feature of the UK market, or whether it is likely to be more general, we repeat the 
entire analysis above on winner, loser and momentum portfolios formed from US 
stocks. The US data cover the period January 1978 to December 2001, and are 
obtained from Datastream. The mean returns of the winner, loser, and momentum 
portfolios, formed in an identical way to that described above for the UK market, are 
presented in Table 3.10. There is ample evidence of momentum effects, with the 
winner portfolio average returns statistically significantly exceeding those of the 
losers for all nine portfolio formation and holding periods examined. While the sizes 
of the momentum effects are slightly smaller for the US, they are of the same order 
of magnitude as they are for the UK. For example, for the 12-12 strategy, the average 
monthly return for the UK is 1.43%, and for the US it is 1.12%. For the latter market, 
profitability is highest at 1.71% per month for the 12-3 strategy, whereas it is 
maximized at 1.93% for the 6-6 strategy in the UK. 
Table 3.11 reports the parameter estimates for the statistic market and Fama-French 
models using the US data. It is evident that the three - factor model is no more able to 
explain the profitability of relative strength portfolios for this market than it is for the 
UK. For all nine (eight of the nine) combinations of portfolio formation and holding 
periods examined, the momentum profits are still positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% (1%) level. 
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Finally, Table 3.12 shows the parameters for the conditional market and Fama and 
French models with a GJR-GARCH (1, l)-M term estimated using US Data. While 
the importance of time-varying idiosyncratic risk appears more uniformly high 
whatever combination of portfolio formation and holding period are used in the UK 
context than for the US, in the latter case, the momentum profits are again largely 
explained by the incorporation of the idiosyncratic risk tenns into the equations. This 
leads both the sizes of the estimated alphas and their levels of statistical significance 
to reduce. For instance, when the time-varying idiosyncratic risk terms are included 
in the model, the alpha for the 6-6 momentum strategy of 0.0134 when the market 
model is used is reduced by 40% to 0.085 and it is reduced by 25% to 0.012 when 
the Fama-French model is used. For the augmented market model and the 
Fama-French model presented, 5 out of 9 strategies are significantly profitable at the 
5% level. Our other major findings concerning the speed of ad ustment of volatility i 
and the asymmetric response of volatility to good and bad news for the winners 
relative to the losers still holds. 
3.4. Conclusions 
This chapter considers whether the widely documented momentum profits are a 
compensation for time-varying idiosyncratic risk as described by the family of 
autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic models. The motivation for estimating a 
GJR-GARCH(I, I)-M model stems from the fact that since losers have a higher 
probability than winners to disclose bad news, one cannot assume a symmetric 
response of volatility to good and bad news. Neither can we presuppose that the 
speed of adjustment of volatility to news is the same for the winners and the losers. 
Our results suggest that the volatility of the winners indeed differs from that of the 
78 
losers. For example, the volatility of the winners is found to be more sensitiN-e to 
recent news and less persistent than that of the losers. The converse, that the 
volatility of the losers is found to be more sensitive to distant news and more 
persistent than that of the winners, also holds. 
Most importantly, we also document that the GJR-GARCH(l, l)-M models explain 
much of the profitability of the momentum strategies, and certainly have more 
descriptive power than the commonly used size and value risk factors. Interestingly, 
neither the GJR-GARCH(l, l) nor the GARCH(l, l)-M specifications alone could 
account for the abnormal return of the relative- strength portfolios. It is therefore a 
combination of the asymmetric response of the losers to good and bad news, the 
sluggish response of losers to bad news and the conditional risk premium embedded 
in the GARCH(l, l)-M model, that explain the profitability of the relative-strength 
port 0 ios. 
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Chapter 4. The Value Premium and Time-Varying 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
4.1. Introduction 
The value premium, or the difference in returns between a portfolio of value stocks 
and a portfolio of growth stocks, has been identified in academic studies and 
exploited by financial market practitioners for over a decade. Basu (1977), Fama and 
French (1992,1993,1995 and 1996) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
report US evidence that value stocks with high figures for the ratios of B/M, C/P or 
E/P outperform growth stocks with low figures for these ratios. Similar evidence has 
also been found in the UK and other international stock markets by Dimson, Nagel 
and Quigley (2003) and Fama and French (1998). While the existence of this value 
premium goes largely undisputed, interpreting the premium and identifying its causes 
has been more controversial. 
Haugen (1995), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and La Porta, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) focus on behavioral explanations, attributing it to the 
judgment biases of investors. The argument goes that investors base their 
expectations of future performance on past performance and, as a result, they 
underprice value stocks and overprice growth stocks. Eventually, overly enthusiastic 
growth investors are disappointed by the poor earnings announcements of growth 
stocks while overly pessimistic value investors are pleasantly surprised by the 
performance of value companies. The market then corrects previous mis-pricings 
such that value stocks become winners and growth stocks become losers. However, 
Levis and Liodakis (2001) report that the market does not extrapolate from either 
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past earnings growth or past price perfonnance. Their evidence suggests that positive 
and negative surprises have an asymmetric effect on the returns of value and growth 
stocks. Positive shocks have a strong positive impact on the returns of value stocks, 
while negative shocks have a strong negative impact on the returns of growth stocks. 
By contrast, Fama and French (1993,1995 and 1996) and Chen and Zhang (1998) 
document that the value premium is a compensation for risk. They argue that high 
B/M. C/P and E/P companies (value stocks) suffer from a relatively high likelihood 
of financial distress with continuously low earnings and high earnings risk. On the 
other hand, low B/M, C/P and E/P companies (growth stocks) experience strong 
growth with continuously high earnings and low earnings risk. Therefore, they 
propose that the superior returns from value investing are merely compensation for 
holding risky stocks. The two studies by Fama and French (2006) and Ang and Chen 
(2007) examine the value premium using the CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965). They find that the CAPM is able to capture the value premium of 1926-1963, 
but fails to explain it for the post- 1963 period. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Ang and Chen (2007) 
and Adrian and Franzoni (2005) argue that a significant weakness of the static 
CAPM is its assumption that the beta of the asset is constant through time. They 
develop a conditional CAPM by allowing betas and expected returns to vary over 
time and find that the conditional CAPM performs substantially better than the static 
CAPM in explaining the cross-sectional variation in expected returns on size and 
B/M portfolios. However, Lewellen and Nagel (2006) argue that while betas do 
fluctuate substantially over time, these variations are not large enough to explain the 
value premium and the momentum effect, a result echoed by Petkova and Zhang 
(2005). Fama and French (2006) confirm that even allowing betas to van, annuallN-, 
the conditional CAPM still fails to describe the post- 1963 value premium. 
There is increasing evidence that idiosyncratic risk may matter. The question as to 
whether average stock variance is priced is still open with convincing evidence on 
both sides of the debate. On one hand, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001), 
Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003), Ghysels, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2005), Fu (2005), 
Diavatopoulos, Doran and Peterson (2006) and Jiang and Lee (2006) show that there 
is a positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and stock market return. On the 
other hand, Bali, Cakici, Yan and Zhang (2005) and Bali and Cakici (2007) put 
forward the claim that the relation could be spurious since it is driven by illiquid 
small capitalization stocks traded on the NASDAQ and depends on the measure of 
idiosyncratic volatility used, on the sample analyzed and on the data frequency. 
The goal of this chapter is to analyze the post- 1963 value premium defined using the 
ratios of B/M, C/P and E/P. Instead of using the capital asset pricing model, it 
examines time-varying risk as measured by a model for the conditional variance of 
the value and growth portfolios and tests whether value stocks are riskier than growth 
stocks in the sense of time-varying risk through a conditional measure of 
portfolio-specific risk. We follow the methodology used in Chapter 3 and model the 
time-dependent structure of conditional volatility and its impact on the returns of 
value and growth portfolios through a GARCH process (see Engle, 1982 and 
Bollerslev, 1986). 
The rationale for choosing this model is that, as well as having constant betas, the 
static CAPM also assumes that the variances of the error terms are constant. 
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However, numerous researchers have found that for financial time series, the 
variances of the error terms change over time in a partially predictable fashion (see. 
for example, French, Schwert and Stambaugh, 1987 and Schwert and Seguin, 1990) 
and exhibit volatility clustering, where large (small) volatility changes tend to be 
followed by large (small) volatility changes. In the financial literature, the error term 
in asset pricing models is often interpreted as representing information arriving in the 
market. The static CAPM ignores the impact of conditional information on the 
expected stock return caused by heteroskedasticity. By contrast, the GARCH model 
is designed to capture the impact of new information on the conditional variance 
through the most recent squared error. The essence of the motivation for using the 
GARCH model is that the release of new information (captured by the error term) 
may cause the risk (conditional variance) of value and growth stocks to change over 
time in a way that is priced and can be captured by the model. 
Another rationale for explaining the value premium through this model is that the 
premium may not solely rely on systematic risk. The traditional CAPM implies that 
idiosyncratic risk can be diversified away when investors hold a market portfolio. 
However, Levy (1978), Merton (1987) and Malkiel and Xu (2001) extend the CAPM 
and find that idiosyncratic risk can also be priced if investors do not hold the market 
portfolio. Chen and Zhang (1998) report that the value portfolio largely consists of 
stocks that have high likelihoods of financial distress with high earnings uncertainty. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) show that the growth portfolio largely 
consists of stocks that have long records of high growth rates of sales, earnings and 
cash flow. Therefore, the value and growth portfolios may be not perfectly 
diversified in terms of market portfolio although they consist of large numbers of 
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stocks. Chapter 3 provides evidence that time-varying idiosyncratic risk can fully 
explain momentum profits. Thus, it may also can capture the value premium. 
This chapter uses a similar methodology as in Chapter 3 and models idiosyncratic 
risk of the value and growth portfolios through a GARCH framework. Extending 
from Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988), we specify different versions of the 
GARCH-based conditional variances with the CAPM and market capitalization. In 
particular, we examine whether the value premium is a compensation for exposure to 
1) the time-varying risk of the market; 2) the time-varying risk of a size factor; 3) 
idiosyncratic risks that affect value and growth portfolios in opposite ways that are 
captured by the GARCH specification; and 4) a combination of all three. The 
advantage of this approach is that it allows estimation of the CAPM and 
GARCH-in-mean model simultaneously. 
The contributions of this chapter to the literature can be further specified as follows. 
We use a conditional variance term in the equation for returns which does not 
assume that the level of risk is time-invariant. Our results are in support of the idea 
that value stocks do not have higher market risk than growth stocks. While the 
CAPM beta has strong explanatory power for the value and growth portfolio returns 
when examined separately, it cannot explain the post-1963 value premium. We find 
that this premium is a compensation for exposure to unsystematic risk which can be 
fully explained by the conditional variance model. The results are robust to different 
definitions of value and growth stocks (B/M, C/P and E/P) and to variations in the 
country under review (the US and UK). Our model is able to explain the value 
premium without resorting to ad hoc rationalizations based on behavioural 
considerations, transactions costs or illiquidity. Our risk measure is based on the total 
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risk of the value and growth portfolios, hence allowing the idiosyncratic component W 
of risk to vary over time. 
The remainder of chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 develops a model for 
the time-varying idiosyncratic risk within a GARCH-M framework and discusses the 
econometric specifications. Section 4.3 describes the data. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 
report the empirical results for US and UK data respectively. Section 4.6 provides an 
analysis of the findings and finally, Section 4.7 offers some concluding remarks. 
4.2. Econometric Framework 
4.2.1. The Static CAPM 
Letting r,, and r,,,, denote excess returns on asset i and on the market portfolio of 
all assets in period t, the static CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), which is 
further developed by Black (1972), can be written as follows 
E(rj, )=ßiE(rmt) (1) 
where fl, = Cov (r,, 9 rm, )/ Var (rm, ) (2) 
and E0, Covo and Varo denote the expectation, covariance and variance, 
respectively. This single-period CAPM assumes that the ratio of the expected market 
excess return to the expected asset excess return remains constant over time; that is, 
all investors have the same expectations about asset returns for any given time period. 
However, in practice investors may update their expectations each period according 
87 
to new information and this leads to conditional expectations, which are stochastic 
rather than constant. 
4.2.2. Model Specifications 
We start by considering the static CAPM in ex post form given by 
Model 1: 
rp, =a+, 8(Rmt 
- 
R, )+c,, (3) 
where r, is either the excess returns on the value and growth portfolios or the 
return on the high-minus-low (HML) portfolio, R., is the value-weighted return on 
the market portfolio of all assets, Rf, is the three-month Treasury bill rate and 
ep, 
- 
N(O, C2). If the static CAPM is sufficient, the alpha coefficient should be equal 
to zero in statistical terms. 
The CAPM model with a standard GARCH (1,1) process (see Bollerslev, 1986) for 
the conditional variance of portfolio returns is given by 
Model 2: 
rp, a+ ß(Rm, 
- 
Rf, ) + ep, 
u2 79 2+ oc]r2 Pt 
-ý w +) pt-1 Pt-1 
(4) 
where r- N(Oý a2), 072 is the conditional variance of portfolio returns, y, 0, 111 PI PI 
and o are parameters to be estimated. To ensure that (72 is non-negative, PI 
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non-degenerate and that the GARCH (1,1) process is covariance stationarity, the 
conditions c9>O, O<y<1,0<0<1 andy+O<l are imposed. The CAPM witha 
GARCH specification for the conditional variance allows expected excess returns, 
the conditional variances and the covariances of asset returns to vary over time. It 
follows that the conditional variance depends not only on past shocks but also on 
past realizations of the conditional variance itself. 
According to Nelson (1991), Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle (1993) and 
Rabemananjara and Zakoian (1993), good news (as measured by positive shocks) 
and bad news (as measured by negative shocks) may have an asymmetric impact on 
the conditional variance of stock returns. In particular, it has been shown that 
volatility is higher for negative returns than positive returns of the same magnitude. 
This has been argued to arise either from "leverage" (the impact of falling versus 
rising stock prices on a firm's debt-to-equity ratio) or "volatility feedback" effects. In 
Model 3, we explicitly capture this potential asymmetric effect and test whether 
value and growth stocks respond in the same way to good and bad news. Therefore, 
we obtain: 
Model 3: 
rp, + ß(Rm, 
- 
Rft)+ cpt 
22+I 
_j"r2 17 t, + 
ou 2 UP, =W+ IVEP, 1 p(-i PI-1 
(5) 
where q measures any asymmetric response of volatility to good and bad news, 
cp, 
- 
N(O, up2l ), I, 
-, 
=I if cl-I <0 (bad news) and I, 
-, 
=0 otherwise. Now the 
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2 conditions for non-negative and non-degenerate up, and covariance stationaritý- 
areco>O, O<y<l, 0:! ýO<I, y+q12ý! O and Y+q/2+0<1. 
In Models 4 and 5, we follow Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988) and add to 
Models 2 and 3a conditional standard deviation term in the mean equation that 
models the time-varying risk premium of value and growth portfolios. The resulting 
model, which we term the GJR-GARCH-M (Standard Deviation) (hereafter 
GARCH-M (SD)) formulation, is 
Model 4: 
rp, =a+ ß(Rut 
- 
Rft )+ Jup, + 
-ep, 
222 
upt 
= Co + vEpt-, + oupt-1 
Model 5: 
rp, =a+, O(R., 
- 
Rfi + 5o--,, + cp, (7) 
2 
oj+ý 2 (T Ic pj_j + 77 1 '62 + 
ou 2 
Pt = t-I Pt-I PI-I 
where (5 measures the risk premium, up, captures the time-varying risk, and 
ch 
- 
N(O, up'J. These models imply that increased risk as measured by the 
conditional standard deviation leads to a rise (J > 0) or fall ((5 < 0) in the level of 
compensation for holding the asset. 
Following Nelson (1991) and Hentschel (1995), for comparison and completeness 
we adopt another commonly used functional form for capturing the time-varying risk 
in Models 6 and 7, which instead of the conditional standard deviation, uses the 
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conditional variance in the mean equation. We term it as the GJR-GARCH--M 
(Variance) (hereafter GARCH-M (V)). Therefore, we obtain 
Model 6 
rp, + ß(Rut 
- 
Rf, )+ vo-p, + ept 
u2 7c 
2 
+o0-2 
(8) 
pt =Co+ 2 PI-1 PI-1 
Model 7: 
rp, + ß(Ru, 
- 
Rf, + vup', + sp, 
22+ 17 It u=0+, vcpt- 
_I 
e2j_I + ou 2 pt 1p Pi-1 
where vo-, 2 measures the time-varying risk premium and c- N(O, 0.2 ). The PI PI Pf 
models specified in equations (6) to (9) imply that there are serial correlations in 
asset returns which arise through the introduction of the conditional variance, which 
is itself autocorrelated, in the mean equation. In addition, the conditional expected 
portfolio return is a linear function of the conditional variance. 
Using Models 2 to 7, the main hypothesis involves whether the value premium can 
be explained by the conditional GARCH-CAPM model, which would imply a=0 
for HML (high minus low) portfolio. Therefore, two-sided test is more appropriate 
than one-sided test on parameters of Models 2 to 7. We also analyze the impact of 
more recent information (as measured by y) and older information (as measured by 0) 
on the volatility of the value and growth portfolio returns. For Models 6,7,8 and 9, 
we examine the null hypothesis that the value premium is a compensation for 
time-varying risk, which implies that either 45 >0 or v>0. For Models 5,7 and 
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9, we further test for the existence of any asymmetric impact of good and bad news 
on the volatility of the value and growth portfolios returns under the null hypothesis 
that 77 =0. 
4.3. Data Description 
Our US data comprise portfolios that include all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
stoc S. 18 At the end of June each year during the sample period, all stocks are ranked 
into I O-decile portfolios based on the ratios of B/M, C/P and E/P and then the 
value-weighted returns of portfolios for the following 12 months are calculated. A 
value portfolio contains the top 10% of stocks ranked by each ratio and a growth 
portfolio contains stocks in the bottom 10%. The full sample period for B/M 
portfolios runs from July 1926 to June 2006 for consistency with the studies of Fama 
and French (2006) and Ang and Chen (2007). For the C/P- and E/P 
-sorted portfolios, 
the sample covers the period July 1963 to June 2006. 
In order to provide comparative evidence for a different market, we obtain the UK 
return series of the value and growth portfolios sorted on B/M, C/P and E/P, also 
from Kenneth R. French's website. However, the ranking method for the UK value 
and growth portfolios is slightly different to that of the US portfolios. At the end of 
December each year, all stocks listed on the UK stock market are ranked into 3 
groups based on the ratios of B/M, C/P and E/P. The value portfolio is constructed to 
contain stocks in the top 30% after ranking according to each ratio and the growth 
portfolio contains stocks in the bottom 30%. The sample period runs from January 
" The return series of portfolios are downloaded from Kenneth R. French's website: Data are obtained 
from http: //mba. tuck. dai-tmotith. edu/pages/facultv/ken. french/data libra[y. htmi. 
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1975 to December 2002. We find that the high B/M portfolio does not significantly 
outperform the low B/M portfolio for the UK data over the 1975 to 2001 period. 
Fama and French (1998) report a similar result for the period 1975 to 1995. By 
w 
contrast, Dimson, Nagel and Quigley (2003) show a strong value premium (when 
value is measured by B/M) in the UK stock market over the period 1955 to 2001. 
These possibly are due to the different sample period and ranking method as Dimson. 
Nagel and Quigley (2003) include stocks in the top (bottom) 40% by B/M ranking to 
form value (growth) portfolio. In order to investigate this value premium, in all 
subsequent tests using UK data in this study, we use the same return series of value 
and growth portfolios sorted on B/M as employed in the study of Dimson, Nagel and 
Quigley (2003). 19 The sample covers the period January 1963 to December 200 1. 
4.4. The US Value Premium Sorted on B/M, C/P and EIP 
The core objective of this chapter is to examine whether time-varying risk can 
explain the post-1963 value premia. However, before moving on to this, we first 
analyze the mean returns on the US B/M, C/P and E/P portfolios and then examine 
their performance within the static CAPM. Next, we allow for time-varying risk of 
the value, growth and HML portfolios through different GARCH model 
specifications. Finally, we add a size factor to the conditional variance model. 
4.4.1. The Mean Return on Value and Growth Portfolios 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the monthly returns on the US B/M, CIP 
and E/P portfolios. High represents a value portfolio containing stocks in the top 
19 Data are obtained from Stefan Nagel's web site: http: //facuIty-gsb. stanford. edu/nageUindex. htm. 
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10% of each ratio, while Low represents a growth portfolio containing stocks in the 
bottom 10% of each ratio. HML is a portfolio with the average returns on the value 
portfolio minus the average returns on the growth portfolio. The value premium is 
then defined as the average return on the HML portfolio. To be more comparable 
with the studies of Fama and French (2006) and Ang and Chen (2007), we explore 
the monthly return on B/M-sorted portfolios for the full sample period from July 
1926 to June 2006 (hereafter 26-06), and two sub-sample periods from July 1926 to 
June 1963 (hereafter 26-63) and from July 1963 to June 2006 (hereafter 63-06). For 
the C/P and E/P portfolios, the sample period covers July 1963 to June 2006. The 
t-statistics reported in Table 4.1 are for the significance of the mean based on 
heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust (Newey and West, 1987) standard 
errors. 
Consistent with the evidence in Fama and French (1992,1993 and 2006), Davis, 
Fama and French (2000) and Ang and Chen (2007), we find that the growth portfolio 
has low mean returns from 0.81% to 0.93% per month on the B/M-sorted portfolios 
for the full period and the sub-samples. By contrast, the value portfolio has high 
mean returns from 1.39% to 1.43% per month. As a result, there is a reliable value 
premium in returns. The value premium is 0.54% per month on average over the 
period 26-06 and is significant at the 5% level (t = 2.49). For the two sub-samples, 
the value premium is 0.5% (t = 1.23) and 0.57% (t = 2.88) per month over the 26-63 
and 63-06 periods, respectively. 
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics for monthly returns on US value, growth and 
HML portfolios 
This table reports the monthly mean returns (%), standard deviations (Std Dex.,, %) and 
t-statistics for the significance of the mean for the value-weighted portfolios. At the 
end of June each year during the sample period, all stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ are ranked into I O-decile portfolios based on the ratios of B/M, C/P and E/P. 
B/M is the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of equity; C/P is the ratio 
of cash flow to market value of equity; E/P is the ratio of earnings to market value of 
equity. High represents a value portfolio containing stocks in the top 10% by each ratio. 
Low represents a growth portfolio containing stocks in the bottom 10%. HML (high 
minus low) is a portfolio with the average returns on the value portfolio minus those on 
the growth portfolio. The full sample period for B/M portfolios runs from July 1926 to 
June 2006, and two sub-sample periods run from July 1926 to June 1963 and from July 
1963 to June 2006. The sample period for C/P and E/P portfolios runs from July 1963 
to June 2006. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on Newey-West standard errors. 
Significance is denoted by superscripts at the 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (') levels for a 
two-sided test. 
B/M Portfolio CIP Portfolio E/P Portfolio 
High Low HML High Low HML High Low HML 
711926-612006 711963-612006 7/1963-6/2006 
Mean (%) 1.40 0.87 0.54 
t-statistic (4.63) a (4.65) a (2.49) 
Std Dev (%) 9.40 5.77 6.69 
711926-611963 
Mean (%) 1.43 0.93 0.50 
t-statistic (2.39) b (3.05) a (1.23) 
Std Dev (%) 12.57 6.39 8.55 
711963-612006 
Mean (%) 1.39 0.81 0.57 
t-statistic (5 
. 
90) a (3.58) a (2.88) a 
Std Dev (%) 5.34 5.18 4.52 
1.33 0.84 0.49 1.42 0.82 0.60 
(6.03) a (3.42) a (2.58) a (6.12) a (3.24) a (2.96) a 
5.01 5.58 4.30 5.27 5.74 4.60 
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The estimates of monthly standard deviation suggest that the average leý-el of total 
risk has changed over time. The average standard deviation of the B/M value 
portfolio is 12.57% per month over the period 26-63 and only 5.34% per month over 
the period 63-06. Similarly, for the B/M growth portfolio, it is 6.39% per month for 
26-63 and 5.18% per month for 63-06. In addition, the results also show that the 
value portfolio has more total risk than the growth portfolio over the early period 
26-63; but over the period 63-06, the average standard deviations of the value and 
growth portfolios are almost the same. Consequently, the value premium of 26-63 
has more total risk attached than that of 63-06. The average standard deviation of the 
HML portfolio is 8.55% per month for 26-63 and 4.52% per month for 63-06. 
For the C/P and E/P portfolios, the magnitudes of the monthly mean returns and 
standard deviations are similar to those of the B/M portfolios over the same sample 
period. For example, the mean returns are 0.84% and 0.82% per month for the C/P 
and E/P growth portfolios respectively, versus 0.81% per month for the B/M growth 
portfolio. The average standard deviations are 5.01 % and 5.27% per month for the 
C/P and E/P value portfolios respectively; the figure is almost the same at 5.34% for 
the B/M value portfolio. The value premia in returns are 0.49% and 0.6% per month 
for the C/P and E/P HML portfolios respectively; both of these are statistically 
significant at the I% level. 
4.4.2. The Static CAPM 
Table 4.2 reports OLS estimates of the static CAPM for the B/M, C/P and E/P 
portfolios. The results confirm the findings of Fama and French (1992,1993 and 
2006) and Ang and Chen (2007) that the (B/M) value premium of 26-06 and 26-63 
96 
can be explained by the static CAPM as the a coefficient is 0.25% per month (t = 
1.36) for 26-06 and 
-0.13% per month (t = 
-0.43) for 26-63. In particular, the 
t-statistic shows that both the a coefficients are statistically insignificant. On the 
other hand, the static CAPM is rejected for the B/M, C/P and E/P value premia of 
63-06 since the a coefficients are 0.62%, 0.59% and 0.69% per month respectively. 
and all of them are significant at the 1% level. The goodness of fit statistics confirms 
this finding. The R-squared values are much higher in periods when the static CAPM 
captures the value premium (13% to 31% for the periods 26-06 and 26-63, versus I% 
to 5% only for the period 63-06 and for the B/M, C/P and E/P-sorted value premia). 
The market risk as measured by beta also changes over time. The CAPM beta of the 
B/M value portfolio decreases from 1.7 for 26-63 to 0.98 for 63-06. Conversely, the 
estimated beta of the B/M growth portfolio increases from 0.96 for 26-63 to 1.09 for 
63-06. Over the period 26-63, the value portfolio has higher market risk than the 
growth portfolio. However, over the 63-06 period, the value portfolio has less market 
risk than the growth portfolio. As a result, the market beta of the B/M HML portfolio 
is positive and significant for 26-63, (fl = 0.74, t=5.95), while it is negative and 
insignificant for 63 
-06 (fl = -0.11 9t=-1.69). Similarly, the market betas of the C/P 
and E/P HML portfolios are also negative and significant at the 1% level. These 
results suggest that beta cannot explain the positive value premium of 63-06. 
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Table 4.2. Estimates of the static CAPM for US value, growth and HNIL 
portfolios 
The table reports coefficient estimates of the static CAPM, given by 
rp, =a+ 8(Rm, 
- 
Rfj )+ Ep, 
where rp, is either the excess returns on the value and growth portfolios or the return 
on the high-minus-low portfolio, Rm, is the value-weighted return on the market 
portfolio of all assets, Rf, is the three-month Treasury bill rate. a (%) measures the 
f2 abnormal performance of the portfolio; # measures the market risk of the port olio. R 
is used to compare the goodness-to-fit of the model. At the end of June each year 
during the sample period, all stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ are ranked 
into 10-decile portfolios based on the ratios of B/M, C/P and E/P. High represents a 
value portfolio containing stocks in the top 10% by each ratio. Low represents a 
growth portfolio containing stocks in the bottom 10%. HML (high minus low) is a 
portfolio with the average returns on the value portfolio minus those on the growth 
portfolio. The full sample period for B/M portfolios runs from July 1926 to June 2006, 
and two sub-sample periods run from July 1926 to June 1963 and from July 1963 to 
June 2006. The sample period for C/P and E/P portfolios runs from July 1963 to June 
2006. White's heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance is 
denoted by superscripts at the I% ('), 5% (b) and 10% () levels for a two-sided test.. 
B/M Portfolio C/P Portfolio E/P Portfolio 
High Low HML High Low HML High Low HML 
711926-612006 
a (%) 0.17 
(1.11) 
1.45 
-0.09 0.25 
(-1.45) (1.36) 
1.00 0.44 
711963-612006 
0.41 
-0.18 0.59 
(3.48) a (-1.97) b (3.22) 
0.96 1.18 
-0.22 
711963-612006 
0.48 
-0.21 0.69 
(3.73) (-2.04) b (3.45) 
1.00 1.20 
-0.19 
(22.51) (39.84) (-2.84) 
0.70 0.84 0.03 
(17.06) (58.62) (4.51) 
R20.70 0.90 0.13 
711926-611963 
a (%) 
-0.14 0.00 -0.13 
(-0.51) (-0.04) (-0.43) 
1.70 0.96 0.74 
(15.63) (47.28) (5.95) 
R20.76 0.94 0.31 
711963-612006 
a 0.46 
-0.16 0.62 
(3.31) (-1.87) (3.15) 
0.98 1.09 
-0.11 
(21.10) (44.64) (-1.69) 
R20.65 0.86 0.01 
(22.34) (46.60) (-3.45) 
0.71 0.86 0.05 
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If the static CAPM is an adequate characterization of the temporal variation in 
returns, the variances of the error tenns should be constant. This motivates us to 
perform a series of Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests to assess the validity of the static 
CAPM under the null hypothesis that there is no ARCH (Engle 1982), in the errors. 
Following previous studies in the time-series literature, we test for ARCH-effects of 
order up to 5. The test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a Z' with 5 degrees of 
freedom under the null hypothesis of no ARCH. 
Table 4.3 reports the ARCH LM test statistics and p-values. Interestingly, the B/M, 
C/P and E/P value, growth and HML portfolios over the 63-06 period show 
substantial evidence of ARCH effects as all the LM statistics are significant at the 
5% level. Conversely, the LM statistics of the B/M portfolios over the earlier 26-63 
period are statistically insignificant. Therefore, it is perhaps no surprise that the static 
CAPM cannot explain the post-1963 value premium but can capture the value 
premium of 26-63. It is evident that there are problems of heteroskedasticity (and 
autocorrelation) contained in the post- 1963 HML portfolio returns, which are not 
captured by the static CAPM. On the other hand, there is no heteroskedasticity or 
autocorrelation in the pre- 1963 HML portfolio returns, and the static CAPM works 
well in explaining the value premium over this period. 
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Table 4.3. LM tests for ARCH in the residuals of the static CAP-M 
The table reports autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test statistics, which are asymptotically distributed as Z2 (5) 
-variants 
under the null hypothesis that there is no ARCH up to order 5 in the residuals of the 
static CAPM. At the end of June each year during the sample period, all stocks listed 
on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ are ranked into 10-decile portfolios based on the 
ratios of B/M, C/P and E/P. High represents a value portfolio containing stocks in the 
top 10% by each ratio. Low represents a growth portfolio containing stocks in the 
bottom 10%. HML (high minus low) is a portfolio with the average returns on the 
value portfolio minus those on the growth portfolio. The full sample period for B/M 
portfolios runs from July 1926 to June 2006, and two sub-sample periods run from 
July 1926 to June 1963 and from July 1963 to June 2006. The sample period for the 
C/P and E/P portfolios runs from July 1963 to June 2006. p-values are presented in 
parentheses. Significance is denoted by superscripts at the I% ('), 5% (b ) and 10% (c) 
levels for a two-sided test. 
B/M Portfolio C/P Portfolio E/P Portfolio 
High Low HML High Low HML High Low HML_ 
711926-612006 
LM test statistic 23.01 26.43 23.84 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
711963-612006 
27.82 12.70 26.07 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
711963-612006 
82.72 25.91 70.15 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
711926-611963 
LM test statistic 4.51 8.45 3.58 
p-value (0.21) (0.13) (0.31) 
711963-612006 
LM test statistic 27.24 10.94 19.26 
p-value (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) 
4.4.3. The CAPM within a GARCH Framework 
In order to allow for heteroskedasticity (and autocorrelation) in the errors of the 
CAPM models for the post- 1963 value, growth and HML portfolios, we assume that 
the conditional variances of portfolio returns follow a GARCH (1,1) process. Table 
4.4 report the results of normality test for the errors of the value, growth and HML 
portfilios in Models 2 to 7. The decision to allocate a stock to either the value or 
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growth portfolio is based on B/M in Panel A, on C/P in Panel B and on E/P in Panel 
C. The results show that except for HML portfolio sorted on B/M and E/P and 
growth portfolio sorted on E/P, the errors of others portfolios are non-normal 
distributed. 
Table 4.5 presents the estimates of Models 2 to 7 for the value, growth and HML 
portfolios over the 63-06 period. The estimation methods for GARCH family models 
reported in this table and the rest of this chapter are the same to chapter 3, which 
compute Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors. These approaches use 
maximum likelihood estimators together with non-normality robust standard errors, 
which take into account of the biased standard error due to the non-normality of 
errors. AIC values are also reported in Table 4.5. AIC is a function of the maximized 
value of the log-likelihood function and is used to compare the relative merits of 
models. The rationale for reporting AIC instead of R2 is that the fon-ner is designed 
for any model while the latter is only applicable for linear regression models and will 
not reflect any goodness of fit in the conditional variance equation. A model with the 
lowest value of AIC is preferred. 
Portfolios sorted on B/M 
Table 4.5, Panel A, Model 2 reports the estimates of the conditional CAPM with a 
standard GARCH (1,1) specification (Model 2). The market beta of the value 
portfolio is 0.96 (t = 28.04) and of the growth portfolio is 1.09 (t = 48.91). Clearly, 
the value portfolio has less market risk than the growth portfolio and beta has strong 
explanatory power for the separate value and growth portfolio returns. However, the 
beta of the HML portfolio is negative (# = -0.07, t= -1.5), implying that the CAPM 
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cannot explain the positive B/M value premium. The y coefficient measures the 
impact of recent information on volatility and is equal to 0.13 for the value portfolio 
and 0.04 for the growth portfolio, indicating that recent information has a stronger 
impact on the volatility of the value portfolio than on that of the growth portfolio. 
The 0 coefficient captures the impact of historical infon-nation on volatility and is 
equal to 0.85 for the value portfolio and 0.94 for the growth portfolio, suggesting that 
older information has less influence on the volatility of the value portfolio than on 
that of the growth portfolio. The positive and significant coefficients y and 0 also 
suggest that both historical and more recent information have strong impact on the 
volatility of the value, growth and HML portfolios. 
Model 3 allows good news and bad news to have an asymmetric impact on the 
2 
volatility of portfolio returns by adding a leverage effect term, to the 
variance equation of Model 2. The estimated value of this parameter for the value 
portfolio is 0.07, which is insignificantly different from zero (t = 1.01). Thus, no 
matter whether the announcement represents good news or bad news, the impact on 
the volatility of the value portfolio is symmetric. On the other hand, q for the growth 
portfolio is 
-0.05 20 , which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Therefore, after 
an announcement of good news, the volatility of the growth portfolio increases more 
than after the announcement of bad news. 
In models 4 and 5, we add a time-varying risk term, Jul, to the mean equations of 
Models 2 and 3. The results show that the excess return on the value portfolio is 
20 In GJR-GARCH model, both yand 7 ineasure the impact of new infonnation and q only represents 
half of new information, so the non-negative condition should be y+ r7 /2ý! 0, therefore, the negative Cý 
q and y+rl <0 in here are allowed. 
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positively related to its time-varying premium as the 6 coefficient of Model 4 is 0.35 
(t = 2.16) and of Model 5 is 0.33 (t = 2.07). Conversely, the excess return on the 
growth portfolio is negatively related to its premium as the 6 coefficient of Model 4 
is 
-0.32 (t = -2.04) and of Model 5 is -0.23 (t = -1.69). While a negative premium on 
time-varying total risk for the growth portfolios might at first blush appear 
counter-intuitive, this result is entirely consistent with that of Hirt and Pandher 
(2005), who show that idiosyncratic risk is negatively priced in S&P 500 stocks. This 
can be attributed to the key characteristic of S&P 500 companies that they have low 
book-to-market ratios, high price-to-earnings ratios and low cashflow-to-price ratios 
- 
i. e., that they are growth stocks. 
Therefore, once we explicitly model the time-varying total risk of the value and 
growth portfolios, the value portfolio appears to command a higher risk premium 
than the growth portfolio (iýalue ý' 9grow1h). As a result, the expected return on the 
HML portfolio is positively and significantly related to its time-varying risk and the 
6 coefficient of Model 4 is 0.50 (t = 2.46) and of Model 5 is 0.46 Q=2.36). These 
suggest that the value premium could in part be the result of increased levels of risk, 
as modeled by the conditional standard deviation of the HML portfolio returns. More 
importantly, the a coefficient of Model 4 supports the hypothesis that indeed 
conditional risk is the reason behind the better performance of value stocks in Table 
4.1. Once the portfolio- specific time-varying risk of the value and growth stocks is 
explicitly modeled, the alpha of the value portfolio drops from 0.46% a month in 
Table 4.2 to 
-0.49% in Table 4.5 (Model 4). Similarly, the risk-adjusted return of the 
growth stocks in Table 4.5 (0.45%) is much better than the raw returns suggested 
(-0.16% in Table 4.2). Interestingly, the alpha of the value portfolio is statistically 
insignificant in Table 4.5, while it is positive at the 1% level in Table 4.2. Similarly. 
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the alpha of the growth portfolio in Table 4.5 is ditinguishable from 0. Results that 
are qualitatively similar are obtained from alternative specifications of the 
model. Altogether, the evidence in Table 4.5 suggests that the conditional CAPM 
with a (GJR-) GARCH-M (SD) specification is able to capture the expected returns 
on the value and growth portfolios. 
Models 6 and 7 use the conditional variance to replace the conditional standard 
deviation as a time-varying measure of risk in the mean equations of Models 4 and 5. 
Most of the estimates from these two models are similar to those of Models 4 and 5. 
The time-varying risk premium coefficient, v, of the HML portfolio is 5.63 (t = 2.48) 
for Model 6 and 5.28 (t = 2.46) for Model 7. Both of them are statistically significant 
at the 5% level. The null hypothesis of a=0 is also supported by Models 6 and 7 not 
only for the value and growth portfolios, but also for the HML portfolio. The a 
coefficient of the HML portfolio is 
-0.45% (t = -1.07) per month for Model 6 and 
-0.44% (t = -1.12) per month for Model 7. The AIC results also support this finding 
that Models 6 and 7 are the preferred models for capturing the value premium since 
they have the lowest AIC figures. 
Portfolios sorted on C/P 
Panel B presents similar results as in Panel A, but this time we sort stocks into value 
or growth portfolios based on their C/P ratios. Like the B/M portfolios, the value 
portfolio has less market risk than the growth portfolio since the average CAPM beta 
is 0.98 for the C/P value portfolio and 1.17 for the C/P growth portfolio. Additionally, 
the betas of the value and growth portfolios are positive and significant at the I% 
level. These estimates suggest that beta is again an important variable in exp aining 
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temporal variations in the returns on the C/P value and growth portfolios. By contrast, 
the beta of the HML portfolio is negative and significant at the 1% level. Thus, the 
CAPM fails to explain the positive C/P value premium. The risk premium 
coefficients, 6 and v, are positive for the value portfolio and negative for the growth 
portfolio as for the B/M sort. This suggests that the value portfolio is more risky than 
the growth portfolio in the sense of time-varying total portfolio risk. Therefore, the 
superior return on the value portfolio may be a compensation for the additional risk 
of holding the value portfolio. The risk premium coefficient i, for the HML portfolio 
is 4.52 (t = 1.95) for Model 6 and 4.4 (t = 1.93) for Model 7. These results confirm 
that time-varying risk plays a central role in explaining the C/P value premium. 
Moreover, the CAPM with the (GJR-) GARCH (1, l)-M (SD) and (GJR-) GARCH 
(1, l)-M (V) specifications are able to explain expected returns on the value and 
growth portfolios since all of the a coefficients of Models 4 to 7 are statistically 
insignificant for the value and growth portfolios. The alpha of the HML portfolio is 
-0.18% (t = -0.5) per month for Model 6 and -0.19% (t = -0.53) per month for Model 
7. The AIC results suggest that Model 6 should be chosen for the HML portfolio 
since it has the lowest AIC of 
-3.598. Overall, the results of the C/P portfolios are 
consistent with our findings for the B/M portfolios that once time-varying total 
portfolio risk is taken into account, the value premium measured using C/P does not 
exist. 
Portfolios sorted on E/P 
In Panel C, the results are similar to those of the B/M and C/P portfolios. The value 
portfolio again has less market risk than the growth portfolio and the CAPM beta 
110 
fails to explain the positive value premium on E/P due to the negative market beta. 
The risk premium coefficients, 6 and v, of Models 4 to 7 are positive and significant 
for the value portfolio and negative and significant for the growth portfolio at the 5% 
level, indicating that the value portfolio is more risky than the growth portfolio in 
terms of time-varying total portfolio risk. Time-varying risk also plays an important 
role in explaining the E/P value premium as both of the risk premium coefficients of 
Model 6 (v = 5.44, t=2.78), and Model 7 (v = 5.26, t=2.81), are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Most importantly, the difference in time-varying total risk 
once more explains most of the difference in average returns that is observed in 
Table 4.2. For Model 6, the alpha is 
-0.18% per month for the value portfolio, 0.28% 
per month for the growth portfolio and 
-0.43% per month for the HML portfolio. For 
Model 7, it is 
-0.22% per month for the value portfolio, 0.28% per month for the 
growth portfolio and 
-0.43% per month for the HML portfolio. In particular, none of 
these alphas are statistically significant at the 5% level. Clearly, the conditional 
CAPM with a (GJR-) GARCH (1, l)-M (V) specification not only captures the E/P 
value premium, but can also explain the returns on the value and growth portfolios. 
These results provide additional evidence that after taking account of time-varying 
risk, the value premium does not exit. The AIC values for the E/P sorted HML 
portfolios also suggest that Model 6 best captures the value premium. 21 
Another interesting finding from Table 4.5 is that value portfolios uniformly have 
positive time-varying risk premium coefficients, where 6>0 and v>0; conversely, 
growth portfolios have uniformly negative time-varying risk premium coefficients, 
" In addition, we carry out a series of ARCH LM test for the residuals of Models 2 to 7 for the value, 
growth and HML portfolios and find that the test statistics are statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
there is no evidence of ARCH effects in the errors after using GARCH (1,1) specifications. 
where 6<0 and v<0. These results suggest that the value portfolios have higher 
total risk than the growth portfolios. The possible explanation follows the view of 
fundamental analysis. Penman (2007) uses a residual earnings model to value equity 
and measure the B/M ratio. He finds that when a company generates return on 
shareholder's equity (ROCEs) lower than its required returns, the company produces 
negative residual earnings. This leads to a lower valuation than its book value and a 
high B/M ratio. This type of companies are value stocks. Low ROCEs are affected 
by firms' unfavourable financial leverage and operating liability leverage. Therefore, 
value stocks are financial distress companies and have high operating and financial 
risk, that is, high total risk. On the other hand, when a company produces ROCEs 
higher than its required returns, the company has positive residual earnings. This 
causes a higher valuation than its book value and a low B/M ratio. This type of 
companies consists of growth stocks. High ROCEs are affected by firms' favourable 
financial leverage and operating liability leverage. As a result, growth stocks have 
high earning growth and low operating and financial risk with low total risk. Our 
results appear to support the findings of Chen and Zhang (1998). 
4.4.4. The CAPM and Conditional Variance Model Including a Size Factor 
Loughran (1997), Daniel and Titman (1997), Davis, Fama and French (2000) and 
Fama and French (2006) report that the post- 1963 value premium is greater for small 
capitalization stocks than for large capitalization stocks. Their results raise a question 
as to whether the size effect can explain the post- 1963 value premium. We examine 
this hypothesis by adding a Fama and French (1993)-style size factor into Models 2 
to 7 described above. This leads to: 
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rp, a+9,,, 
(Rm, 
- 
Rf, + OsmB SMB, + Jap, + vo- p2, +, 6p, 
a2= 0) + ye 2_+ qI 62 +oO72 pt pi 1 1-1 PI-I PI-I 
where v-N (0,072t SMB is the Fama and French size factor which is the PI pII 
difference between the average returns on the small market capitalization portfolio 
and the average returns on the big market capitalization portfolio, and 
measures portfolio loadings on the size factor. All other notation is as described 
nlk 
above and either 5=0 or v=0. 
Table 4.6 presents estimates of this model for the value, growth and HML portfolios. 
Panel A reports the results for the B/M portfolios. The value portfolio sorted on B/M 
loads heavily on small capitalization stocks, while conversely, the B/M growth 
portfolio loads heavily on big capitalization stocks. For the B/M HML portfolio, we 
find that the ability of the model to explain the expected return is improved once the 
size factor is added. For example, the alpha of Model 7 drops from 
-0.44% (t =-1.12) 
per month in Table 4.5 to 
-0.22% (t = -0.57) per month in Table 4.6. Additionally, 
the Os,, estimates from all models are positive and significant at the 1% level. 
These results suggest that the size effect indeed can explain part of the value 
premium and the AIC values also support this finding. For instance, the AIC of 
Model 7 decreases from 
-3.441 in Table 4.5 to -3.473 in Table 4.6. On the other hand, 
even adding a size factor, Models 2 and 3 are still rejected for the value premium as 
=- 2.96; a 'ý 0.45%, '- 2.58) are still the alphas (amodel 2 ý- 0.51%, tmode12 mode13 2 tmo&13, ý- 
significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that the size effect cannot fully 
explain the post-1963 B/M value premium, a result consistent with the stud), of 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). 
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Panels B and C of Table 4.6 show estimates for the C/P- and E/P-sorted portfolios. 
The value and growth portfolios for both value measures load heavily on small 
capitalization stocks. For the HML portfolio, the 8swB coefficients are statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level. In addition, the alphas are almost the same between the 
models with and without the size factor. Therefore, we conclude that there is no size 
effect in the value premium when it is defined using C/P and E/P. The AIC results 
also confirm our conclusion since the AIC of Model 6 is 
-3.598 in Table 4.5 and 
-3.595 in Table 4.6 for the C/P HML portfolio; and it is 
-3.528 in Table 4.5 and 
-3.529 in Table 4.6 for the E/P HML portfolio. 
4.5. UK Evidence 
Using US data, we show above that the 1963-2006 value premium can be fully 
explained by the conditional model incorporating a GARCH-in-mean specification. 
However, in order to ensure that these results are not an artifact unique to this market, 
in this section we conduct a comparison in which we reapply the models to the UK 
market. 
Table 4.7 reports summary statistics for monthly returns on the UK value, growth 
and HML portfolios. Consistent with the US evidence, we find that the value premia 
in returns are 0.5%, 0.42% and 0.36% per month for the B/M, C/P and E/P HML 
portfolios respectively. The value premium based on B/M is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. The average unconditional standard deviation of the value portfolio 
is similar to that of the growth portfolio. For instance, the average standard deviation 
equals 5.22% per month for the B/M value portfolio and 5.26% per month for the 
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Table 4.7. Summary statistics for monthly returns on UK value, growth and 
HML portfolios 
This table reports the monthly mean returns (%), standard deviations (Std De"', %) and 
t-statistics for the significance of the mean for the UK value-weighted portfolios. B, M 
is the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of equity; C/P is the ratio of cash 
flow to market value of equity; E/P is the ratio of earnings to market value of equity. 
At the end of December each year, all stocks listed on the UK stock market are ranked 
into 3 groups based on the ratios of B/M, C/P and E/P. For the B/M (C/P and E/P) 
portfolios, High represents a value portfolio containing stocks in the top 40% (30%) of 
a ratio. Low represents a growth portfolio containing stocks in the bottom 40% (30%) 
of a ratio. HML (high minus low) is a portfolio with the average returns on the value 
portfolio minus the average returns on the growth portfolio. The sample period for 
B/M portfolios runs from January 1963 to December 2001 and for C/P and E/P 
portfolios it runs from January 1975 to December 2002. The t-statistics in parentheses 
are based on Newey-West standard errors. Significance is denoted by superscripts at 
the 1% ('), 5% (b ) and 10% (c) levels for a two-sided test. 
B/M Portfolio C/P Portfolio E/P Portfolio 
High Low HML High Low HML High Low HML 
Mean (%) 1.65 1.15 0.50 1.83 1.41 0.42 1,79 1.43 0.36 
t-statistic (6.86) (4.74) a (4.92) a (5.10) «' (4.17) a (1.89) c (5.12)a (4.2 1) (1.90) 
Std Dev (%) 5.22 5.26 2.21 6.58 6.14 4.10 6.42 6.16 3.55 
B/M growth portfolio. Thus the UK results again confirm that the value premium is 
not a compensation for total unconditional risk. 
OLS estimates of the static CAPM for the UK B/M, C/P and E/P portfolios are 
presented in Table 4.8. The alpha estimates for the B/M, C/P and E/P HML 
portfolios are 0.52%, 0.77% and 0.60% per month respectively; all of these are 
significant at the 5% level. These results provide comparative evidence that the static 
CAPM is also rejected for the UK value premium. The CAPM betas of the HML 
portfolios are also statistically insignificant. 
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Table 4.8. Estimates of the static CAPM for UK value, growth and HNIL 
portfolios 
The table reports coefficient estimates of the static CAPM, given by 
rp, =a+ fim 
(Rmt 
- 
Rf, )+ 
pl 
where rp, is either the excess returns on value and growth portfolios or the return on 
the high-minus-low portfolio, Rm, is the value-weighted return on the market 
portfolio of all assets, Rf, is the three-month Treasury bill rate. a (%) measures the 
abnormal performance of the portfolio; #.. measures the market risk of the portfolio, 
R2 is used to assess the goodness-to-fit of the model. At end of December each year, a] I 
stocks listed in the UK stock market are ranked into 3 groups based on the ratios of 
B/M, C/P and E/P. B/M is the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of 
equity; C/P is the ratio of cash flow to market value of equity; E/P is the ratio of 
earnings to market value of equity. For the B/M (C/P and E/P) portfolios, High 
represents a value portfolio containing stocks in the top 40% (30%) of a ratio. Low 
represents a growth portfolio containing stocks in the bottom 40% (30%) of a ratio. 
HML (high minus low) is a portfolio with the average returns on the value portfolio 
minus the average returns on the growth portfolio. The sample period for B/M 
portfolios runs from January 1963 to December 2001 and for C/P and E/P portfolios it 
runs from January 1975 to December 2002. White's heteroskedasticity robust 
t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance is denoted by superscripts at the I% ('), 5% 
(b ) and 10% (c) levels for a two-sided test. 
B/M Portfolio C/P Portfolio EIP Portfolio 
High Low HML High Low HML High Low HML 
a 0.45 
-0.07 0.52 
(4.57) a (. 0.90) (5.09) a
0.87 0.91 
-0.03 
(47.60) a (45.45) a (-1.71) 
R2 0.84 0.89 0.01 
0.44 
-0.34 0.77 
(1.97) b (-2.28) b (2.39) b 
1.02 0.97 0.05 
(55.26) (66.96) (1.64) 
0.86 0.92 0.01 
0.41 
-0.19 0.60 
(2.05) b (-1.55) (2.09) 
1.02 0.99 0.03 
(54.05) ' (77.95) a (1.15) 
0.89 0.95 0.00 
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Table 4.9. LM tests for ARCH in the residuals of the static CAPNI 
The table reports the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test statistics, which are asymptotically distributed us /5 ) 
-ý, anates 
under the null hypothesis that there is no ARCH of order up to 5 in the residuals of the 
static CAPM. At end of December each year, all stocks listed on the UK stock market 
are ranked into 3 groups based on the ratios of B/M, C/P and E/P. B/M is the ratio of 
the book value of equity to market value of equity; C/P is the ratio of cash flo, 
-v to 
market value of equity; E/P is the ratio of earnings to market value of equity. For the 
B/M (C/P and E/P) portfolios, High represents a value portfolio containing stocks in 
the top 40% (30%) of a ratio. Low represents a growth portfolio containing stocks in 
the bottom 40% (30%) of a ratio. HML (high minus low) is a portfolio with the 
average returns on the value portfolio minus the average returns on the growth 
portfolio. The sample period for B/M portfolios runs from January 1963 to December 
2001 and for C/P and E/P portfolios it runs from January 1975 to December 2002. 
p-values are presented in parentheses. 
EYM Portfolio C/P Portfolio EIP Portfolio 
High Low HML High Low HML High Low HML 
IM test staistic 20.76 163.58 71.99 21.30 13.64 11.76 32.28 12.20 14.25 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) 
In order to examine the statistical validity of the static CAPM for UK data, the 
ARCH-LM statistics and their associated p-values are presented in Table 4.9. The 
results show that all the UK value, growth and HML portfolios, whether they are 
sorted on B/M, C/P or E/P, have ARCH effects in their errors since the LM statistics 
are statistically significant at the 5% level or better in all cases. Therefore, using the 
static CAPM to explain the returns on the value, growth and HML portfolios could 
lead to misleading inferences. 
Table 4.10 presents the parameter estimates for Models 2 to 7 for the UK value, 
growth and HML portfolios. Overall, the UK results fully support the conclusions 
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from the US data. The CAPM betas of the value and groNN-th portfolios are almost the 
same; both of them are positive and significant at the 1% level, confirming that beta 
plays an important role in explaining the temporal returns on the individual value and 
growth portfolios. However, it cannot explain the value premium since the betas of 
the HML portfolios are statistically insignificant at the 5% level. The time-varying 
risk premium coefficients, 6 and v, of Models 4 to 7 are positive for the value 
portfolio and negative for the growth portfolio, suggesting that the value portfolio is 
more risky than the growth portfolio. The most interesting result is that the 
GARCH-M models with either the standard deviation or the variance specifications 
(Models 4 to 7) are able to capture the temporal variation in returns on the value and 
growth portfolios. The models are also able to explain the value premium since with 
only one exceptions (the B/M value portfolio from Model 4), the hypothesis that a= 
0 is uniformly supported at the 5% level for the value, growth and HML portfolios 
whatever method is used for defining value. The AIC results show that the CAPM 
with GJR-GARCH (1,1) 
-M (SD) specification is the preferred model for the B/M 
HML portfolio and the CAPM with (GJR-) GARCH (1, l)-M (V) specification 
should be chosen for the C/P and E/P HML portfolios. 
4.6. Analysis of Results 
Our results are in support of the explanation that the HML premium is a 
compensation for the time-varying idiosyncratic risk inherent in the 
value-minus-growth portfolio. Thus, while the CAPM in both its conditional and 
unconditional forms provided insufficient explanatory power, this may have arisen 
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because it embodies the wrong measure of risk, and it is in fact idiosyncratic rather 
than systematic risk that holds the key. This explanation follo,,, N-s from -viewing the 
firm's equity as a call option on the value of its assets (Merton, 1974). Applying 
Merton's theory of the firm to our present setting helps us understand the positive 
relationship that we identified between the idiosyncratic risk of value stocks and their 
average returns. Since value stocks present characteristics that one naturally would 
associate with financial distress (Chang and Zhang, 1998), one can argue that value 
managers, who own a call option on the value of the fin-n, may select risky projects 
with excessive idiosyncratic risk in an attempt to resurrect their company. Indeed, if 
the high risk projects turn out to be a success, the shareholders will enjoy the profits. 
However, in case of distress, the shareholders can invoke their limited liability and 
thus will not bear the downside risks. This could legitimate our finding that the 
premium on value stocks is a compensation for excessive time-varying idiosyncratic 
risk. Along the same lines, since growth companies face a lower probability of 
default (Chang and Zhang, 1998), growth shareholders have contingent claims on the 
firm's assets that are relatively less valuable than their value peers. As a result and in 
line with our finding, they are less likely to excessively increase the idiosyncratic 
risk of the firm by undertaking projects with high earning risks and consequently 
demand a lower premium on their equity claim. 
Alternatively, it may be that while the value and growth portfolios comprise 
sufficiently large numbers of stocks that most academics and market practitioners 
would consider them well diversified, the compositions are not proportionately 
stratified from an industrial perspective. It is widely known that value portfolios tend 
to attach disproportionately large weights to utilities, mining, and basic 
manufacturing companies whereas growth portfolios imply disproportionately large 
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bets on technology, software, advertising and pharmaceutical companies, for 
example. To the extent that the compositions of the value and growth portfolios have 
changed over time, an increasing polarization in the nature of value and growth 
companies may have occurred in a way that is unrelated to the CAPM beta, leading 
to a non-trivial level of unsystematic risk in these two portfolios that has not been 
fully diversified away, and which is thus priced in the market. 
4.7. Conclusions 
The puzzle that the static CAPM fails to capture the post-1963 value premium, 
variously defined, has been a concern in the financial literature for over a decade. 
This chapter examines the value premium by assuming that the conditional variance 
of portfolio retums follows a GARCH-M process. Our results show that this 
specification can fully explain the value premium and hence the premium can be 
viewed as a compensation for time-varying idiosyncratic risk. These findings are 
supported by different characteristics of value and growth stocks and by the use of 
data from the US and UK stock markets. Our results confirm that the size effect can 
explain part of the value premium when it is defined using B/M, but it does not 
account for the value premium defined by C/P and E/P. 
The results show that the value portfolio appears to have a higher time-varying risk 
premium than the growth portfolio, suggesting that the value portfolio is riskier than 
the growth portfolio in terms of time-varying risk. However, the value portfolio has 
less market risk than the growth portfolio after taking account of total time-varying 
risk. The CAPM beta has strong explanatory power for the value and grow1h 
portfolios, but it fails to explain the value premium. 
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We conjecture that the importance of time-varying total risk in explaining the value 
premium may arise from its ability to capture the idiosyncratic risk present in the 
value and growth portfolios. Our results are indeed consistent with the idea that, 
because value stocks are more distressed than their growth counterparts. N-alue 
managers are more likely to gamble for survival by undertaking projects with high 
earnings risks. This could translate as in our setting into higher conditional 
idiosyncratic risks, and thus into a higher risk premium on value stocks. 
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Chapter 5. Trading Costs for Momentum Strategies 
5.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, an increasing literature reports that momentum 
strategies which buy stocks with the best past performance and sell stocks xvith the 
worst past performance generate significant abnormal returns (see Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993,2001; Rouwenhorst, 1998 and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 
1996). The profitability of momentum strategies has also been shown to be 
predictable by a number of factors, such as the cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns, industry, trading volume, the business cycle, liquidity risk and trading costs 
(see, for example, Conrad and Kaul, 1998; Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Lee and 
Swarninathan, 2000; Chordia and Shivakurnar, 2002; Sadka, 2006; Lesmond, Schill 
and Zhou, 2004 and Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004). We also find in Chapter 3 that 
time-varying idiosyncratic risk play an important role in explaining the momentum 
returns. Among these factors, trading cost is often regarded as one of the most 
important predictors. 
The majority of early studies on momentum (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993; Rouwenhorst, 1998; Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999 and Liu, Strong and Xu, 
1999) assume a round-trip cost of up to 2% and conclude that momentum profits are 
large enough to be exploited after taking trading costs into account. However, recent 
evidence has made it clear that the profitability of momentum strategies very much 
depends on the size and the constituents of transaction costs. Grundy and Martin 
(2001), for example, show that a round-trip cost in excess of 1.5% does wipe out the 
profitability of momentum strategies. Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) explain that 
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the losers, and to a lesser extent the winners, are heavily tilted towards off-NYSE 
stocks with small capitalization and low price, suggesting therefore that the 
long-short portfolios comprise stocks with low liquidity and high trading CoStS. 
22 
Looking at a battery of transaction costs, 23 they conclude that the alleged momentum 
profits are an illusion. Once these costs are taken into account, the so-called profits 
disappear. However, their finding is recently questioned by Hanna and Ready (2005). 
who found that both equally-weighted and value-weighted momentum strategies can 
earn significant excess returns after trading costs. Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) also 
study the impact of transaction costs on momentum profits. Unlike Lesmond, Schill 
and Zhou (2004), they conclude that the abnormal performance of equally- and 
value-weighted momentum portfolios exceed proportional transaction costs (such as 
effective or quoted spreads). Yet these abnormal returns quickly decline with the 
price impact of trading. In effect, the profits of equally- and value-weighted 
momentum strategies do persist but only for relatively small investment mandates (of 
24 less than $200 million and $2 billion, respectively) 
. 
Finally, Ali and Trombley 
(2006) relate momentum profits to short sales constraints and show that the later are 
important in explaining why momentum profits are not arbitraged away. Altogether, 
the evidence suggests that transaction costs are substantially higher than initially 
thought, calling into question the net profitability of relative-strength strategies. 
22 Several US studies find that trading costs are associated with the market capitalization of stocks 
whereby small stocks have higher trading costs than large stocks (see Chan and Lakonishok, 1995, 
1997; Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997; Keim and Madhavan, 1997). For example, Chan and 
Lakonishok (1997) report that an average round-trip cost is 0.9% for large capitalisation stocks and 
3.3 1% for small capitalisation stocks on the NYSE. 
23 Aside from commissions, Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) measure transaction costs via quoted 
spreads, direct effective spreads, the effective spread of Roll (1984) and the limited dependent variable 
estimate of Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) which incorporates not only the spread component of 
transaction costs but also, to some extent, the commissions, short sale costs and price impact. 
24 The alphas are less likely to be wiped out by price impact costs when stocks in the long-short 
portfolios are weighted according to their price impact itself $5 billion needs then to be invested in the 
liquidity-weighted momentum strategy for the profits to disappear. 
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We contribute to the literature on the impact of transaction costs on the profitability 
of long-short strategies in three ways. First, while the studies of Lesmond, Schill and 
Zhou (2004) and Hanna and Ready (2005) look at the net profits of one momentum 
strategy in the US, we analyze in this chapter the robustness of their conclusions to 9 
combinations of ranking and holding periods in the UK. Like Lesmond, Schill and 
Zhou (2004) for the US, we show for the UK that the loser portfolios, and to a IoNver 
extent the winner portfolios, are heavily tilted towards low capitalization stocks with 
low price and low trading volume. As a result, the average round-trip quoted spread 
for the losers are much higher than once thought (3.76%) and greatly exceed those of 
the winners (2.21%). When commissions, short selling costs and stamp duties are 
added, the average round-trip transaction cost based on the quoted spread rises to 
3.77% for winners and 6.71% for losers. Once actual transaction costs are taken into 
account, the alleged momentum profits disappear. 
Our second contribution relates to a detailed consideration of the reasons behind the 
relatively high trading costs of losers. A number of US studies report that stock 
prices respond differently between buyer- and seller-initiated trades (see, for example, 
Kraus and Stoll, 1972; Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1987; Chan and 
Lakonoshok, 1993 and Keim and Madhavan, 1996). We analyze the observed 
asymmetry in the trading costs of winners and losers by decomposing each 
round-trip trade into buyer- or seller-initiated trades. This seems important since a 
long position in a winner stock will necessarily end with the stock being sold when 
the long position is closed out. Similarly, a short position in a loser stock will 
necessarily end with that stock being bought back when the short position is closed. 
The distinction between buyer- and seller-initiated trades proves to be important as it 
sheds some light on the asymmetric pattern in transaction costs between winners and 
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losers. Losers are more expensive than winners because of selling costs that are on 
average 2.3 times higher: selling a loser costs about 2.67% on average, while selling 
a winner costs only 1.18%. A closer analysis of the factors that impact the costs of 
buyer- and seller-initiated trades for winners and losers reveals that losers with low 
capitalization and low trading volume are particularly expensive to sell. 
Our third contribution relates to a new type of re lative- strength strategy. We tenn 
this a low-cost momentum strategy, which selects L% (L=10,20,50,80 and 90) of 
winner and loser stocks with the lowest total trading costs 
- 
namely, the stocks that 
are the cheapest to trade. Based on actual turnover, low-cost relative- strength 
strategies that select the 10% and 20% of winners and losers with the lowest 
effective spreads generate positive and significant net average returns of 19.10% and 
15.53%, respectively. Even after adjusting for market risk and Fama and French 
three risk factors, low-cost momentum strategies with L= 10% and L= 20% still can 
produce positive and significant net abnormal returns at the 5% level. This chapter 
therefore severely questions the profitability of standard momentum strategies but 
concludes that there is still room for momentum-based return enhancement, should 
asset managers decide to adopt low-cost momentum strategies. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the data. 
Section 5.3 presents the methodology and some preliminary results on the 
relationship between size and transaction costs. The three following sections present 
our results with Section 5.4 focusing on an extension of the Lesmond, Schill and 
Zhou (2004) to the UK, Section 5.5 analyzing the reason behind the asymmetry in 
trading costs between losers and winners and Section 5.6 focusing on the low-cost 
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momentum strategies that we propose. Finally, Section 5.7 presents some concluding 
remarks. 
5.2. Data 
Our sample covers the period 31 December 1985 
- 
31 December 2005. All data are 
obtained from Primark Datastream. In order to avoid survivorship bias, we first 
construct a list of all the UK companies that are part of the LSPD over the sample 
period. Following Fama and French (1992), we exclude financial companies from 
our sample. This deletion is implemented for two reasons: first, to avoid double 
counting of the companies in which the financial institutions invest; and second, to 
preserve the momentum returns (since most financial institutions trade on large 
market indices, they belong neither to the winner portfolio nor to the loser portfolio 
and including them may thus dilute momentum profits). We also exclude from our 
sample the lowest 5% of shares by market capitalization in any given year and the 
companies with mid-prices that are less than 5p. This is to address the concern that 
the momentum profits may be solely driven by these extremely small and illiquid 
stocks. As noted below, momentum profits persist even after removing these extreme 
stocks. The treatment of dead stocks follows the method in Chapter 3: delisted stocks 
are assigned a return of 
-100% for death types 7,14,16,20 and 2 125 in the LSPD 
and a return of 0 for other death types such as acquisition, takeovers, mergers, etc. 
This process results in a cross-section of 3,520 companies for which we download 
information on the monthly total return index: the intraday highest (ask) and lowest 
25 These death types 
appointed/liquidation, 
valueless. 
represent: liquidation, quotation cancelled 
in administration/administrative receivership, 
for reason unknown, receiver 
. 
and cancelled and assumed 
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(bid) prices at the end of each month; the closing price adjusted for capital actions at 
the end of each month; the monthly market value; and the trading volume 
- 
that is, 
the number of shares that are traded at the end of the month. We also download the 
same information as above for each of the constituents of the FTSE 100 index and 
the Alternative Investment Market (AIM26) index. The rationale for doing so is to 
analyze the impact of size on transaction costs in the UK and to compare the 
characteristics of the winner and loser stocks in tenns of size, price and trading 
volume relative to those of the constituents of a large capitalization index (the FTSE 
100 index) and a small capitalization index (the AIM index). 
5.3. Methodology and Preliminary Analysis 
This section presents the methodology employed to estimate transaction costs. While 
the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the impact of transaction costs on UK 
momentum profits, we begin our analysis by looking at the relation between market 
capitalization and transaction costs in the UK. The idea is to determine the factors 
that may impact the size of the net momentum profits. 
5.3.1. Methodology Used to Estimate Trading Costs 
Our analysis of transaction costs includes the bid-ask spread (estimated based on 
quoted spread and effective spread), commissions, stamp duties and short-selling 
costs. The estimation procedure is explained below. 
26 The AIM is a branch of the London Stock Exchange that allows smaller firms to float their shares 
with more flexibility and with less stringent reporting and other requirements than on the 
%lain 
Market. 
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Quoted spread estimate 
The quoted bid-ask spread is the simplest measure of trading costs. It is measured as 
the difference between the quoted ask price and the quoted bid price. Following 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), we measure the proportional quoted 
spread as 
-P Quoted Spread 
=1 oo x 
PA" 
BIL 
pull (1) 
where PAj, is the ask price, PBil is the bid price and Pmi, is the bid-ask midpoint for 
asset i on the last trading day of month t. The quoted spread measures the percentage 
trading cost incurred in a round-trip trade. Due to reporting errors, we filter out and 
remove stocks with negative quoted spreads and those with quoted spreads greater 
than 100%. This helps us mitigate the problem of having estimates of trading costs 
driven by a few winner and loser stocks with extremely high or low spreads. 
Effective spread estimate 
The effective spread is the difference between the transaction price and the bid-ask 
midpoint. Lee and Ready (1991) argue that quoted spreads may overstate actual 
trading costs. The effective bid-ask spread is supposed to provide a more accurate 
measure of actual trading costs than the quoted spread since it accounts for potential 
price improvement when market orders are crossed or when specialists "stop" their 
orders before trades take place. Following Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004), the 
proportional half effective spread is calculated as 
136 
pit 
-P Half effective spread = 100 x( pull 
"it (2) 
where Pil is the transaction price for asset i on the last trading day of month t. We 
follow the algorithm introduced by Lee and Ready (1991) to classify buyer- or 
seller-initiated trades. The trade is defined as seller-initiated when the transaction 
price is less than the bid-ask midpoint while it is defined as buyer-initiated Nvhen the 
transaction price is larger than the bid-ask midpoint. The half effective spread 
measures the percentage trading cost paid in a one-way trade. We compute a 
round-trip effective spread as the absolute half effective spread for a buyer-initiated 
trade plus the absolute half effective spread for a seller- initiated trade. 
Commissions, stamp duties and short-selling costs 
Bid-ask spread is not the only cost associated with trading stocks. Equity investors 
must pay brokerage commissions as well as certain fees and stamp duties. 
Commission is measured as a percentage of the total trade value and it generally 
decreases as the total trade value increases. The following commission charges 
schedule is obtained from Barclays StockbrokerS27 for company dealing accounts 
(see Appendix 1): 
Transaction value Commission 
fo-f 109000 1.75% of Trade Value 
f 10,001420,000 1.125% of Trade Value 
f20, OO 1440,000 0.5% of Trade Value 
f40, OO I 
-f 100,000 0.4% of Trade Value 
f. 1009001+ 0.3% of Trade Value 
Minimum f 100 
27 http: //www. stockbrokers. barclays. co. uk/? category=whatweoffer&usecase=Ianding48 
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Aside from commissions, we also consider stamp duty (payable at the rate of 0.5 0o at 
the time of dealing on all UK equity purchases) and short-selling costs. Accounting 
for the impact of short-selling costs on the size of the momentum profits is critical 
since many studies (among others, Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Hong, Lim and 
Stein, 2000 and Ali and Trombley, 2006) suggest that the momentum effect is mainly 
driven by the losers. We assume a short-selling cost of 1.5% per year, an estimate 
that is similar to the cost levied by Barclays Stockbrokers. We assume throughout 
that traders can short-sell loser stocks when they see it fit. While the up-tick rule 
previously forbade US traders from short selling on a downtick, the Financial Service 
Authority has never ruled against the practice in the UK. Since short-selling losers is 
allowed in the UK and is forbidden on a downtick in the US, 
28 
our UK-based 
momentum strategy is replicable, while the returns reported in the US over the sarne 
period can only be regarded as "paper" profits. 
5.3.2. Preliminary analysis: relationship between size and transaction costs 
Several US studies (Chan and Lakonishok, 1995,1997; Bessembinder and Kaufman, 
1997 and Keirn and Madhavan, 1997) identify market capitalization as one of the 
most important factors that affect trading costs. Other things being equal, there is a 
negative relationship between size and transaction costs. As a preliminary step before 
analyzing the net momentum profits, we study the relationship between size and 
trading costs in the UK by focusing on the constituents of the FTSE 100 and of the 
AIM index. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 compare the mean quoted and effective spreads of 
the constituent stocks of the two indices over time. Consistent with the results of US 
2' The up-tick rule is initially established in 1938 but is abandoned in June 2007 following a gradual 
reduction in the scope of securities covered. However, the rule applied to all US equities for most of our 
sample period. 
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studies, we find that stocks traded on the AIM are more expensive than those traded 
on the FTSE 100 in terms of both quoted and effective spreads. On average, the 
mean quoted spread is 3.98% for the constituent stocks of the AIM, ranging from a 
low of 1.87% to a high of 7.35%; and it is 2.22% on average for the constituent 
stocks of the FTSE 100, ranging from a low of 0.86% to a high of 6.96%. Similar 
conclusions are reported for the mean effective spreads. A casual look at Figures 5.1 
and 5.2 also suggests that a unique measure of transactions cost will necessarilY fail 
to capture the changing nature of costs over time. 
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Figure 5.1. Mean quoted spreads for the constituent stocks of the FTSE 100 and the 
AIM indices over time. 
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Figure 5.2. Mean effective spreads for the constituent stocks of the FTSE 100 and the 
AIM indices over time 
Figure 5.3 compares the average quoted spreads and average effective spreads of the 
constituents of the FTSE 100 and the AIM indices. It shows that average quoted 
spreads are higher than average effective spreads. Indeed, the average quoted and 
effective spreads for the FTSE 100 are 2.22% and 1.27%, respectively; and they are 
3.98% and 2.38% for the AIM. These results appear to support the argument of Lee 
and Ready (1991) that the quoted spread may overstate the true spread since trades 
are often executed inside the quoted spread. The overall conclusion from Figures 5.1, 
5.2 and 5.3 is that trading costs are not constant over time and are highly negatively 
correlated to the market capitalization of the stock considered: small cap stocks have 
higher trading costs than larger stocks. 
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5.4. Net Momentum Returns: Evidence from the UK 
This section extends to the UK the analysis of Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) for 
the US. We analyze the magnitude of trading costs and measure the net profits of 9 
relative-strength strategies. We first calculate the average size, price and trading 
volume of winners and losers and compare them to those of the constituents of the 
FTSE 100 and AIM indices. Second, we relate the gross momentum profits to the 
total costs incurred in executing the relative-strength strategies. 
5.4.1. Momentum Strategies 
Following the method of forming winner, loser and momentum portfolios in Chapter 
3, all stocks are ranked and sorted into 10 portfolios based on their past J-month 
cumulative returns (J = 3,6,12 months). The decile portfolio with the highest 
cumulative return is termed the "winner" portfolio, while the decile portfolio with the 
lowest cumulative return is called the "loser" portfolio. The return on the momentum 
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FTSE 100 
portfolio is then measured as the return difference between the winner and loser 
portfolios over the next K months (K = 3,6,12 months). The resulting strategy is 
called the J-K momentum strategy. The procedure is rolled forward at the end of 
each holding period to produce new winner, loser and momentum portfolios. The 
formation of the relative-strength portfolios is therefore non-overlapping, thus 
reducing the trading frequency and the transaction costs incurred in portfolio 
construction. The stocks in the winner and loser portfolios are equally weighted. A 
value-weighting scheme would allocate more wealth to larger, more liquid stocks 
and thus would have been less costly. On balance, however, we choose an 
equal-weighting scheme in order to be consistent with the existing literature 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993,2001; Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000 and Lesmond, Schill 
and Zhou, 2004). 
Table 5.1 presents monthly mean returns for the winner, loser and momentum 
portfolios. The rows represent the ranking periods (J = 3,6 and 12 months) and the 
columns represent the holding periods (K = 3,6 and 12 months). Without exception, 
the winners outperform the losers at the 1% level. Across strategies, the momentum 
portfolios earn an average return of 1.9% per month. This is larger than that of 1.5 1% 
per month reported in Chapter 3. One possible reason for this may be due to different 
sample sizes and sample periods as the sample in this chapter excludes financial 
stocks, extreme small market capitalization and low price stocks. Consistent with 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) and Lesmond, Schill 
and Zhou (2004), we find that momentum profits are mainly produced by the short 
positions. On average, the losers generate a return of -1.58% per month and the 
winners yield a return of 0.32% per month. The results also strongly reject the 
criticism that the momentum effect is only produced by extremely small and illiquid 
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stocks: these stocks are excluded from our sample and yet the momentum strategies 
are still able to generate sizeable positive average returns. 
The results reported in Table 5.1 also suggest that the characteristics of the winner 
and loser stocks in terms of price, size and trading volume substantially differ from 
those of the average constituents of the FTSE 100 and the AIM indices. Irrespective 
of the strategy considered, the winner and loser portfolios comprise predominantly 
stocks that have lower price, lower market capitalization and lower trading volume 
than the average stock in the FTSEIOO index. Table 5.1 therefore suggests that an 
estimate of transactions cost based on the average costs of trading FTSE 100 stocks 
may underestimate the true trading costs engaged in implemented a momentum 
strategy in the UK. We will return to this point shortly. Relative to the average stock 
in the AIM index, the average price, market value and trading volume of the winners 
and losers exceed those of the AIM stocks. This is consistent with our decision to 
exclude from the winner and loser portfolios extreme stocks with very small size and 
very low price. 
In line with Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004), Table 5.1 also extends to the UK the 
evidence that the loser portfolios are made of stocks with relatively smaller price, 
smaller size and lower trading volume than the winner portfolios. In effect, the mean 
share price is f 1.80 for the losers and f2.36 for the winners; the mean market 
capitalization is f-80 million for the losers and E324.7 million for the winners; and the 
mean trading volume is 17.8 million for the losers and 26.4 million for the winners. 
This in turn suggests that assuming symmetry of trading costs between losers and 
winners would be inaccurate. 
143 
r42 
CD 
. mw 
mm 
ß-, qj 
;1 
-4 
ci 
E 
5 
14 
.0 
F-o 
421 
C 
.04 
"C .3-. ' 
Cli 
GO 
K4 
Gn 
Gn 
cn 
, 
C., ) 2 tý ý: 0 
. -4 ýo 
- 
ce 
>0 
0 --4 
-Z Gn 
ý: 0 I=L 
a) a) 'p bIo' 
s-I 
a) 
'ca) 
riD 
- 
-.. 
4-I 
ý44 
> 
). 00., 
= 
ct3 
= 
-r-1-1- r/ 
0 41 
0 
+-. 1 0 r- 
IL 
o 
(U 
cn 
'o 
ýý 
0 
+., 
'o 4- 4-4 (4- 
raý IL 
+-A 
IL 
$-, 4) CC Q) " t: 
> cd 
as Cý V. 
'S'. 0 'r +-A 0 r/ 
c 
_4 44 
cl 
-C 
. 
4-A Q 
-4 
C13 
--ci 5c u ch 1) 
14 
0 71 
40, 
N00 Ol N OD 
r: ýý 666M 0 0N 
00 10 N 
N0 
e 
c 
0 
19 
0. 
0. 
lw 
0. 
00 co (r) 0 0) N0 0N 0 to 
0 ý, 
- 
(4 (1) r (0 0) e ýýýNýýK6 10 
r r-roorrr" 
le (0 
-0 le CO 00 Cy m0 tv) 00N co m (D 
666ýN 
00 NC4COONNr* 
1-1 NN 
'1 0 (1)00r%NMN 
006646(l) 
N 
OONN, MNN, 
to CO kr) m 
WM T- 0) 00 
OD (D IN 
r: 66v 
e) N r- 0) N 
4 
't OD 10 MIM r- U) 00 IDN666r: l) 
r- r: 00 if) r- r- 
0 100 00 t- 
i6r: N 
41 
a) r%NP-roof- r Co 00C4C4of, 0 (0 N000 kl er f- ýýý7ý6ýK (9 r-Oýr: (v) 
00 c4 (4 04 r 
N 0) 0 (4 , o(D 717 N0 
I 
0 1', OMNNOTr, ý 00 -666ýým 
or 
ý 
r: r. 0 T- r. I 
.C 
c 
0 
E 
N ON r-O NO r 
00 NrOoNr- 
NN 
ccc 
cc1c! c 11 
flo 110 I'D u 
0000000 
(Clc 
cE 
cu2 I -C >0 0.2 0.2 > 
0 
r- ý le (0 OD r- 0 0) CD IVD) 
cmýöN r: r: CO r 
lW 
r 
0 
E 
%. r% mq0 
f- r. 0 (D CO 
0rNN T- le rg r» 10 1.1 CO N 
ccc 
cm cm c2 
20 «o 0V0 «o 0 
r0000000 
r 
0 
cE 
E 
Z>0 :) 
a. 2>Z 
0 
0o Zr 
60 11 lw 
E 
N 
r 
,,. 
ON Or MOO MM 
r 
00 ý 0.16ýN'6N 
0N NNITON v 
., 
MN 0 
ccc 
c cl c! c ly 
2u 
c0 
0 
cE 
u3 
-C >Z _5 
IL (1 2>z 
Iýt 
, Zt 
5.4-2. The Impact of Trading Costs on Momentum Profits 
When implementing a momentum strategy, investors are likely to face significant 
trading costs. First, the momentum portfolios are heavily weighted toward small 
stocks with low price and low trading volume (Table 5.1) and these stocks are shown 
to be relatively more expensive (Figures 5.1 to 5.3). Second, the momentum 
strategies are highly trading intensive: investors must buy the winners and short sell 
the losers at the end of the ranking period and close their long-short positions by 
selling the winners and buying back the losers at the end of the holding period. This 
requires up to four round-trip trades a year for strategies with 3-month holding period, 
up to two round-trip trades a year for strategies with 6-month holding period and up 
to one round-trip trade a year for strategies with 12-month holding period. As a first 
approximation, the annual execution cost of a 3-month momentum strategy might be 
four times higher than that of a strategy with a 12-month holding period. 
To calculate momentum returns and estimate trading costs for momentum strategies, 
we first compute the monthly return, quoted, effective spreads and commission for 
each stock; then we rank the winner and loser stocks based on their past retums; 
finally, we calculate monthly returns and transaction costs for the winners and losers 
over the same time. 
Table 5.2 reports estimates of annual trading costs for the winner, loser and 
momentum portfolios based on the assumption of a 100% turnover of the 
constituents of the long-short portfolios at the end of each holding period. The 
analysis includes quoted or effective spreads, commission, a 0.5% stamp duty for 
stock purchases and an annual 1.5% cost on short selling. For example, the total 
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trading cost of the 3-3 winner portfolio based on the quoted spread estimate is 
16.11% and can be decomposed as follows: quoted spread of 9.72%, commission of 
4.39% and 4 stamp duties of 0.5% each. The total trading for the loser portfolio also 
includes a yearly short selling cost of 1.5%. Table 5.2 shows that the estimates of the 
quoted spread, effective spread and commission associated with the losers are 
systematically higher than those of the winners. Across the 9 strategies, the average 
quoted spread, effective spread and commission for the losers are 7.84%, 7.73% and 
3.68% respectively, which are 73%, 98% and 47% higher than those of the winners 
(those of the winners are 4.54%, 3.9 1 %, and 2.5 1 %, respectively). When the stamp 
duties on purchases and the costs of short-selling the losers are added, the total 
annual trading costs based on quoted spread averaged across the 9 strategies is 
15.06% for the losers versus 8.72% for the winners. Based on effective spread, the 
losers (with an average annual total cost of 14.94%) are 86% more expensive than 
the winners (which cost 8.02% on average a year). 
Those results are consistent with the findings of Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004), in 
which the transaction costs of the winners and losers are much higher than those of 
the majority of the CRSP stocks. They estimate transaction costs for portfolio PI (the 
losers), portfolio P2 (80% of the CRSP sample) and portfolio P3 (the winners). They 
find that transaction costs for the losers range from 30% to 75% higher than those of 
P2 and those for the winners range from 18% to 61% higher than those of P2. While 
the estimates reported in Table 5.2 are yearly, transaction costs are often reported on 
a round-trip basis. Assuming a 100% turnover of the portfolios, we estimate that the 
average round-trip quoted spreads are 2.2 1% for the winners and 3.76% for the losers. 
Once round-trip commissions, stamp duties and short selling costs are added, 
round-trip transaction costs equal on average 3.77% for winners and 6.71% for losers. 
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Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) report a round-trip transaction cost of 4.3% for the 
winners and 5.1% for the losers. The reason that our round-trip transaction cost of 
the losers is higher than that of Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) is because that we 
include 1.5% short selling cost for the losers. Early studies on momentum strategies 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Rouwenhorst, 1998 and Moskowitz and Grinblatt. 
1999) assume round-trip transaction costs below 2% for both winners and losers. We 
find that this estimate vastly underestimates actual trading costs for the UK. As 
previously reported, symmetric costs on long and short positions will also lead to a 
severe overstatement of net momentum returns. 
The round-trip quoted and effective spreads of Table 5.2 are 2.21% and 1.90% 
respectively for the winners and 3.76% and 3.72% for the losers. A comparison of 
these costs to the average quoted and effective spreads of the constituents of the 
FTSE 100 and AIM indices in Figure 5.3 suggests that the average quoted spread of 
the winners is comparable to that of the constituents of the FTSE 100 index (2.22%), 
while the average effective spread of the winners slightly exceeds that of the FTSE 
100 (1.26%). While the assumption made in previous studies of an equal spread 
between the large capitalization index and the winners seem to be valid, this 
assumption breaks down for the losers. Their quoted and effective spreads resemble 
much more the ones reported for the AIM index in Figure 5.3 (3.98% and 2.38%, 
respectively). 
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The trading costs reported in Table 5.2 are measured at the end of the ranking period. 
While the positions are opened at the end of the ranking period, they are closed at the 
end of the holding period. At that time and depending on how the spreads have 
evolved, the one-way cost of the closing transaction may differ from the one-Nvay 
cost of the opening transaction. Assuming, as in Table 5.2, that transaction costs on 
opening and closing positions are equal, may overestimate (underestimate) actual 
subsequent costs if spreads have become smaller (larger). Bearing this in mind, Table 
5.3 tests the sensitivity of the results of Table 5.2 to the time the positions are opened 
(the end of the ranking period) and closed (the end of the holding period). The 
quoted and effective spreads reported for winners and losers in Table 5.3 are of the 
same magnitude as those reported in Table 5.2. As a result, the estimates of total 
trading costs are similar in both tables irrespective of the way the spread is measured. 
Across the 9 strategies, the average total trading cost based on the quoted spread is 
23.78% a year in Table 5.2 and 23.28% a year in Table 5.3; the average total trading 
cost based on effective spread equals 22.96% in Table 5.2 and 22.56% in Table 5.3. 
Since measuring total trading costs over the holding period does not alter the 
inference on total transaction costs, the remainder of this chapter measures 
transaction costs at the end of ranking period. 
In reality, momentum traders do not need to close out their entire positions at the end 
of the holding period as some stocks will stay in the winner and loser portfolios from 
one holding period to the next. If the momentum strategy recommends retaining the 
stocks in the following period, trading costs are not actually incurred since there is no 
need to close the initial position and to re-open a new one. Table 5.4 reports the 
proportions of winner (respectively, loser) stocks that have remained in the Nvinner 
(respectively, loser) portfolio in the following holding period. We find that strategies 
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with long ranking periods and short holding periods have high proportions of stocks 
remaining in the long-short portfolio in the following holding period. For instance. 
the 12-3 strategy recommends on average to keep a long (short) position in 53.83% 
(58.6%) of the winners (losers) in the following period. This implies that on average 
only 46.17% of the winners and 41.4% of the losers need to change hands at end of 
holding period. Other things being equal, the 12-3 strategy calls for less rotation in 
the constituents of the long-short portfolio and is therefore cheaper to implement. At 
the other end of the spectrum, the longer the holding period is, the more likely it is 
that the constituents of the long-short portfolios will change hands in the next 
holding period. For example, the 6-12 strategy recommends that only 11.85% of the 
winners and 15.57% of the losers be retained at the end of the holding period. 
Table 5.4 also reports estimates of annual total trading costs adjusted down for the 
fraction of position retained. Relative to Table 5.3, total trading costs are 
considerably reduced when actual turnover is taken into account. The decrease in 
transaction costs is particularly strong for the strategies with high proportions of 
winner and loser stocks that are retained in the same portfolio in the following 
holding period. For example, the total trading costs of the 12-3 strategy based on 
quoted spread estimates drop from 38.38% for full turnover in Table 5.2 to 19.27% 
for actual turnover in Table 5.4; the average total trading costs based on effective 
spread estimates drop from 37.26% to 18-69%. 
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Table 5.5 reports annual momentum returns and net momentum profits after taking 
account of total trading costs based on full and actual turnovers. All momentum 
strategies produce significant positive gross returns, with an average return of 
23.14% per year across the 9 strategies. The picture is completely different once 
transaction costs are taken into account. Based on full tumover, none of 
relative-strength strategies generate positive and significant net profits. The strategies 
with short holding periods even yield significant negative net average returns at the 
5% level. Once we employ the lower and more realistic measure of trading costs 
based on actual turnover, none of the net momentum returns are significant at the 5 Oe 
level. In summary, the magnitude of trading costs plays an important role in 
assessing the profitability of momentum strategies. When trading costs are 
considered, none of the momentum strategy generates a positive net return. 
Robustness of the results to the value-weighted returns and transaction costs 
Table 5.6 presents estimates of value-weighted annual gross return, total trading 
costs and net annual return after total trading costs on momentum strategies based on 
full turnover. Comparing value-weighted annual returns on momentum portfolios in 
Table 5.6 to those in Table 5.5, we find that momentum strategies generate smaller 
value-weighted returns than equally-weighted returns, with only two exceptions (the 
3-6 and 3-12 strategies). On average, the value-weighted annual return is 20.05% and 
the equally-weighted annual return is 23.14%. The estimates of value-weighted 
annual total trading costs for momentum strategies are uniformly less than the 
equally-weighted total trading costs based on quoted spreads and full turnover. 
The 
average annual total trading cost is 22.38% for value-weighted momentum strategies 
and 23 
. 
78% for equal ly-weighted momentum strategies. The possible reasons maý- be 
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Table 5.5. Estimates of net returns on momentum strategies 
The table reports annual mean gross and net returns (%) on momentum strategies 
based on full and actual turnovers. The estimates of total trading costs based on quoted 
spread (%) equal quoted spread plus commission, stamp duty on purchases (0.59,, 0 per 
purchase) and short selling costs for losers (1.5% per year). The estimates of total 
trading costs based on effective spread (%) equal effective spread plus commission. 
stamp duty on purchases and short selling costs for losers. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Significance is denoted by superscripts at the I% (a), 5% () and 10% 
levels for a two-sided test. 
Holding period of 3 Holding period of 6 Holding period of 12 
months months months 
Turnover Full Actual Full Actual Full Actual 
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months 
Annual momentum return 
Net return after total trading cost 
Based on quoted spread 
Based on effective spread 
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months 
Annual momentum return 
Net return after total trading cost 
Based on quoted spread 
Based on effective spread 
19.46 22.22 22.05 
(4.78) a (4.31) a (2.32) b 
-21.07 -14.69 1.37 4.05 9.31 11.25 
(-5.59) a (-3.87) (0.28) (0.84) (0.92) (1.17) 
-19.43 -13.26 2.24 4.83 9.60 11.44 
(-5.15) a (-3.49) a (0.47) (1.01) (0.96) (1.20) 
26.15 25.74 21.10 
(5.50) a (4.96) a (2.37) b 
-13.77 0.78 5.18 8.10 8.79 10.40 
(-2.95) a (0.17) (1.04) (1.62) (1.01) (1.10) 
-12.16 1.85 5.79 8.64 9.24 10.77 
(-2.71) a (0.41) (1.19) (1.76) c (1.08) (1.17) 
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months 
Annual momentum return 26.65 
(4.90) 
Net return after total trading cost 
Based on quoted spread 
Based on effective spread 
24.25 
(4.11) 
20.64 
(3.10) " 
-11.74 7.37 4.54 10.17 8.85 
10.58 
(-2.15) b (1.36) (0.79) (1.76) '' (1.23) (1.55) 
-10.62 7.96 4.97 10.49 
9.26 10.89 
(-2.08) b (1.51) (0.89) (1.85) ' (1.31) (1.62) 
154 
Table 5.6. Estimates of value-weighted transaction costs and net returns on 
momentum strategies 
The table reports annual value-weighted annual total trading costs (%), mean gross and 
net returns (%) on momentum strategies based on full turnover. Trading costs are 
measured at the end of the ranking period. The estimates of total trading costs based on 
quoted spread (%) equal quoted spread plus commission, stamp duty on purchases 
(0.5% per purchase) and short selling costs for losers (1.5% per year). t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Significance is denoted by superscripts at the I% ('), 5% () and 10% (c) 
levels for a two-sided test. 
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months 
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum 
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months 
Annual value-weighted return 
4.33 
-13.67 17.99 3.92 -19.74 23-65 1.61 -20.99 22.61 
(0.86) (-1.22) (1.92) c (0.62) (-1.53) (2.07) b (0.20) (-1.15) (1.52) 
Total trading costs based on quoted spread 
15.38 22.04 37.42 7.81 11.45 19.26 4.23 6.69 10.92 
Net value-weighted return after total trading cost based on full turnover 
-19.43 4.39 11.69 
(-2.17) b (0.39) (039) 
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months 
Annual value-weighted return 
9.28 
-15.94 25.22 5.56 -18.64 24.20 3.34 -15-52 
18.85 
(2.88) a (-1.20) (2.24) b (0.95) (-1.51) (2.39) b (0.59) (-1.24) (1.50) 
Total trading costs based on quoted spread 
14.68 22.17 36.85 7.02 12.30 19-32 4.01 6.96 10.97 
Net value-weighted r turn after total trading cost based on full turnover 
-11.63 4.88 
7.89 
(-1.10) (0.49) (0.63) 
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months 
Annual value-weighted return 
8.09 
-16.21 24.30 5.96 -16.38 22.34 
4.43 
-14.83 19-26 
(2.67) a (-1.49) (2.25) b (0.91) (-1.51) (1.60) (0.93) (-1.21) (1,57) 
Total trading costs based on quoted spread 
7.48 1M5 13-08 23.81 36-89 6.42 12.78 19.20 3.07 
Net value-weighted return after total trading cost based on full turnover 
-12.59 3.14 
8.71 
(-1.16) (0.23) (0,71) 
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the fact that the value-weighted estimation reduces the weights on small stocks. Due 
to the lower value-weighted total trading costs and annual momentum returns, the 
value-weighted net momentum returns are consistent with the equally 
- 
Nve i ghted net 
momentum returns, with an average of 
-0.33% for value-weighted net return and 
-0.95% for equal-weighted net return after total trading costs; in addition, none of the 
value-weighted net momentum returns are positive and significant at the 5% level. In 
summary, using value-weighted and equally 
-weighted methods to estimate 
momentum returns and transaction costs does not alter the conclusion concerning the 
net momentum returns. 
5.5. Analysis of the Observed Asymmetric Costs of the Winners and 
Losers 
The results of Tables 5.2 and 5.4 show that trading costs are asymmetric for the 
winners and losers, the losers having higher trading costs than the winners. This 
section studies further the observed asymmetry by splitting each round-trip winner 
and loser trade into buyer-initiated trade and seller-initiated trades. As previously 
mentioned, the trade is defined as seller-initiated if the transaction price is less than 
the bid-ask midpoint; if not, it is defined as buyer-initiated. The rationale for splitting 
each round-trip trade into two one-trip trades comes from the fact that buyer- and 
seller-initiated trades have been found to have different impacts on prices (see Kraus 
and Stoll, 1972; Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1987; Chan and Lakonishok, 
1993,1995 and Keim and Madhavan, 1996). So an analysis of the one-trip effective 
spread might shed more light on the reasons behind the observed asymmetry 
between 
the transaction costs of winners and losers in Tables 5.2 and 5.4. 
156 
Figure 5.4 shows the average estimates of the half effective spreads on buyer- and 
seller-initiated trades for 3 winner portfolios, 3 loser portfolioS, 29 and the average 
constituent of the FTSE 100 and AIM indices. It is clear that buying the average 
constituent of the FTSEIOO index costs as much as selling it (0.63% and 0.64'. o, 
respective y). This conclusion does not, however, apply to small capitalization stocks, 
for which a seller-initiated trade on average costs 1.72%, which is 2.6 times as much 
as a buyer-initiated trade (which costs 0.66% on average). Likewise, the half 
effective spreads of seller- initiated trades are larger than the half effective spreads of 
buyer-initiated trades for both losers and winners. For example, buying a winner only 
costs 0.88% on average, while closing a long position in a winner costs slightly more 
(1.18%). The difference between the costs of buyer- and se I ler- initiated trades is 
even more pronounced for losers which happen to be extremely expensive to sell: 
selling a loser costs a massive 2.67% on average, while buying it back only costs 
30 1.14%. While buying winners is only slightly less expensive than buying losers 
(0.88% and 1.14%, respectively), the selling costs of winners and losers differ 
dramatically (1.18% and 2.67%, respectively). Clearly, the difference in trading costs 
that we observed between winners and losers in Tables 5.2 and 5.4 can be explained 
by the fact that the losers are particularly expensive to sell. 
The results in Figure 5.4 for representative constituents of the FTSE100 and AIM 
indices show that the magnitude of the costs of seller-initiated trades depends on the 
29 To conserve space, the results are only reported here for the momentum strategies with a 12 month 
holding period. The results from the other strategies are similar and are available from the authors upon 
request. 
30 Our results are consistent with Berkowitz, Logue and Noser (1988) who argue that the relativelý' 
higher cost of sells might be due to them being motivated by information and done in larger volumes 
and at greater speed than buys. Keim and Madhavan (1997) also report that the total cost of 
seller- initiated trades are larger than those of buyer-initiated trades and also attribute this finding to 
order quantities that are larger for sells than for buys in their sample. 
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market capitalization of the stock that is being traded. The smaller the stock, the 
more expensive it is to sell. This observation motivates our analysis of the 
relationship between transaction costs on buyer- and seller-initiated trades and the 
size of the winners and losers. To do that, we first sort the universe of stocks into 
winners and losers based on their past performance using, as previously, the 10% and 
90% breakpoints. We then split each of the two extreme performers into three 
sub-portfolios based on the average market capitalization of the stock in the ranking 
period. We use the 30%-70% breakpoints and end up with 3 winner portfolios 
(Small-Winner, Medium-Winner and Big-Winner) and 3 loser portfolios 
(Small-Loser, Medium-Loser and Big-Loser). 
3 
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Figure 5.4. Average half effective spreads for buyer- and seller-initiated trades 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 report for different levels of market capitalization the average 
half effective spreads of buyer- and seller-initiated trades for the 3 winner and 3 loser 
portfolios with 12-month holding period. As reported for the FTSEIOO and AIM 
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indices in Figure 5.4, size does not have much impact on the cost of buying losers 
and winners. Buying small capitalization stocks costs on average 0.92% for winners 
and 1.26% for losers; buying large capitalization stocks costs on average 0.81% for 
winners and 1.07% for losers. So we can safely conclude that the market 
capitalization of a stock is not an important determinant of the cost of a 
buyer-initiated trade. The opposite conclusion applies to seller-initiated trades, for 
which we find an inverse relationship between size and costs. Indeed, selling small 
capitalization stocks on average costs 1.67% for winners and 4.80% for losers. The 
costs of selling large capitalization stocks is much lower (0.84% for winners and 
1.57% for losers). We can therefore conclude that the difference in transaction costs 
between losers and winners that we observed in Tables 5.2 and 4.4 is driven at least 
in part by small capitalization loser stocks that are extremely expensive to sell. 
3 
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Figure 5.5. Average spreads of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades for the 
winners by size class. 
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Figure 5.6. Average spreads of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades for the losers 
by size class. 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyarn (2000) also highlight the importance of trading 
volume as a determinant of bid-ask spreads. We hypothesize therefore that trading 
volume might also have an impact on the cost of buyer- and seller-initiated trades for 
winners and losers. Using the same sorting technique as previously used for size, we 
form 3 winner-trading volume portfolios (Low-Winner, Medium-Winner, 
High-Winner) and 3 loser-trading volume portfolios (Low-Loser, Medium-Loser, 
High-Loser). Figures 5.7 and 5.8 display, for different levels of trading volume, the 
average half effective spreads of buyer- and seller-initiated trades for the 3 winner 
and 3 loser portfolios with a 12-month holding period. When it comes to the losers, 
the evidence of an inverse relationshiP between size and the cost of seller-initiated 
trades seems to apply to trading volume as well. In effect, the cost of selling losers 
with low trading volume (3.73% on average) is 65% higher than the cost of selling 
losers with high trading volume (2.42%). To a lesser extent, the same negative 
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relationship between volume and costs is reported for the seller- initiated trades of 
winners too: Closing a long position on a winner stock with lo,, N- trading volume costs 
on average 1.23%; selling a winner with medium or high trading volume costs less 
I I% and 1.03%, respectively). The opposite applies to the cost of buyer-initiated 
trades. The cost of buying winners and losers with low trading volume equals 0.79% 
and 0.92%, respectively; which is slightly less than the cost of buying winners and 
losers with high trading volume (1.13 % and 1.5 8%, respectively). 31 
To summarize, this section attempts to explain the difference in spreads observed 
between winners and losers in Tables 5.2 and 5.4 by relating the cost of buyer- and 
seller- initiated trades to the market capitalization and the trading volume of winners 
and losers. It appears that the relatively expensive trading costs of losers are mainly 
driven by the higher costs involved in selling small stocks with low trading volume. 
To a certain extent, the evidence also applies to the cost of seller- initiated trades for 
winners: the smaller the stock, the more expensive it is to close a long position in a 
winner. When it comes to the costs incurred in buyer-initiated trades, transaction 
costs for both winners and losers do not depend on the size of the stock and are 
positively related to its trading volume. 
" Borrowing Keim and Madhavan's (1996) analysis, the result of a positive relation between volume 
and the cost of buyer-initiated trades could be due to the fact that large buyer-initiated trades are more 
informationally motivated than large seller-initiated trades since buyers have many potential stocks to 
choose from and sellers tend to sell, because of short-selling constraints, only the stocks they already 
own. So a large block purchase in a particular stock conveys a message of good news that drive stocks 
and spreads up, while a large block sale might be due to liquidity needs and not necessary result from 
bad news. 
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5.6. The Profitability of Low-Cost Momentum Strategies 
Our previous results provide evidence that the profitability of momentum strategies 
is strongly impeded by trading costs. This motivates us to exploit a new type of 
momentum strategy with low trading costs. We call it a low-cost momentum strategyý'. 
The idea is to select loser and winner stocks that are likely to be the cheapest to trade. 
The strategy first ranks all stocks into 10 equally-weighted groups based on their past 
J-month cumulative returns (J = 3,6,12 months). The 10% of all stocks with high 
cumulative returns are defined as winner stocks, and the 10% of all stocks with low 
cumulative returns are defined as loser stocks. Our low-cost momentum strategy then 
buys the L% (L% = 10%, 20%, 50%, 80% and 90%) of winner stocks, sells the L% 
of loser stocks that have the lowest total costs (measured as quoted spread plus 
commission) and holds the long-short portfolio over the next K months (K = 3,6 and 
12 months). We call the ensuing strategy the J-K-L% strategy. The resulting 
combination of ranking periods, holding periods and quoted spreads result in a total 
of 45 low-cost strategies. We conduct here the same analysis as previously and 
analyze the net profits of the 45 low-cost strategies based on full and actual turnover. 
Table 5.7 reports monthly mean returns on the low-cost momentum strategies. 
Irrespective of the weighting on total cost, the winner portfolios uniformly 
outperform the loser portfolios at the I% level. Among the 45 low-cost strategies, the 
12-6-10% strategy is the most profitable with an average return of 2.67% per month 
and the 3-3-10% strategy yields the lowest average return at 1.45% per month. One 
source of concern however is the fact that the resulting low-cost portfolio for L= 
10% might not be well diversified given the low number of stocks that are held on 
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average in the long or short portfolios (9), but this is the price that must be paid for 
adopting a momentum strategy with an acceptable level of trading costs. 
Table 5.8 reports the estimates of annual total trading costs for low-cost momentum 
strategies based on full turnover. The total trading costs are measured as quoted 
spread plus commission, stamp duty of purchases and short selling cost for losers. 
We find that the total trading costs can be substantially reduced from the standard 
relative-strength strategies of Table 5.2 to the low-cost strategies of Table 5.8. The 
conclusion is particularly valid for low values of L (10% and 20%); namely, when 
one shortlists only the most liquid winners and losers. For example, the annual total 
trading costs of the 6-3 strategy drop from 39.92% for the standard momentum 
strategies in Table 5.2 to 11.75% and 13.42% for the 6-3-10% and 6-3-20% low-cost 
strategies in Table 5.8. On average, the annual total trading costs based on quoted 
spread drop by 46% from 23.78% in Table 5.2 to 12.92% in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.9 presents, for each of the 45 low-cost strategies, the mean proportions of 
winner and loser stocks that are retained in the same portfolio in the following 
holding period, along with estimates of total trading costs based, this time, on actual 
turnover. The results show that the lower L, the more likely it is that the constituents 
of the long-short portfolio will change hands from one holding period to the next. 
Across the 9 strategies for which L= 10%, only 5.62% of winner stocks and 8.3 5% 
of loser stocks are retained in the long-short portfolios on average from one holding 
period to the next. When L= 90%, the proportion of retained positions is much 
higher (at 20.77% for winner stocks and 23.97% for loser stocks on average). It 
follows that there might be a trade off between holding fewer stocks and rotating the 
portfolio more often. 
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Table 5.7. Monthly mean returns on low-cost momentum strategies 
The table reports monthly mean return (%) on various low-cost momentum strategies. 
Winner and loser are equally 
-weighted non-overlapping portfolios containing L% (L = 
10,20,50,80 and 90) of winner and loser stocks with the lowest total costs (measured 
as quoted spread plus commission). Momentum is a portfolio that buys the resulting 
winners and short sells the resulting losers. t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance 
is denoted by superscripts at the 1% (a) 5% (b ) and 10% (') levels for a two-sided test. 
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding pe riod of 12 months 
Nber Nber Nber 
stocks Winner Loser Momentum stocks Winner Loser Mom entum stocks Winner Loser Wmentum 
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months 
L= 10% 9 0.07 
-1.38 1.45 9 0.11 -1.77 1.88 9 -0.12 -2.09 1.97 
(0.21) (-2.77) (3.41) (0.30) (-3.07) (3-82) (-0.24) (-3,06) a (3-18) 
L =20% 18 0.09 
-1.42 1.51 17 0.20 -1.66 1.85 16 0.16 -1.79 1.96 
(0.31) (-3.38) (4.71) a (0.58) (-3-51) (5.15) a (0,35) (-3-17) (4.44) 
L =50% 42 0.37 
-1.47 1.84 42 0.43 -1.47 1.89 39 0.15 -1.72 1.87 
(1.33) (-3.97) (7.08) a (1.26) (-3.48) a (6-13) (0-33) (-3-62) (4B) 
L =80% 66 0.39 
-1.51 1.90 65 0.47 -1.50 1.96 61 0.06 -1.61 1.67 
(1.34) (4,03) (7.43) (1.35) (-3.59) a (6-61) (0.14) (-3-39) (4.58) 
L =90% 74 0.33 
-1.48 1.81 74 0.44 -1.53 1.96 69 0.06 -1.66 1.72 
(1.13) (-3,95) a (7,38) a (1.25) (-3.65) (6.79) a (0,12) (-3.50) (4.82) 
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months 
L= 10% 9 0.49 
-1.52 2.02 9 0.46 -1.94 2.40 9 0.01 -2.34 2.35 
(1.64) (-2.91) ' (4,01) a (1.38) (-3.46) , (4.86) (0.03) (-3.47) (3.70) 
L =20% 17 0.47 
-1.49 1.96 17 0.36 -1.68 2.04 16 0.03 -1-68 1.71 
(1.70) ' (-3.55) a (5.33) ' (1.10) (-3.47) a (5.37) a (0.08) (-2.89) (3.58) 
L= 50% 41 0.63 
-1.57 2.20 41 0.54 -1.55 2.10 39 0.14 -1.52 1.66 
(2.20) b (4.25) ' (7.77) a (1.65) (-3.73) a (6.68) (0.33) (-3.14) (4.40) 
L =80% 64 0.62 
-1.63 2.25 64 0.58 -1.59 2.18 61 0,04 -1.51 1.55 
(2.12) b (4.41) a (8.07) a (1.71) ' (-3.80) a (7.05) a (0.10) (-3.12) a (4.26) a 
L= 90% 72 0.60 
-1.64 2.24 72 0.54 -1.62 2.16 68 0.03 -1-58 
1.61 
(2.02) b (4.42) a (8.27) a (1.58) (-3.83) a (7.18) a (0.06) (-3.23) (4.46)l 
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months 
L= 10% 9 0.36 
-1.87 2.23 9 0.53 -2.15 2.67 8 0.01 -2.62 
2.63 
(1.10) (4,01) ' (4.81) ' (1.66) (4,31) a (5.77) ' (0.02) (4.42) (4.76) 
L =20% 16 0.63 
-1.83 2.46 16 0.53 -1.57 2.09 15 0.09 -1-81 
1.90 
(1.95), (4-51) ' (7.01) ' (1.67) (-3.76) a (6.05) a (0.21) (-3.62) (4,38) 
L =50% 39 0.73 
-1-57 2.30 39 0.56 -1.41 1.97 36 0.20 -1-55 
1.75 
(2.52) b (4.39) ' (8.94) ' (1.79) ' (-3.54) , (7.31) ' (0.51) (-3-31) (5.79) 
L =80% 61 0.73 
-1-51 2.24 61 0.61 -1.43 2.04 56 
0.20 
-1-50 1.70 
(2.55) b (4.33) ' (8.92) a (1,90), (-3.55) , (7.81) a (0-51) (-3-16) (5-84) 
L= 90% 68 0.69 
-1.54 2.23 68 0.58 -1.49 2.08 64 
0.11 
-1.53 1.64 
(2.38) b (4.38) a (9.00) a (1.79) ' (-3.65) a (8.04) ' (0.28) (-3.18) (5.57) 
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Table 5.9. Estimates of trading costs based on actual turnover 
- 
results for 
low-cost momentum strategies 
The table reports estimates of annual total trading costs (%) for ý, arious low-cost 
momentum strategies based on actual turnover. Winner and Loser are 
equally-weighted non-overlapping portfolios containing L% (L = 10,20,50,80 and 90) 
of winner and loser stocks with the lowest total costs (measured as quoted spread plus 
commission). When actual turnover is measured, stamp duty on purchases (0.5% per 
purchase) and short selling costs for losers (1.5% per year) are also considered as part 
of trading costs. Momentum is a portfolio that buys the resulting winners and short 
sells the resulting losers. "Portfolio position retained" is the mean ratio of winners and 
losers that remain in the respective portfolios in the following period. 
Holding period of 3 months 
Winner Loser Momentum 
Holding 
Winner 
period of 6 months 
Loser Momentum 
Holding 
Winner 
period of 12 months 
Loser Momentum 
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months 
Portfolio position retained (916) 
L= 10% 3.13 6.91 3.44 4.95 4.34 5.55 
L =20% 4.60 8.27 5.66 7.27 3.91 6.42 
L= 50% 6.72 11.22 6.30 9.68 6.90 8.64 
L= 80% 10.11 15.36 10.88 14.04 10.61 12.57 
L= 90% 11.37 18.14 12.39 16.49 12.26 13-93 
Total trading costs based on actual turnover 
L= 10% 4.63 6.65 11.28 2.36 4.14 6.50 1.21 2.82 4.03 
L= 20% 5.11 7.81 12.92 2.60 4.73 7.34 1.39 3.13 4.52 
L= 50% 7.35 11.37 18.72 3.79 6.62 10.41 2.03 4.01 6.03 
L= 80% 10.28 15.27 25-56 5.39 8.74 14.13 2.90 5.13 8.03 
L= 90% 11.84 17.35 29.19 6.26 9.95 16.21 3.40 5.77 9.17 
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months 
Portfolio position retained (Yo) 
L= 10% 9.29 12.27 3.98 6.51 3.95 6.29 
L= 20% 16.96 18.72 4.89 7.88 4.92 6.82 
L= 50% 20.85 24.47 7.66 15.07 7.47 8.86 
L= 80% 29.84 34.36 11.99 14.32 9.91 11.98 
L= 90% 33.54 38.54 13-55 17.09 10.82 12.69 
Total trading costs based on actual turnover 
L= 10% 4.40 6.38 10.77 2.30 4.15 6.46 1.19 2.82 4.01 
L =20% 4.55 7.05 11.61 2,51 4.70 7.21 1.31 3.09 4.40 
L= 50% 6.26 10.16 16.42 3.56 6.49 10.04 1.90 4.03 5.93 
L= 80% 8.14 12.83 20.97 4.97 8.84 13.81 2.69 5.20 7.89 
L= 90% 9.07 14.25 23.32 5.76 10.05 15.81 3.15 5.83 8.98 
Panel C: Ranking Period of 12 months 
Portfolio position retained (Yo) 
L= 10% 12.64 18.12 5.58 10.16 4.20 4.37 
L =20% 19.18 25.52 10.05 13.14 
3.89 11.25 
L= 50% 31.14 34.01 19.19 17.93 7.02 7.59 
L= 80% 43.62 46.31 29.02 28.59 13.20 11.70 
L= 90% 48.59 51.74 32.15 33.81 12.23 13.31 
Total trading costs based on actual turnover 
L= 10% 4.22 5.89 10.10 2.25 3.95 6.20 1.14 2.82 
3.96 
L =20% 4.36 6.59 10.94 2.38 4.53 6.91 
1.25 3.03 4.28 
L= 50% 5.35 9.23 14.58 3.14 6.34 9.48 1.71 4.09 
5.79 
L= 80% 6.57 11.19 17.76 4.14 8.09 12-24 2.31 5.22 
7.52 
L= 90% 7.07 12.23 19.30 4.67 9.07 13.74 2.64 5.89 
8.53 
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In Table 5.4, we noted that the 12-3 rel ative- strength strategy involves the least 
trading activity since it retains the highest proportions of winners and losers from one 
holding period to the next. Table 5.9 presents the same conclusion. For example, 
31.14% (34.01%) of the time, the winners (losers) of the 12-3-50% strategy Nvill 
remain in the winner (loser) portfolio in the following holding period. This suggests 
that based on full turnover implementing the 12-3-50% low-cost strategy can save 
over 30% of the costs involved on the purchase and sale of winners and losers. As a 
result, the total trading costs based on actual turnover of the 12-3 strategy drop from 
19.27% for the standard momentum strategy in Table 5.4 to 10.10% and 10.94% in 
Table 5.9 for the 12-3-10% and 12-3-20% low-cost strategies, respectively. Overall, 
based on actual turnover, the low-cost momentum strategies that select 10% or 20% 
of winner and loser stocks with the lowest transaction costs are much less expensive 
than the standard momentum strategies of Table 5.4. Across the 9 J-K strategies the 
average yearly trading cost for L= 10% is only 7.04% versus 7.79% for L= 20% and 
17.80% for L= 100% (in Table 5.4). So our low-cost strategies can reduce the total 
trading costs of standard momentum strategies by up to 60%. 
Table 5.10 reports the net annual returns on low-cost relative-strength strategies once 
total trading costs based on full and actual turnovers are taken into account. While 
none of the standard momentum strategies generate positive net returns at the 5% 
level in Table 5.5, Table 5.10 shows that based on full turnover, 18 out of 45 
low-cost strategies offer positive and significant net returns at the 5% level. When 
actual turnover is considered instead, 22 low-cost strategies have positive and 
significant net returns at the 5% level. The 12-12-10% low-cost strategy happens to 
be the most profitable (27.66% net annual return based on actual turnover, t-statistics 
of 4.16). The 3-3-90% strategy is the least profitable (average annual net return of 
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-7.48% based on actual turnover, t-statistic of 
- 
1.49). The performance of the 
strategies that shortlist the most liquid 10% and 20% xinner and loser stocks is 
particularly noticeable. Based on actual turnover, the strategies with L= 10% and L 
= 
20% generate average net returns of 19.10% and 15.53%, respectively. 
Risk-adjusted returns of low-cost momentum strategies 
Table 5.11 reports OLS estimates of the CAPM and Fama and French (FFM) models 
for the net monthly momentum returns on low-cost momentum strategies. Based on 
full turnover, 22 out of 45 alpha coefficients estimated from the CAPM and 30 out of 
45 alpha coefficients estimated from the FFM are positive and significant at the 5% 
level. Based on actual turnover, 28 and 35 low-cost strategies have positive and 
significant alpha coefficients at the 5% level for the CAPM and the FFM, 
respectively. Consistent with the results in Table 5.10, the 12-12-10% low-cost 
momentum strategy generates the highest net abnormal return of 2.57% per month 
for the CAPM and 2.62% per month for the FFM (based on actual turnover). The 
3-3-90% low-cost momentum strategy yields the lowest net abnormal return of 
-0.52% per month for the CAPM and -0.41% per month for the FFM (based on 
actual turnover). On average, the strategies with L= 10% generate net abnormal 
return of 1.60% from the CAPM and 1.69% from the FFM, which are in line with 
monthly net raw return of 1.5 9% reported in Table 5.10. The strategies with L= 20% 
earn average monthly net abnormal return of 1.33% from the CAPM and 1.45% from 
the FFM, which are similar to the monthly net raw return of 1.29% in Table 5.10. In 
summary, after taking account of market risk and Fama and French three risk factors, 
low-cost momentum strategies with L= 10% and L= 20% still can produce positive 
and significant net abnormal returns based on both full and actual turnovers. 
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Table 5.10. Estimates of net returns on low-cost momentum strategies 
The table reports annual average net returns (%) on low-cost momentum strategies 
based on full and actual turnovers. The low-cost momentum strategy buý-s the L% of 
winners and short sells the L% of losers with the lowest total costs (measured as 
quoted spread plus commission). When actual turnover is measured, stamp duty on 
purchases (0.5% per purchase) and short selling costs for losers (1.5% per ý-ear) are 
also considered as part of trading costs. t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance is 
denoted by superscripts at the I% (a), 5% (b ) and 10% (c) levels for a two-sided test. 
Holding period of 3 Holding period of 6 Holding period of 12 
months months months 
Turnover Full Actual Full Actual Full Actual 
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months 
L = 10% 5.64 6.11 15.87 16.01 19.49 19.59 
(0.56) (0.65) (2.9 3) a (2.96) a (1.34) (1.35) 
L =20% 4.56 5.26 14.65 14.91 18.83 18.96 
(0.76) (0.90) (2.7 9) a (2.83) a (1.63) (1.64) 
L = 50% 1.89 3.32 11.85 12.31 16.15 16.40 
(0.64) (0.94) (2.18) b (2.26) b (1.27) (1.30) 
L =80% 
-5.58 -2.75 8.48 9.45 11.55 12.06 
(-1.05) (-0.39) (1.83) (2.01 b (0.94) (0.98) 
L =90% 
-11.32 -7.48 6.05 7.36 10.80 11.46 
(-2.40) b (-1.49) (1.44) (1.69) (0.93) (0.99) 
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months 
L = 10% 12.45 13.43 22.19 22.37 24.09 24.20 
(1.59) (1.75) (4.2 8) a (4.32) a (2.51 b (2.52) b 
L =20% 10.10 11.92 17.06 17.32 16.01 16.15 
(1.90) c (2.2 5) b (3.4 9) a (3.54) a (1.93) c (1.95) c 
L = 50% 6.49 9.93 14.48 15.15 13.78 14.04 
(1.99) b (2.76) a (3.31) a (3.4 5) a (1.17) (1.19) 
L =80% 
-0.73 6.08 11.30 12.30 
10.29 10.77 
(-0.18) (1.74) c (2.4 8) b (2.69) a (0.76) (0.80) 
L =90% 
-5.28 3.56 8.78 10.14 
9.72 10.30 
(-0.93) (1.09) (1.88) c (2.16) b (0.72) (0.78) 
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months 
L = 10% 15.29 16.66 25.62 25.89 27.57 27.66 
(2.90) a (3.10) a (3.3 5) a (3.38) a (4.15) a (4.16) a 
L =20% 16.29 18.59 17.74 18.19 18.30 
18.50 
(3.64) a (4.08) a (3.56) a (3.64) a (3.14) a (3.18) a 
L =50% 8.24 13.03 13.22 14.18 14.96 
15.18 
(2.01) b (2.91) a (2.53) b (2.68) a (2.34) b (2.38) b 
L =80% 
-0.02 9.13 10.20 
12.26 12.38 12.87 
(0.37) (1.95) ' (1.77) c (2 
. 
09) b (1.69) (1.75) 
L = 90% 
-4.37 7.43 8.42 
11.16 10.55 11.14 
(-0.39) (1.61) (1.50) (1.94) (1.49) (1.57) 
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5.7. Conclusions 
The chapter examines the profitability of momentum strategies in the UK. taking into 
account the transactions costs involved in executing the required trades. We 
corroborate, for nine momentum strategies in the UK, the conclusions of Lesmond, 
Schill and Zhou (2004) for the 6-6 momentum strategy in the US. In particular, we 
find that the losers are more oriented towards stocks with lower market capitalization, 
lower price and lower trading volume than the winners and, thus, have higher total 
costs. An average round-trip quoted spread equals 2.21% for the winners and 3.76% 
for the losers. Based on effective spreads, round-trip transaction costs are only 
marginally smaller (1.90% for winners and 3.72% for losers). Once commissions, 
short selling costs and stamp duties are added, the average round-trip transaction cost 
based on the quoted spread rises to 3.77% for the winners and 6.71% for the losers. 
These estimates are far from the 2% round-trip cost reported in the early momentum 
literature which severely underestimated the actual cost of trading both the losers and 
winners in the UK. Net of these costs based on full or actual turnover, the 
profitability of relative- strength strategies proves to be an illusion. 
Aside from providing confirmatory evidence for a range of momentum portfolios for 
the UK, we add our own contribution to the Lesmond, Schill. and Zhou (2004) study 
in two ways. First, '%ve investigate the reasons for the observed asymmetric pattern in 
trading costs between the winners and losers by splitting each round-trip trade into a 
buyer-initiated trade and a seller-initiated trade. While the trading costs of 
buyer-initiated trades are almost the same for the winners and losers, the trading 
costs of se I ler- initiated trades are asymmetric. On average, selling losers costs 2.3 
times as much as closing a position in winners. This suggests that the asymmetry in 
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trading costs between the winners and losers critically relates to the higher costs of 
selling the latter. We also relate the costs of buyer- and seller- initiated trades to the 
size and trading volume of the winners and losers. We find that the asymmetry in 
trading costs between the winners and losers is due to the higher cost of selling small 
capitalization loser stocks with low trading volumes. We note also that while size 
critically impacts the cost of selling the winners and losers, it does not affect the cost 
of buying them. Finally, for both the winners and losers, trading volume relates 
positively to the cost of buyer-initiated trades and negatively to the cost of 
seller-initiated trades. 
Second, we derive and test the profitability, net of transaction costs, of so-called 
low-cost momentum strategies that select winner and loser stocks with the lowest 
total transaction costs. Interestingly, we conclude that, although standard momentum 
strategies are not profitable net of transaction costs, 22 out of 45 low-cost strategies 
produce, based on actual turnover, positive and significant net average returns. For 
example, the strategies that shortlist the 10%, 20% and 50% of winner and loser 
stocks with the lowest total transaction costs generate average net returns of 19.10%, 
15.53% and 12.61%, respectively. Even after considering risk, low-cost momentum 
strategies with L= 10% and L= 20% still can earn positive and significant net 
abnonnal returns based on both full and actual turnovers. 
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Chapter 6. Summary and Future Research 
6.1. Summary 
Momentum and value strategies are among the most controversial topics in financial 
literature. The evidence of momentum profits and the value premium has attracted a 
lot of attention by finance researchers since they strongly challenge both the EMH 
and the traditional CAPM. The explanations for these anomalies have been subject to 
considerable debate. Rational expectations argue that the profits are a compensation 
for risk and transaction costs, while behavioural economists interpret the profits as 
arising ecause investors make mistakes in the way they process information. 
This study first examines momentum profits and the value premium by assuming that 
the variance of portfolio returns follows a GARCH process. The rationale for using 
the CAPM with a GARCH(l, l)-M specification is that the model allows for the 
impact of conditional information on the expected stock return caused by 
heteroskedasticity. Additionally, this model is able to capture the impact of 
time-varying idiosyncratic risk on the winner, loser, value and growth portfolios 
through time-varying total risk. These portfolios are sorted either by past 
performance or by book to market equity of stocks. Each portfolio has its own 
specific characteristics. Therefore, idiosyncratic risk, driven by these characteristics, 
may be a potential explanatory variable for the profits of momentum and value 
strategies. 
Chapter 3 investigates whether momentum profits in the UK are a compensation for 
time-varying idiosyncratic risk. It shows that the CAPM and the FFM Nvith a 
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GJR-GARCH-M specification can fully capture momentum profits. Thus. 
momentum profits are a compensation for exposure to time-varying idiosyncratic 
risk. Interestingly, both the GJR-GARCH(l, l) and the GARCH(1,1)-%1 
specifications fail to account for the performance of momentum strategies. The 
profitability of momentum portfolios is explained by a combination of the 
time-varying risk premium and the asymmetric impact of good and bad news on the 
volatility of the momentum returns. 
Chapter 3 also reveals that the impact of recent news on the volatility of the winners 
is more than it is on the volatility of the losers. Vice versa, the impact of distant news 
on the volatility of the losers is more than it is on the volatility of the winners. In 
addition, the volatility of the losers shows a higher level of persistence than that of 
the winners. Our results are consistent with the findings of Hong, Lim and Stein 
(2000) that for finns with no or low analysts coverage, bad news travels slower than 
good news and thus, the volatility of the losers may respond more slowly to news 
than that of the winners as the losers are more likely to disclose bad news and the 
winners are more likely to receive good news. We conjecture that the time-varying 
risk of companies with no or low analyst coverage depends on the nature of the 
information that has been disclosed: Good news is disclosed earlier, and impacts on 
volatility sooner, than bad news. Relative to the volatility of the winners, that of the 
losers also clearly shows a more asymmetric response to good and bad news. 
Negative return shocks increase the volatility of the losers more than they increase 
that of the winners. 
Chapter 4 follows the same methodology used in Chapter 3 and investigates the 
relationship between time-varying idiosyncratic risk and the US post- 1963 value 
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premium t ough the conditional model with GARCH-M specifications. The results 
are in line with the findings in Chapter 3. That is the value premium can be fullY 
captured by these specifications and the premium is a compensation for time-varý-ing 
idiosyncratic risk. These findings are robust to different value and growth stocks 
defined by BA4, C/P and E/P ratios, and to the countries under view (US and UK). 
Chapter 4 also finds that after taking account of total time-varying risk, the value 
portfolio does not have a higher market risk than the growth portfolio, although the 
market beta still has a strong explanatory power on the returns of the individual value 
and growth portfolio. This appears to support the findings of previous studies (see, 
for example, Jagannathan and Wang, 1996; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001 and Adrian 
and Franzoni, 2005) that the conditional CAPM with time-varying beta performs 
well in explaining cross-sectional expected returns. On the other hand, the results 
show that the market betas are negative or insignificant for the momentum and HML 
portfolios. Therefore, Lewellen and Nagel (2006), Fama and French (2006) and 
Petkova and Zhang (2005) report that even after allowing betas to vary over time, the 
CAPM still fails to explain asset-pricing anomalies. The results in Chapter 4 are in 
support of the idea that the ability of time-varying total risk, in explaining the value 
premium, derives from the fact that it captures the time-varying idiosyncratic risk in 
the value and growth portfolios. 
Fama and French (1996) conjectured that the value premium is priced as a risk factor 
because it is related to investment opportunities, a suggestion that is given credence 
empirically by Hahn and Lee (2006) and Petkova (2006) using financial variables 
that can capture such opportunities. The primary finding in this chapter, that the 
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value premium is highly positively correlated with its time-varying volatility, is also 
consistent with this notion. 
Chapter 5 examines the impact of trading costs on the profitability of momentum 
strategies through 9 combinations of ranking and holding periods in the UK. It shows 
that the losers consist mainly of stocks with low capitalization, low price and low 
trading volume in relation to the winners. Therefore, the average round-trip quoted 
spreads for the losers are much higher than those of the winners, which are 
underestimated by the previous momentum studies. The magnitude of trading costs 
can substantially reduce the net profits of momentum strategies. After taking account 
of total trading costs, momentum profit opportunities do not exist based on full 
turnover. Even with adjusted down trading costs based on actual tUrnover, 
momentum strategies still cannot produce positive net average returns at the 5% 
significant level. This chapter also analyzes the relationship between transaction 
costs on buyer- and seller-initiated trades and the market capitalization and trading 
volume of the winners and losers. The results reveal that both the market 
capitalization and trading volume of the winners and losers are negatively related to 
the cost of sel ler- initiated trades. Therefore, the relatively high trading costs of the 
losers are mainly driven by the high selling costs on small stocks with low trading 
volume. 
Chapter 5 proposes a low-cost momentum strategy, which buys and sells the L% 
(L=10,20,50,80,90) of winner and loser stocks with the lowest total trading costs. 
The results show that based on actual turnover, 22 out of 45 low-cost momentum 
strategies can generate positive and significant net average returns. In particular, 
low-cost strategies, that trade on the 10% and 20% winner and loser stocks with the 
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lowest total transaction costs, yield positive and significant net annual average 
returns of 19.10% and 15.53%, respectively. 
6.2. Future Research 
An increasing body of literature finds that idiosyncratic risk may be priced if 
investors do not hold a well-diversified portfolio (see, for example, Levy, 1978; 
Merton, 1987; Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003 and Malkiel and Xu, 2001). Chapters 3 
and 4 provide substantial evidence of the importance of time-varying idiosyncratic 
ris n explaining momentum profits and the value premium. This idea could also be 
applied to on the cross-section of expected returns. Size and B/M sorted portfolios 
consist of stocks that are highly correlated with each other. As a result, some 
idiosyncratic risks in these portfolios cannot be diversified away. 
To examine the relationship between the cross-section of expected returns and 
time-varying idiosyncratic risk, one would use the Fama and French (1992) 100 
value-weighted size and B/M sorted portfolios. Following the methodology 
employed in Chapters 3 and 4, one could assume that the variance of the 
cross-section of expected returns follows a GARCH-M process and examine whether 
these returns can be explained by time-varying idiosyncratic risk through a 
conditional model. More precisely the idea would then be to use the two-step 
methodology of Fama and McBeth (1973) in an attempt to find out if time-varying 
idiosyncratic risk is priced. Within this framework, one could also test whether size 
and B/M are still sources of priced risk once idiosyncratic risk is taken into account. 
Another topic that attracts our attention is the relationship between industrý, 
momentum and time-varying idiosyncratic risk. Several studies report the existence 
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of industry momentum, which is captured by investing in past wInning industry 
portfolios and selling past losing industry portfolios. This strategy can be highly 
profitable (see, for example, Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Grundy and Martin,, 
2001 and Chordia and Shivakurnar, 2002). Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) show 
that the performances of stocks within the same industry are more strongly positively 
correlated than stocks across industries. Therefore, industry portfolios are not 
perfectly diversified and time-varying idiosyncratic risk may contribute to industry 
momentum. 
Chapter 3 shows that momentum profits can be fully captured by the conditional 
variance model without resorting to transactions costs and illiquidity issues that are 
the focus of Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) or Sadka (2006). Sadka (2006) finds 
that the persistence of momentum profits can be partially attributed to compensation 
for liquidity risk. In Chapter 5, the magnitude of trading costs is found to play an 
important role in assessing the net profits of momentum strategies. It would be 
interesting in future research to explore whether momentum profits can be explained 
by liquidity risk. Following Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyarn (2000), research could 
use the trading costs and trading volume of stocks as proxies for liquidity and form 
liquidity mimicking portfolios to examine the impact of liquidity risk on the 
profitability of momentum strategies. 
Chan and Lakonishock (1993 and 1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1997) report 
substantially variation in trading costs between different investment styles. In 
particular, investors who trade in value stocks have lower trading costs than those 
who trade in growth stocks. However, the results in Chapter 5 show that trading costs 
are high for stocks with small size, low price and low trading volume. Chen and 
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Zhang (1998) report that value stocks have characteristics of small size and low price. 
Therefore, we conjecture that value stocks may have higher trading costs than growth 
stocks. This is in conflict with the findings of existing studies and is an interesting 
area for future research. 
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Appendix I 
Barclays Stockbrokers Company Dealing Account 
- 
Rates & Chargesfth 
Commission Charges 
Commission is charged per deal. Other charges and service restrictions may apply. 
Online Commission 
- 
All investment types except non-IRS foreign securities, unit trusts and OEICs. 
Deals per calendar month Commission 
1-5 F-I 2 
6-10 E7.50 
11 and above F-6.95 
Telephone Comn-tission 
- 
All investment types except non-IRS foreign securities, bonds, unit trusts and 
OEICs. 
Deal value Commission 
Eo 
- 
E1,000 El 7.50 
E1,001 
- 
E2,000 E24 
E2,001 
- 
f-4,000 E36 
E4,001 
- 
E20,000 F-54 
Over E20,000 E75 
Commission will be negotiable on large size telephone deals (typically in excess of E100,000) for all Company 
Dealing Accounts opened after 30 January 2008. 
The initial commission rate you pay in each quarter is determined by the number of deals you place in previous 
calendar quarters. Each time you hit a new tier, you will be switched to the lower commission rates with 
immediate effect. In order to remain at the new tier you must maintain the required number of deals per quarter. 
The calendar quarlters run from January to March, April to June., July to September and October to December. 
The number of telephone and online deals you place are consolidated when calculating your deal count, but 
each method has its own commission rates, 
Non-IRS Foreign Securities (telephone dealing only) 
Deal value 
First E 10,000 1.75% 
Next El 0,000 1,125% 
Next E20,000 0.50% 
Next E60,000 OA0% 
197 
Thereafter 0,30% 
Minimum for US shares E45 
Minimum for non-US shares F-1 00 
Automatic Dividend Reinvestment 
Automatic dividend reinvestment purchases are charged at a flat rate commission of 1.0% (minimum El, 
maximum E7.50). 
Funds 
The initial charge for buying funds through Funds Market is 1.5%. Other funds vary according to the fund 
manager. 
There is no charge for selling Funds Market funds but there is a El 5 charge per deal on the sale of non-Funds 
Market funds. 
Taxes & Levies 
Stamp duty or stamp duty reserve tax (SDRT) on all UK equity purchases is payable at the prevailing rate at the 
time of dealing. 
The current rates are: 
0.5% SDRT on all UK equity purchases settled through CREST, rounded up to the nearest lp 0.5% stamp duty 
on all UK equity purchases not settled through CREST, rounded up to the nearest E5 
Stamp duty on Irish registered stock is currently charged at 1% 
The Panel of Takeovers and Mergers currently levy! El on all UK equity transactions of E10,000 and over 
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